ESSAYS

AND

TREATISES

ON

SEVERAL SUBJECTS.

By DAVID HUME, Esq;

IN FOUR VOLUMES.

VOL. I.

CONTAINING

ESSAYS, MORAL and POLITICAL.

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ERRATA.

Page 6, Line 2, read *fit to supply*
Page 174, Line 10 of the Note for *sovereign*, read *foreign*
Page 300, Line 6, for *bid* read *stand*.

ESSAY

ESSAY I.

Of the DELICACY *of* TASTE *and* PASSION.

SOME People are ſubject to a certain *delicacy* of *paſſion*, which makes them extremely ſenſible to all the accidents of life, and gives them a lively joy upon every proſperous event, as well as a piercing grief, when they meet with croſſes and adverſity. Favours and good offices eaſily engage their friendſhip; while the ſmalleſt injury provokes their reſentment. Any honour or mark of diſtinction elevates them above meaſure; but they are as ſenſibly touch'd with contempt. People of this character have, no doubt, much more lively enjoyments, as well as more pungent ſorrows, than men of cool and ſedate tempers: But, I believe, when every thing is balanc'd, there is no one, who would not rather chuſe to be of the latter character, were he entirely maſter of his own diſpoſition. Good or ill fortune is very little at our own diſpoſal: And when a perſon, that has this ſenſibility of temper, meets with any misfortune, his ſorrow or reſentment takes intire poſſeſſion of him, and deprives him of all reliſh in the common oc-

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currences of life; the right enjoyment of which forms the greateſt part of our happineſs. Great pleaſures are much leſs frequent than great pains; ſo that a ſenſible temper muſt meet with fewer trials in the former way than in the latter. Not to mention, that men of ſuch lively paſſions are apt to be tranſported beyond all bounds of prudence and diſcretion, and to take falſe ſteps in the conduct of life, which are often irretrievable.

THERE is a *delicacy* of *taſte* obſervable in ſome men, which very much reſembles this *delicacy* of *paſſion*, and produces the ſame ſenſibility to beauty and deformity of every kind, as that does to proſperity and adverſity, obligations and injuries. When you preſent a poem or a picture to a man poſſeſs'd of this talent, the delicacy of his feeling, makes him be touch'd very ſenſibly with every part of it; nor are the maſterly ſtrokes perceiv'd with more exquiſite reliſh and ſatisfaction, than the negligences or abſurdities with diſguſt and uneaſineſs. A polite and judicious converſation affords him the higheſt entertainment; rudeneſs or impertinence is as great a puniſhment to him. In ſhort, delicacy of taſte has the ſame effect as delicacy of paſſion: it enlarges the ſphere both of our happineſs and miſery, and makes us ſenſible to pains as well as pleaſures, which eſcape the reſt of mankind.

BELIEVE, however, there is no one, who wi[illegible] not agree with me, that notwithſtanding this r[illegible] ſemblanc

ſemblance, a delicacy of taſte is as much to be deſir'd and cultivated as a delicacy of paſſion is to be lamented, and to be remedy'd, if poſſible. The good or ill accidents of life are very little at our diſpoſal; but we are pretty much maſters what books we ſhall read, what diverſions we ſhall partake of, and what company we ſhall keep. Philoſophers have endeavour'd to render happineſs entirely independent of every thing external. That is impoſſible to be *attain'd*: But every wiſe man will endeavour to place his happineſs on ſuch objects as depend moſt upon himſelf: and *that* is not to be *attain'd* ſo much by any other means as by this delicacy of ſentiment. When a man is poſſeſs'd of that talent, he is more happy by what pleaſes his taſte, than by what gratifies his appetites, and receives more enjoyment from a poem or a piece of reaſoning than the moſt expenſive luxury can afford.

How far delicacy of taſte, and that of paſſion, are connected together in the original frame of the mind, it is hard to determine. To me there appears to be a very conſiderable connexion betwixt them. For we may obſerve that women, who have more delicate paſſions than men, have alſo a more delicate taſte of the ornaments of life, of dreſs, equipage, and the ordinary decencies of behaviour. Any excellency in theſe hits their taſte much ſooner than ours; and when you pleaſe their taſte, you ſoon engage their affections.

But whatever connection there may be originally betwixt these dispositions, I am persuaded, that nothing is so proper to cure us of this delicacy of passion, as the cultivating of that higher and more refined taste, which enables us to judge of the characters of men, of compositions of genius, and of the productions of the nobler arts. A greater or less relish of those obvious beauties which strike the senses, depends entirely upon the greater or less sensibility of the temper: But, with regard to the sciences and liberal arts, a fine taste is really nothing but strong sense, or at least depends so much upon it, that they are inseparable. To judge aright of a composition of genius, there are so many views to be taken in, so many circumstances to be compared, and such a knowledge of human nature requisite, that no man, who is not possess'd of the soundest judgment, will ever make a tolerable critic in such performances. And this is a new reason for cultivating a relish in the liberal arts. Our judgment will strengthen by this exercise: We shall form truer notions of life: Many things, which please or afflict others, will appear to us too frivolous to engage our attention: And we shall lose by degrees that sensibility and delicacy of passion, which is so incommodious.

But perhaps I have gone too far in saying, That a cultivated taste for the polite arts extinguishes the passions, and renders us indifferent to those objects which are so fondly pursu'd by the rest of mankind. When I reflect a little more, I find, that it rather

rather improves our sensibility for all the tender and agreeable passions; at the same time that it renders the mind incapable of the rougher and more boisterous emotions.

Ingenuas didicisse fideliter artes,
Emollit mores, nec sinit esse feros.

FOR this, I think there may be assigned two very natural reasons. In the *first* place, nothing is so improving to the temper as the study of the beauties, either of poetry, eloquence, musick, or painting. They give a certain elegance of sentiment, which the rest of mankind are entire strangers to. The emotions they excite are soft and tender. They draw the mind off from the hurry of business and interest; cherish reflection; dispose to tranquillity; and produce an agreeable melancholy, which, of all dispositions of the mind, is the best suited to love and friendship.

IN the *second* place, a delicacy of taste is favourable to love and friendship, by confining our choice to few people, and making us indifferent to the company and conversation of the greatest part of men. You will very seldom find, that mere men of the world, whatever strong sense they may be endow'd with, are very nice in distinguishing of characters, or in marking those insensible differences and gradations which make one man preferable to another. Any one, that has competent sense, is sufficient for their entertainment: They talk to him, of their pleasure and affairs, with the same frankness as

they would to any other; and finding many, who are fit ſupply his place, they never feel any vacancy or want in his abſence. But to make uſe of the alluſion of a famous * *French* author, the judgment may be compared to a clock or watch, where the moſt ordinary machine is ſufficient to tell the hours; but the moſt elaborate and artificial can only point out the minutes and ſeconds, and diſtinguiſh the ſmalleſt differences of time. One that has well digeſted his knowledge both of books and men, has little enjoyment but in the company of a few ſelect companions. He feels too ſenſibly, how much all the reſt of mankind fall ſhort of the notions which he has entertain'd. And, his affections being thus confin'd within a narrow circle, no wonder he carries them further than if they were more general and undiſtinguiſh'd. The gaiety and frolic of a bottle-companion improves with him into a ſolid friendſhip: And the ardours of a youthful appetite become an elegant paſſion.

* *Monſ.* Fontenelle, *Pluralité des Mondes.* Soir 6.

ESSAY II.

Of the LIBERTY *of the* PRESS.

THERE is nothing more apt to surprise a foreigner, than the extreme liberty, which we enjoy in this country, of communicating whatever we please to the public, and of openly censuring every measure, enter'd into by the King or his ministers. If the administration resolve upon war, 'tis affirm'd, that either wilfully or ignorantly they mistake the interest of the nation, and that peace, in the present situation of affairs, is infinitely preferable. If the passion of the ministers lie towards peace, our political writers breathe nothing but war and devastation, and represent the pacific conduct of the goverment as mean and pusillanimous. As this liberty is not indulg'd in any other government, either republican or monarchical; in *Holland* and *Venice*, no more than in *France* or *Spain*; it may very naturally give occasion to these two questions, *How it happens that* Great-Britain *enjoys such a peculiar privilege?* and, *Whether the unlimited exercise of this liberty be advantageous or prejudicial to the public?*

As to the first question, Why the laws indulge us in such an extraordinary liberty? I believe the

reaſon may be deriv'd from our mix'd form of government, which is neither wholly monarchical, nor wholly republican. 'Twill be found, if I miſtake not, a true obſervation in politics, that the two extremes in government, of liberty and ſlavery, commonly approach neareſt to each other; and that as you depart from the extremes, and mix a little of monarchy with liberty, the government becomes always the more free; and on the other hand, when you mix a little of liberty with monarchy, the yoke becomes always the more grievous and intolerable. I ſhall endeavour to explain myſelf. In a government, ſuch as that of *France*, which is entirely abſolute, and where laws, cuſtom, and religion concur, all of them, to make the people fully ſatisfied with their condition, the monarch cannot entertain the leaſt *jealouſy* againſt his ſubjects, and therefore is apt to indulge them in great *liberties* both of ſpeech and action. In a government altogether republican, ſuch as that of *Holland*, where there is no magiſtrate ſo eminent as to give *jealouſy* to the ſtate, there is alſo no danger in intruſting the magiſtrates with very large diſcretionary powers; and tho' many advantages reſult from ſuch powers, in the preſervation of peace and order; yet they lay a conſiderable reſtraint on men's actions, and make every private ſubject pay a great reſpect to the government. Thus it ſeems evident, that the two extremes, of abſolute monarchy and of a republic, approach very near to each other in the moſt material circumſtances. In the *firſt*, the magiſtrate has no jealouſy of the people: In the *ſecond*, the people have no jealouſy of the magiſtrate:

giſtrate: Which want of jealouſy begets a mutual confidence and truſt in both caſes, and produces a ſpecies of liberty in monarchies, and of arbitrary power in republics.

To juſtify the other part of the foregoing obſervation, that in every government the means are moſt wide of each other, and that the mixtures of monarchy and liberty render the yoke either more eaſy or more grievous; I muſt take notice of a remark of *Tacitus* with regard to the *Romans* under the emperors, that they neither could bear total ſlavery nor total liberty, *Nec totam ſervitutem, nec totam libertatem pati poſſunt.* This remark a famous poet has tranſlated and applied to the *Engliſh*, in his admirable deſcription of queen *Elizabeth*'s policy and government.

Et ſit aimer ſon joug a l'Anglois indompté,
Qui ne peut ni ſervir, ni vivre en liberté.

HENRIADE, *Liv.* I.

ACCORDING to theſe remarks, we are to conſider the *Roman* government under the emperors as a mixture of deſpotiſm and liberty, where the deſpotiſm prevail'd; and the *Engliſh* government as a mixture of the ſame kind, but where the liberty predominates. The conſequences are exactly conformable to the foregoing obſervation; and ſuch as may be expected from thoſe mixed forms of government, which beget a mutual watchfulneſs and jealouſy. The *Roman* emperors were, many of

them, the moſt frightful tyrants that ever diſgrac'd human nature; and 'tis evident their cruelty was chiefly excited by their *jealouſy*, and by their obſerving, that all the great men of *Rome* bore with impatience the dominion of a family, which, but a little before, was no ways ſuperior to their own. On the other hand, as the republican part of the government prevails in *England*, though with a great mixture of monarchy, 'tis oblig'd, for its own preſervation, to maintain a watchful *jealouſy* over the magiſtrates, to remove all diſcretionary powers, and to ſecure every one's life and fortune by general and inflexible laws. No action muſt be deem'd a crime but what the law has plainly determin'd to be ſuch: No crime muſt be imputed to a man but from a legal proof before his judges; and even theſe judges muſt be his fellow-ſubjects, who are oblig'd, by their own intereſt, to have a watchful eye over the encroachments and violence of the miniſters. From theſe cauſes it proceeds, that there is as much liberty, and even, perhaps, licentiouſneſs in *Britain*, as there were formerly ſlavery and tyranny in *Rome*.

THESE principles account for the great liberty of the preſs in theſe kingdoms, beyond what is indulg'd in any other government. 'Tis ſufficiently known, that deſpotic power would ſteal in upon us, were we not extremely watchful to prevent its progreſs, and were there not an eaſy method of conveying the alarum from one end of the kingdom to the other. The ſpirit of the people muſt frequently be rouz'd *to curb* the ambition of the court; and the dread

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of rouzing this ſpirit, muſt be employ'd to prevent that ambition, Nothing ſo effectual to this purpoſe as the liberty of the preſs, by which all the learning, wit and genius of the nation may be employ'd on the ſide of liberty, and every one be animated to its defence. As long, therefore, as the republican part of our government can maintain itſelf againſt the monarchical, it muſt be extremely jealous of the liberty of the preſs, as of the utmoſt importance to its preſervation.

SINCE therefore the liberty of the preſs is ſo eſſential to the ſupport of our mix'd government; this ſufficiently decides the ſecond queſtion, *Whether this liberty be advantageous or prejudicial*; there being nothing of greater importance in every ſtate than the preſervation of the ancient government, eſpecially if it be a free one. But I would fain go a ſtep farther, and aſſert, that ſuch a liberty is attended with ſo few inconveniencies, that it may be claim'd as the common right of mankind, and ought to be indulg'd them almoſt in every government; except the eccleſiaſtical, to which indeed it would be fatal. We need not dread from this liberty any ſuch ill conſequences as follow'd from the harangues of the popular demagogues of *Athens* and tribunes of *Rome*. A man reads a book or pamphlet alone and coolly. There is none preſent from whom he can catch the paſſion by contagion. He is not hurry'd away by the force and energy of action. And ſhould he be wrought up to never ſo ſeditious a humour, there is no violent reſolution pre-

ſented to him, by which he can immediately vent his paſſion. The liberty of the preſs, therefore, however abus'd, can ſcarce ever excite popular tumults or rebellion. And as to thoſe murmurs or ſecret diſcontents it may occaſion, 'tis better they ſhould get vent in words, that they may come to the knowledge of the magiſtrate before it be too late, in order to his providing a remedy againſt them. Mankind, 'tis true, have always a greater propenſion to believe what is ſaid to the diſadvantage of their governors, than the contrary; but this inclination is inſeparable from them, whether they have liberty or not. A whiſper may fly as quick, and be as pernicious as a pamphlet. Nay, it will be more pernicious, where men are not accuſtom'd to think freely, or diſtinguiſh betwixt truth and falſhood.

It has alſo been found, as the experience of mankind increaſes, that the *people* are no ſuch dangerous monſter as they have been repreſented, and that 'tis in every reſpect better to guide them, like rational creatures, than to lead or drive them, like brute beaſts. Before the United Provinces ſet the example, toleration was deem'd incompatible with good government; and 'twas thought impoſſible, that a number of religious ſects could live together in harmony and peace, and have all of them an equal affection to their common country, and to each other. *England* has ſet a like example of civil liberty; and tho' this liberty ſeems to occaſion ſome ſmall ferment at preſent, it has not as yet produc'd any pernicious effects; and it is to be hop'd, that

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men, being every day more accuſtom'd to the free diſcuſſion of public affairs, will improve in their judgment of them, and be with greater difficulty ſeduc'd by every idle rumour and popular clamour.

'Tis a very comfortable reflection to the lovers of liberty, that this peculiar privilege of *Britain* is of a kind that cannot eaſily be wreſted from us, but muſt laſt as long as our government remains, in any degree, free and independent. 'Tis ſeldom, that liberty of any kind is loſt all at once. Slavery has ſo frightful an aſpect to men accuſtom'd to freedom, that it muſt ſteal in upon them by degrees, and muſt diſguiſe itſelf in a thouſand ſhapes, in order to be receiv'd. But, if the liberty of the preſs ever be loſt, it muſt be loſt at once. The general laws againſt ſedition and libelling are at preſent as ſtrong as they poſſibly can be made. Nothing can impoſe a farther reſtraint, but either the clapping an IMPRIMATUR upon the preſs, or the giving to the court very large diſcretionary powers to puniſh whatever diſpleaſes them. But theſe conceſſions would be ſuch a bare-fac'd violation of liberty, that they will probably be the laſt efforts of a deſpotic government. We may conclude, that the liberty of *Britain* is gone for ever when theſe attempts ſhall ſucceed.

ESSAY

ESSAY III.

Of IMPUDENCE *and* MODESTY.

I AM of opinion, That the complaints against Providence have been often ill-grounded, and that the good or bad qualities of men are the causes of their good or bad fortune, more than what is generally imagin'd. There are, no doubt, instances to the contrary, and these too pretty numerous; but few, in comparison of the instances we have of a right distribution of prosperity and adversity: Nor indeed could it be otherwise from the common course of human affairs. To be endow'd with a benevolent disposition, and to love others, will almost infallibly procure love and esteem; which is the chief circumstance in life, and facilitates every enterprize and undertaking; besides the satisfaction, which immediately results from it. The case is much the same with the other virtues. Prosperity is naturally, tho' not necessarily attach'd to virtue and merit; and adversity, in like manner, to vice and folly.

I MUST, however, confess, that this rule admits of an exception, with regard to one moral quality; and that *modesty* has a natural tendency to conceal

But when he endeavours at impudence, if he ever fail in the attempt, the remembrance of that failure will make him blush, and will infallibly disconcert him: After which every blush is a cause for new blushes, 'till he be found out to be an arrant cheat, and a vain pretender to impudence.

If any thing can give a modest man more assurance, it must be some advantages of fortune, which chance procures to him. Riches naturally gain a man a favourable reception in the world, and give merit a double lustre, when a person is endowed with it; and supply its place, in a great measure, when it is absent. 'Tis wonderful to observe what airs of superiority fools and knaves, with large possessions, give themselves above men of the greatest merit in poverty. Nor do the men of merit make any strong opposition to these usurpations; or rather seem to favour them by the modesty of their behaviour. Their good sense and experience make them diffident of their judgment, and cause them to examine every thing with the greatest accuracy: As, on the other hand, the delicacy of their sentiments makes them timorous lest they commit faults, and lose in the practice of the world that integrity of virtue, so to speak, of which they are so jealous. To make wisdom agree with confidence, is as difficult as to reconcile vice and modesty.

These are the reflections which have occur'd upon this subject of impudence and modesty;

and I hope the reader will not be displeas'd to see them wrought into the following allegory.

JUPITER, in the beginning, join'd VIRTUE, WISDOM and CONFIDENCE together; and VICE, FOLLY, and DIFFIDENCE: And thus connected, sent them into the world. But tho' he thought he had match'd them with great judgement, and said that *Confidence* was the natural Companion of *Virtue*, and that *Vice* deserv'd to be attended with *Diffidence*, they had not gone far before dissension arose among them. *Wisdom*, who was the guide of the one company, was always accustom'd, before she ventur'd upon any road, however beaten, to examine it carefully; to enquire whither it led; what dangers, difficulties and hindrances might possibly or probably occur in it. In these deliberations she usually consum'd some time; which delay was very displeasing to *Confidence*, who was always inclin'd to hurry on, without much forethought or deliberation, in the first road he met. *Wisdom* and *Virtue* were inseparable: But *Confidence* one day, following his impetuous nature, advanc'd a considerable way before his guides and companions; and not feeling any want of their company, he never enquir'd after them, nor ever met with them more. In like manner the other society, tho' join'd by *Jupiter*, disagreed and separated. As *Folly* saw very little way before her, she had nothing to determine concerning the goodness of roads, nor could give the preference to one above another; and this want of resolution was encreas'd by *Diffidence*, who, with her doubts and scru-

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ples, always retarded the journey. This was a great annoyance to *Vice*, who lov'd not to hear of difficulties and delays, and was never satisfy'd without his full career, in whatever his inclinations led him to. *Folly*, he knew, tho' she hearken'd to *Diffidence*, would be easily manag'd when alone; and therefore, as a vicious horse throws his rider, he openly beat away this controller of all his pleasures, and proceeded in his journey with *Folly*, from whom he is inseparable. *Confidence* and *Diffidence* being, after this manner, both thrown loose from their respective companies, wander'd for some time; till at last chance led them at the same time to one village. *Confidence* went directly up to the great house, which belong'd to WEALTH, the lord of the village; and without staying for a porter, intruded himself immediately into the innermost apartments, where he found *Vice* and *Folly* well receiv'd before him. He join'd the train; recommended himself very quickly to his landlord; and enter'd into such familiarity with *Vice*, that he was enlisted in the same company with *Folly*. They were frequent guests of *Wealth*, and from that moment inseparable. *Diffidence*, in the mean time, not daring to approach the great house, accepted of an invitation from POVERTY, one of the tenants; and entering the cottage, found *Wisdom* and *Virtue*, who being repuls'd by the landlord, had retir'd thither. *Virtue* took compassion of her, and *Wisdom* found, from her temper, that she would easily improve: So they admitted her into their society. Accordingly, by their means, she alter'd in a little time somewhat

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ESSAY IV.

That POLITICS may be reduc'd to a SCIENCE.

IT is a great question with several, Whether there be any essential difference between one form of government and another? and, whether every form may not become good or bad, according as it is well or ill administred *? Were it once admitted, that all governments are alike, and that the only difference consists in the character and conduct of the governors, most political disputes would be at an end, and all *Zeal* for one constitution above another must be esteem'd mere bigotry and folly. But tho' a friend to *Moderation*, I cannot forbear condemning this sentiment, and should be sorry to think, that human affairs admit of no greater stability, than what they receive from the casual humours and characters of particular men.

'Tis true, those who maintain, that the goodness of all government consists in the goodness of the

* *For forms of government let fools contest:*
Whate'er is best administer'd is best.

ESSAY on MAN, Book 3.

admini-

adminiſtration, may cite many particular inſtances in hiſtory, where the very ſame government, in different hands, has vary'd ſuddenly into the two oppoſite extremes of good and bad. Compare the *French* government under *Henry* III. and under *Henry* IV. Oppreſſion, levity, artifice on the part of the rulers; faction, ſedition, treachery, rebellion, diſloyalty on the part of the ſubjects: Theſe compoſe the character of the former miſerable æra. But when the patriot and heroic prince, who ſucceeded, was once firmly ſeated on the throne, the government, the people, every thing ſeem'd to be totally chang'd; and all from the difference of the temper and ſentiments of theſe two ſovereigns. An equal difference of a contrary kind, may be found on comparing the reigns of *Elizabeth* and *James*, at leaſt with regard to foreign affairs: and inſtances of this kind may be multiply'd, almoſt without number, from ancient as well as modern hiſtory.

BUT here I would beg leave to make a diſtinction. All abſolute governments (and ſuch that of *England* was, in a great meaſure, till the middle of the laſt century, notwithſtanding the numerous panegyrics on antient *Engliſh* liberty) muſt very much depend on the adminiſtration; and this is one of the great inconveniences of that form of government. But a republican and free government would be a moſt glaring abſurdity, if the particular checks and controuls, provided by the conſtitution, had really no influence, and made it not the intereſt, even of bad men, to operate for the public good. Such is

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the intention of their forms of government, and such is their real effect, where they are wisely contrived: As, on the other hand, they are the sources of all disorder, and of the blackest crimes, where either skill or honesty has been wanting in their original frame and institution.

So great is the force of laws, and of particular forms of government, and so little dependence have they on the humours and temper of men, that consequences almost as general and certain may be deduc'd from them, on most occasions, as any which the mathematical sciences afford us.

THE *Roman* government gave the whole legislative power to the commons, without allowing a negative either to the nobility, or senate. This unbounded power the commons possess'd in a collective body, not in a representative. The consequences were: When the people, by success and conquest, had become very numerous, and had spread themselves to a great distance from the capital, the city-tribes, tho' the most contemptible, carry'd almost every vote: They were, therefore, most cajol'd by every one who affected popularity: They were supported in idleness by the general distribution of corn, and by particular bribes, which they receiv'd from almost every candidate: By this means they became every day more licentious, and the *Campus Martius* was a perpetual scene of tumult and sedition: Arm'd slaves were introduc'd among these rascally citizens; so that the whole government

motes not the interest of the whole body, however it may that of some individuals. There will be a distinction of rank betwixt the nobility and people, but this will be the only distinction in the state. The whole nobility will form one body, and the whole people another, without any of those private feuds and animosities, which spread ruin and desolation every where. 'Tis easy to see the disadvantages of a *Polish* nobility in every one of these particulars.

'Tis possible so to constitute a free government, as that a single person, call him duke, prince, or king, shall possess a very large share of the power, and shall form a proper balance or counterpoise to the other parts of the legislature. This chief magistrate may be either *elective* or *hereditary*; and tho' the former institution may, to a superficial view, appear the most advantageous; yet a more accurate inspection will discover in it greater inconveniencies than in the latter, and such as are founded on causes and principles eternal and immutable. The filling of the throne, in such a government, is a point of too great and too general interest, not to divide the whole people into factions: From whence a civil war, the greatest of ills, may be apprehended, almost with certainty, upon every vacancy. The prince elected must be either a *Foreigner* or a *Native*: The former will be ignorant of the people whom he is to govern; suspicious of his new subjects, and suspected by them; giving his confidence entirely to strangers, who will have no other care but of enriching themselves in the quickest manner, while their master's favour and

and authority are able to ſupport them. A native will carry into the throne all his private animoſities and friendſhips, and will never be regarded, in his elevation, without exciting the ſentiments of envy in thoſe, who formerly conſider'd him as their equal. Not to mention, that a crown is too high a reward ever to be given to merit alone, and will always induce the candidates to employ force, or money, or intrigue, to procure the votes of the electors: So that ſuch an election will give no better chance for ſuperior merit in the prince, than if the ſtate had truſted to birth alone to determine their ſovereign.

IT may therefore be pronounc'd as an univerſal axiom in politics, *That an hereditary prince, a nobility without vaſſals, and a people voting by their repreſentatives, form the beſt* MONARCHY, ARISTOCRACY, *and* DEMOCRACY. But in order to prove more fully, that politics admit of general truths, which are invariable by the humour or education either of ſubject or ſovereign, it may not be amiſs to obſerve ſome other principles of this ſcience, which may ſeem to deſerve that character.

IT may eaſily be obſerved, that tho' free governments have been commonly the moſt happy for thoſe who partake of their freedom; yet are they the moſt ruinous and oppreſſive for their provinces: And this obſervation may, I believe, be fix'd as a maxim of the kind we are here ſpeaking of. When a monarch extends his dominions by conqueſt, he ſoon learns to conſider his old and his new ſubjects as on

the ſame footing; becauſe, in reality, all his ſubjects are to him the ſame, except the few friends and favourites, with whom he is perſonally acquainted. He does not, therefore, make any diſtinction betwixt them in his *general* laws; and, at the ſame time, is no leſs careful to prevent all *particular* acts of oppreſſion on the one as on the other. But a free ſtate neceſſarily makes a great diſtinction, and muſt always do ſo, till men learn to love their neighbours as well as themſelves. The conquerors, in ſuch a government, are all legiſlators, and will be ſure ſo to contrive matters, by reſtrictions of trade, and by taxes, as to draw ſome private, as well as public, advantage from their conqueſts. Provincial governors have alſo a better chance in a republic, to eſcape with their plunder, by means of bribery or intereſt; and their fellow-citizens, who find their own ſtate to be inrich'd by the ſpoils of the ſubject-provinces, will be the more inclin'd to tolerate ſuch abuſes. Not to mention, that 'tis a neceſſary precaution in a free ſtate to change the governors frequently; which obliges theſe temporary tyrants to be more expeditious and rapacious, that they may accumulate ſufficient wealth before they give place to their ſucceſſors. What cruel tyrants were the *Romans* over the world during the time of their commonwealth! 'Tis true, they had laws to prevent oppreſſion in their provincial magiſtrates; but *Cicero* informs us, that the *Romans* could not better conſult the intereſt of the provinces than by repealing theſe very laws. For, ſays he, in that caſe, our magiſtrates, having entire impunity, would plunder no more than would ſatisfy their own

[illegible]

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half of all the product of the ground, which of itself was a very high rent, they also loaded them with many other taxes. If we pass from ancient to modern times, we shall find the same observation to hold true. The provinces of absolute monarchies are always better treated than those of free states. Compare the *Pays conquis* of *France* with *Ireland*, and you will be convinc'd of this truth; tho' this latter kingdom being, in a good measure, peopled from *England*, possesses so many rights and privileges as should naturally make it challenge better treatment than that of a conquer'd province. *Greece* is also an obvious instance to the same purpose.

THERE is an observation of *Machiavel*, with regard to the conquests of *Alexander* the *Great*, which, I think, may be regarded as one of those eternal political truths which no time nor accidents can vary. It may seem strange, says that politician, that such sudden conquests, as those of *Alexander*, shou'd be possess'd so peaceably by his successors, and that the *Persians*, during all the confusions and civil wars of the *Greeks*, never made the smallest efforts towards the recovery of their former independent government. To satisfy us concerning the cause of this remarkable event, we may consider, that a monarch may govern his subjects in two different ways. He may either follow the maxims of the eastern princes, and stretch his power so far as to leave no distinction of ranks among his subjects, but what proceeds immediately from himself; no advantages of birth; no hereditary honours and possessions; and, in a word, no credit among

g the people, except from his commiſſion alone. nonarch may exert his power after a milder man- like our *European* princes; and leave other s of honour, beſide his ſmile and favour: Birth, poſſeſſions, valour, integrity, knowledge, or and fortunate atchievements. In the former s of government, after a conqueſt, 'tis impoſſi- 'er to ſhake off the yoke; ſince no one poſſeſſes, g the people, ſo much perſonal credit and au- y as to begin ſuch an enterprize: Whereas, in itter, the leaſt misfortune, or diſcord of the s, will encourage the vanquiſh'd to take arms, iave leaders ready to prompt and conduct them ry undertaking *.

SUCH

have taken it for granted, according to the ſuppoſi- *Machiavel*, that the antient *Perſians* had no nobility; here is reaſon to ſuſpect, that the *Florentine* ſecretary, eems to have been better acquainted with the *Roman* he *Greek* authors, was miſtaken in this particular. ore antient *Perſians*, whoſe manners are deſcribed by *on*, were a free people, and had nobility. Their were preſerved even after the extending of their ſts and the conſequent change of their government, mentions them in *Darius*'s time, *De exped. Alex. lib.* 2. ans alſo ſpeak often of the perſons in command as family. *Tygranes*, who was general of the *Medes Xerxes*, was of the race of *Achæmenes*, *Herod. lib.* 7. . *Artachæes*, who directed the cutting of the canal. mount *Athos*, was of the ſame family. Id. cap. 117. *xus* was one of the ſeven eminent *Perſians* who con- igainſt the *Magi*. His ſon, *Zopyrus*, was in the higheſt ind under *Darius*, and deliver'd *Babylon* to him. His on, *Megabyzus*, commanded the army, defeated at *on*. His great grandſon *Zopyrus*, was alſo eminent, is baniſhed *Perſia. Herod. lib.* 3. *Thuc. lib.* 1. *Roſaces*, ommanded an army in *Ægypt* under *Artaxerxes*, was iſcended from one of the ſeven conſpirators, Diod.

SUCH is the reasoning of *Machiavel*, which seems to me very solid and conclusive; tho' I wish he had not mix'd falshood with truth, in asserting, that monarchies govern'd according to the eastern policy, tho' more easily kept when once subdu'd, yet are the most difficult to subdue; since they cannot contain any powerful subject, whose discontent and faction may facilitate the enterprizes of an enemy. For besides, that such a tyrannical government enervates the courage of men, and renders them indis-

Sic. lib. 16. *Agesilaus*, in *Xenophon*, *Hist. Græc. lib.* 4. being desirous of making a marriage betwixt king *Cotys* his ally, and the daughter of *Spithridates* a *Persian* of rank, who had deserted to him, first asks *Cotys* what family *Spithridates* is of. One of the most considerable in *Persia*, says *Cotys*. *Ariæus*, when offer'd the sovereignty by *Clearchus* and the ten thousand *Greeks*, refus'd it as of too low a rank, and said, that so many eminent *Persians* wou'd never endure his rule. *Id. de exped. lib.* 2. Some of the families, descended from the seven *Persians* abovementioned remain'd during all *Alexander*'s successors; and *Mithridates*, in *Antiochus*' time, is said by *Polybius* to be descended from one of them, lib. 5. cap. 43. *Artabazus* was esteemed, as *Arrian* says, εν τοις πρωτοις Περσων. lib. 3. And when *Alexander* marry'd in one day 80 of his captains to *Persian* women, his intention plainly was to ally the *Macedonians* with the most eminent *Persian* families. Id. lib. 7. *Diodorus Siculus*, says they were of the most noble birth in *Persia*, lib. 17. The government of *Persia* was despotic, and conducted, in many respects after the eastern manner, but was not carry'd so far as to extirpate all nobility, and confound all ranks and orders. It left men who were still great, by themselves and their family, independent of their office and commission. And the reason why the *Macedonians* kept so easily dominion over them was owing to other causes easy to be found in the historians; tho' it must be own'd that *Machiavel*'s reasoning is, in itself just, however little applicable to the present case.

ferent

towards the fortunes of their [illegible]
[illegible] I say, we find, by experience, that [illegible]
[illegible]perary and delegated authority of the [illegible]
[illegible] magistrates: being always [illegible]
as [illegible]
[illegible]

[illegible] merely on [illegible] and institu- [illegible] Historians [illegible] with *Grose*. [illegible] of Salerno, and [illegible] of St. *Sergio*, which [illegible] of the people, was [illegible] the sound integrity [illegible]

[illegible] are always [illegible] Good laws may [illegible] the government, where [illegible] little humanity [illegible] of men. The most Illus- [illegible] in a [illegible] between the beginning of the [illegible] the due balance [illegible] being then fix'd by [illegible] being yet lost [illegible] Yet at this very time, [illegible] common, that [illegible] capitally [illegible] persons, in a

[illegible] *Nil. Fabricand. lib. 8.*

† T. Livii, lib. 40. cap. 43.

part

part of *Italy*; and found informations of this nature ſtill multiplying upon him. There is a ſimilar, or rather a worſe inſtance *, in the more early times of the commonwealth. So deprav'd in private life were that people, whom in their hiſtories we ſo much admire. I doubt not but they were really more virtuous during the time of the two *Triumvirates*, when they were tearing their common country to pieces, and ſpreading ſlaughter and deſolation over the face of the earth, merely for the choice of tyrants †.

HERE, then, is a ſufficient inducement to maintain, with the utmoſt ZEAL, in every free ſtate, thoſe forms and inſtitutions by which liberty is ſecured, the public good conſulted, and the avarice or ambition of particular men reſtrain'd and puniſh'd. Nothing does more honour to human nature, than to ſee it ſuſceptible of ſo noble a paſſion; as nothing can be a greater indication of meanneſs of heart in any man, than to ſee him devoid of it. A man who loves only himſelf, without regard to friendſhip or merit, is a deteſtable monſter; and a man, who is only ſuſceptible of friendſhip, without public ſpirit, or a regard to the community, is deficient in the moſt material part of virtue.

BUT this is a ſubject which needs not be longer inſiſted on at preſent. There are enow of zealots on

* *Id.* lib. 8. cap. 18.

† *L'Aigle contre L'Aigle, Romains contre Romains*
Combattants ſeulement pour le choix des Tyrans. CORNEILLE.

both sides who kindle up the passions of their parties are, and under the pretence of public good, pursue the interests and ends of their particular factions. For my part, I shall always be more fond of promoting moderation than zeal; tho' perhaps the surest way of producing moderation in every party, is to increase our zeal for the public. Let us therefore try, if it be possible, from the foregoing doctrine, to draw a lesson of moderation with regard to the parties into which our country is at present * divided; at the same time, that we allow not this moderation to abate the industry and passion with which every individual is bound to pursue the good of his country.

THOSE who either attack or defend a minister in such a government as ours, where the utmost liberty is allow'd, always carry matters to an extreme, and exaggerate his merit or demerit with regard to the public. His enemies are sure to charge him with the greatest enormities, both in domestic and foreign management; and there is no meanness nor crime, of which, in their account, he is not capable. Unnecessary wars, scandalous treaties, profusion of public treasure, oppressive taxes, every kind of maladministration is ascribed to him. To aggravate the charge, his pernicious conduct, it is said, will extend its baneful influence even to posterity, by undermining the best constitution in the world, and disordering that wise system of laws, institutions and customs, by which our ancestors, for so many centuries, have been so happily governed. He is not only

* In 1742.

a wicked

a wicked minister in himself, but has remov'd every security provided against wicked ministers for the future.

ON the other hand, the partizans of the minister make his panegyric run as high as the accusation against him, and celebrate his wise, steady, and moderate conduct in every part of his administration. The honour and interest of the nation supported abroad, public credit maintain'd at home, persecution restrain'd, faction subdu'd; the merit of all these blessings is ascrib'd solely to the minister. At the same time he crowns all his other merits, by a religious care of the best constitution in the world, which he has preserv'd inviolate in all its parts, and has transmitted entire, to be the happiness and security of the latest posterity.

WHEN this accusation and panegyric are receiv'd by the partizans of each party, no wonder they engender a most extraordinary ferment on both sides, and fill the whole nation with the most violent animosities. But I would fain persuade these party-zealots, that there is a flat contradiction both in the accusation and panegyric, and that it were impossible for either of them to run so high, were it not for tl contradiction. If our constitution be really * *noble fabric, the pride of* Britain, *the envy of our ne bours, rais'd by the labour of so many centuries, repa at the expence of so many millions, and cemented by a profusion of blood*; I say, if our consti

* *Dissertation on Parties*, Letter

any degree deſerve theſe eulogies, it wou'd never have ſuffer'd a wicked and a weak miniſter to govern triumphantly for a courſe of twenty years, when oppos'd by the greateſt geniuſes of the nation, who exercis'd the utmoſt liberty of tongue and pen, in parliament, and in their frequent appeals to the people. But, if the miniſter be wicked and weak, to the degree ſo ſtrenuouſly inſiſted on, the conſtitution muſt be faulty in its original principles, and he cannot conſiſtently be charg'd with undermining the beſt conſtitution of the world. A conſtitution is only ſo far good, as it provides a remedy againſt mal-adminiſtration; and if the *Britiſh* conſtitution, when in its greateſt vigour, and repair'd by two ſuch remarkable events, as the *Revolution* and *Acceſſion*, where our ancient royal family was ſacrific'd to it; if our conſtitution, I ſay, with ſo great advantages, does not, in fact, provide any ſuch remedy, we are rather beholden to any miniſter who undermines it, and affords us an opportunity of erecting in its place a better conſtitution.

I wou'd make uſe of the ſame topics to moderate the zeal of thoſe who defend the miniſter. *Is our conſtitution ſo excellent?* Then a change of miniſtry can be no ſuch dreadful event; ſince 'tis eſſential to ſuch a conſtitution, in every miniſtry, both to preſerve itſelf from violation, and to prevent all enormities in the adminiſtration. *Is our conſtitution very bad?* Then ſo extraordinary a jealouſy and apprehenſion, on account of changes, is ill-plac'd; and a man ſhould no more be anxious in this caſe, than a

huſband,

husband, who had marry'd a woman from the town, should be watchful to prevent her infidelity. Public affairs, in such a constitution, must necessarily go to confusion, by whatever hands they are conducted; and the zeal of *patriots* is much less requisite in that case than the patience and submission of *philosophers*. The virtue and good intentions of *Cato* and *Brutus* are highly laudable; but, to what purpose did their zeal serve? To nothing, but to hasten the final period of the *Roman* government, and render its convulsions and dying agonies more violent and painful.

I WOU'D not be understood to mean, that public affairs deserve no care and attention at all. Would men be moderate and consistent, their claims might be admitted; at least might be examin'd. The *country-party* might still assert, that our constitution, tho' excellent, will admit of mal-administration to a certain degree; and therefore, if the minister be bad, 'tis proper to oppose him with a *suitable* degree of zeal. And, on the other hand, the *court-party* may be allow'd, upon the supposition that the minister were good, to defend, and with *some* zeal too, his administration. I would only persuade men not to contend, as if they were fighting *pro aris & focis*, and change a good constitution into a bad one, by the violence of their factions *.

I HAVE

* *What our author's opinion was of the famous minister here pointed at, may be learn'd from that essay, printed in the former editions, under the Title of* A character of Sir ROBERT WALPOLE. *It was as follows:* There never was a man, whose intentions and character have been more earnestly and open

I HAVE not here consider'd any thing that is personal in the present controversy. In the best constitution

vassed, than those of the present minister, who, having govern'd a learn'd and free nation for so long a time, amidst such mighty opposition, may make a large library of what has been wrote for and against him, and is the subject of above half the paper that has been blotted in the nation within these twenty years. I wish, for the honour of our country, that any one character of him had been drawn with such *judgment* and *impartiality*, as to have some credit with posterity, and to shew, that our liberty has, once at least, been employ'd to good purpose. I am only afraid of failing in the former quality of judgment: But if it should be so, 'tis but one page more thrown away, after an hundred thousand, upon the same subject, that have perish'd, and become useless. In the mean time, I shall flatter myself with the pleasing imagination, that the following character will be adopted by future historians.

SIR *ROBERT WALPOLE*, prime minister of *Great Britain*, is a man of ability, not a genius; good natur'd, not virtuous; constant, not magnanimous; moderate, not equitable †. His virtues, in some instances, are free from the allay of those vices, which usually accompany such virtues: He is a generous friend, without being a bitter enemy. His vices, in other instances, are not compensated by those virtues which are nearly ally'd to them: His want of enterprise is not attended with frugality. The private character of the man is better than the public: His virtues more than his vices: His fortune greater than his fame. With many good qualities he has incurr'd the public hatred: With good capacity he has not escap'd ridicule. He would have been esteem'd more worthy of his high station, had he never possess'd it; and is better qualify'd for the second than for the first place in any government. His ministry has been more advantageous to his family than to the public, better for this age than for posterity, and more pernicious by bad

† *Moderate in the exercise of power, not equitable in engrossing it.*

precedents

ſtitution of the world, where every man is reſtrain'd by the moſt rigid laws, 'tis eaſy to diſcover either the good or bad intentions of a miniſter, and to judge, whether his perſonal character deſerves love or hatred. But ſuch queſtions are of little importance to the public, and lay thoſe who employ their pens upon them, under a juſt ſuſpicion either of malevolence or of flattery.

precedents than by real grievances. During his time trade has flouriſh'd, liberty declin'd, and learning gone to ruin. As I am a man, I love him; as I am a ſcholar, I hate him; as I am a *Briton*, I calmly wiſh his fall. And were I a member of either houſe, I would give my vote for removing him from St. *James's*; but ſhould be glad to ſee him retire to *Houghton-Hall*, to paſs the remander of his days in eaſe and pleaſure.

The author is pleaſed to find, that after animoſities are laid, and calumny has ceas'd, the whole nation almoſt have return'd to the ſame moderate ſentiments with regard to this great man; if they are not rather become more favourable to him, by a very natural tranſition, from one extreme to another. The author would not oppoſe theſe humane ſentiments towards the dead; tho' he cannot forbear obſerving, that the not paying more of our public debts was, as hinted in this character, a great, and the only great, error in that long adminiſtration.

ESSAY

ESSAY V.

Of the first PRINCIPLES of GOVERNMENT.

NOTHING is more surprizing to those who consider human affairs with a philosophical eye, than to see the easiness with which the many are govern'd by the few; and to observe the implicite submission with which men resign their own sentiments and passions to those of their rulers. When we inquire by what means this wonder is brought about, we shall find, that as FORCE is always on the side of the govern'd, the governors have nothing to support them but OPINION. 'Tis therefore, on opinion only that government is founded; and this maxim extends to the most despotic and most military governments, as well as to the most free and most populiar. The *sultan of Egypt*, or the *emperor of Rome*, might drive his harmless subjects, like brute beasts, against their sentiments and inclination: But he must, at least, have led his *mamalukes*, or *praetorian bands*, like men, by their opinion.

OPINION is of two kinds, viz. opinion of INTEREST, and opinion of RIGHT. By opinion of interest,

intereſt, I chiefly underſtand the ſenſe of the public advantage which is reap'd from government; along with the perſuaſion, that the particular government, which is eſtabliſh'd, is equally advantageous with any other that could eaſily be ſettled. When this opinion prevails among the generality of a ſtate, or among thoſe who have the force in their hands, it gives great ſecurity to any government.

RIGHT is of two kinds, right to POWER, and right to PROPERTY. What prevalence opinion of the firſt kind has over mankind, may eaſily be underſtood by obſerving the attachment which all nations have to their ancient government, and even to thoſe names which have had the ſanction of antiquity. Antiquity always begets the opinion of right; and whatever diſadvantageous ſentiments we may entertain of mankind, they are always found to be prodigal both of blood and treaſure in the maintenance of public juſtice. This paſſion we may denominate enthuſiaſm, or we may give it what appellation we pleaſe; but a politician, who ſhould overlook its influence on human affairs, would prove himſelf to have but a very limited underſtanding. There is, indeed, no particular, in which, at firſt ſight, there may appear a greater contradiction in the frame of the human mind than the preſent. When men act in a faction, they are apt, without any ſhame or remorſe, to neglect all the ties of honour and morality, in order to ſerve their party; and yet, when a faction is form'd upon a point of right or principle, there is no occaſion, where men diſcover a greater obſtinacy,

and

and a more determin'd ſenſe of juſtice and equity. The ſame ſocial diſpoſition of mankind is the cauſe of both theſe contradictory appearances.

'Tis ſufficiently underſtood, that the opinion of right to property is of the greateſt moment in all matters of government. A noted author has made property the foundation of all government; and moſt of our political writers ſeem inclin'd to follow him in that particular. This is carrying the matter too far; but ſtill it muſt be own'd, that the opinion of right to property has a great influence in this ſubject.

Upon theſe three opinions, therefore, of public *intereſt*, of *right to power*, and of *right to property*, are all governments founded, and all authority of the few over the many. There are indeed other principles, which add force to theſe, and determine, limit, or alter their operation; ſuch as *ſelf-intereſt*, *fear*, and *affection*: But ſtill we may aſſert, that theſe other principles can have no influence alone, but ſuppoſe the antecedent influence of thoſe opinions above-mention'd. They are, therefore, to be eſteem'd the ſecondary, not the original principles of government.

For, *firſt*, as to *ſelf-intereſt*, by which I mean the expectation of particular rewards, diſtinct from the general protection which we receive from government, 'tis evident, that the magiſtrate's authority muſt be antecedently eſtabliſh'd, or, at leaſt be hop'd for, in order to produce this expectation. The hope of reward may augment the authority with regard to ſome particular perſons; but can never give birth

birth to it, with regard to the public. Men naturally look for the greateſt favours from their friends and acquaintance; and therefore, the hopes of any conſiderable number of the ſtate, would never center in any particular ſet of men, if theſe men had no other title to magiſtracy, and had no ſeparate influence over the opinions of mankind. The ſame obſervation may be extended to the other two principles of *fear* and *affection*. No man would have any reaſon to *fear* the fury of a tyrant, if he had no authority over any but from fear; ſince, as a ſingle man, his bodily force can reach but a ſmall way, and whatever power he has beyond, muſt be founded either on our own opinion, or on the preſum'd opinion of others. And tho' *affection* to wiſdom and virtue in a *ſovereign* extends very far, and has great influence; yet he muſt be antecedently ſuppos'd inveſted with a public character, otherwiſe the public eſteem will ſerve him in no ſtead, nor will his virtue have any influence beyond a narrow ſphere.

A GOVERNMENT may endure for ſeveral ages, tho' the balance of power, and the balance of property do not agree. This chiefly happens, where any rank or order of the ſtate has acquir'd a large ſhare of the property; but, from the original conſtitution of the government, has no ſhare of the power. Under what pretext would any individual of that order pretend to intermeddle in public affairs? As men are commonly much attach'd to their ancient government, it is not to be expected, that the public would ever favour ſuch uſurpations. But where the original con-

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

ſtitution allows any ſhare of power, tho' ſmall; to an order of men, who poſſeſs a large ſhare of the property, 'tis eaſy for them gradually to ſtretch their authority, and bring the balance of power to coincide with that of property. This has been the caſe with the houſe of commons in *England*.

Most writers, who have treated of the *Britiſh* government, have ſuppos'd, that as the houſe of commons repreſents all the commons of *Great Britain*; ſo its weight in the ſcale is proportion'd to the property and power of all whom it repreſents. But this principle muſt not be receiv'd as abſolutely true. For though the people are apt to attach themſelves more to the houſe of commons, than to any other member of the conſtitution; that houſe being choſen by them as their repreſentatives, and as the public guardians of their liberty; yet are there inſtances where the houſe, even when in oppoſition to the crown, has not been follow'd by the people; as we may particularly obſerve of the *tory* houſe of commons in the reign of king *William*. Were the members of the houſe oblig'd to receive inſtructions from their conſtituents, like the *Dutch* deputies, this would entirely alter the caſe; and, if ſuch immenſe power and riches, as thoſe of the whole commons of *Britain*, were brought into the ſcale, 'tis not eaſy to conceive, that the crown could either influence that multitude of people, or withſtand that overbalance of property. 'Tis true, the crown has great influence over the collective body of *Britain* in the elections of members; but were this influence, which at

preſent

present is only exerted once in seven years, to be employ'd in bringing over the people to every vote, it would soon be wasted; and no skill, popularity or revenue, could support it. I must, therefore, be of opinion, that an alteration, in this particular, would introduce a total alteration in our government, and would soon reduce it to a pure republic; and, perhaps, to a republic of no inconvenient form. For tho' the people collected in a body, like the *Roman* tribes, be quite unfit for government, yet when dispersed in small bodies, they are more susceptible both of reason and order; the force of popular currents and tides is, in a great measure, broke; and the public interest may be pursued with some method and constancy. But 'tis needless to reason any farther concerning a form of government, which is never likely to have place in *Britain*, and which seems not to be the aim of any party amongst us. Let us cherish and improve our ancient government as much as possible, without encouraging a passion for such dangerous novelties.

I SHALL conclude this subject with observing, that the present political controversy, with regard to *instructions*, is a very frivolous one, and can never be brought to any decision, as it is manag'd by both parties. The country-party pretend not, that a member is absolutely bound to follow instructions, as an ambassador or general is confin'd by his orders, and that his vote is not to be receiv'd in the house, but so far as it is conformable to them. The court-party, again, pretend not, that the sentiments of

the

the people ought to have no weight with each member; much less that he ought to despise the sentiments of those whom he represents, and with whom he is more particularly connected. And if their sentiments be of weight, why ought they not to express these sentiments? The question, then, is only concerning the degrees of weight which ought to be plac'd on instructions. But such is the nature of language, that 'tis impossible for it to express distinctly these different degrees; and if men will carry on a controversy on this head, it may well happen, that they differ in their language, and yet agree in their sentiments; or differ in their sentiments, and yet agree in their language. Besides, how is it possible to fix these degrees, considering the variety of affairs which come before the house, and the variety of places which members represent? Ought the instructions of *Totness* to have the same weight as those of *London?* Or instructions, with regard to the *Convention*, which respected foreign politics, to have the same weight as those with regard to the *excise*, which respected only our domestic affairs?

ESSAY VI.

Of LOVE *and* MARRIAGE.

I KNOW not whence it proceeds, that women are so apt to take amiss every thing which is said in disparagement of the married state; and always consider a satyr upon matrimony as a satyr upon themselves. Do they mean, that they are the parties principally concern'd, and that if a backwardness to enter into that state should prevail in the world, they would be the greatest sufferers? Or, are they sensible, that the misfortunes and miscarriages of the married state are owing more to their sex than to ours? I hope they do not intend to confess either of these two particulars, or to give such an advantage to their adversaries, the men, as even to allow them to suspect it.

I HAVE often had thoughts of complying with this humour of the fair sex, and of writing a panegyric upon marriage: But, in looking around for materials, they seem'd to be of so mix'd a nature, that at the conclusion of my reflections, I found that I was as much dispos'd to write a satyr, which might be plac'd on the opposite pages of the panegyric: And I am afraid, that as satyr is, on most occasions,

thought

thought to contain more truth than panegyric, I ſhould have done their cauſe more harm than good by this expedient. To miſrepreſent facts is what, I know, they will not require of me. I muſt be more a friend to truth, than even to them, where their intereſts are oppoſite.

I SHALL tell the women what it is our ſex complains of moſt in the married ſtate; and if they be diſpos'd to ſatisfy us in this particular, all the other differences will eaſily be accommodated. If I be not miſtaken, 'tis their love of dominion which is the ground of the quarrel; tho' 'tis very likely, that they will think it an unreaſonable love of it in us, which makes us inſiſt ſo much upon that point. However this may be, no paſſion ſeems to have more influence on female minds, than this for power; and there is a remarkable inſtance in hiſtory of its prevailing above another paſſion, which is the only one that can be ſuppos'd a proper counter-poiſe for it. We are told, that all the women in *Scythia* once conſpir'd againſt the men, and kept the ſecret ſo well, that they executed their deſign before they were ſuſpected. They ſurpris'd the men in drink, or aſleep; bound them all faſt in chains; and having call'd a ſolemn council of the whole ſex, it was debated what expedient ſhould be us'd to improve the preſent advantage, and prevent their falling again into ſlavery. To kill all the men did not ſeem to the reliſh of any part of the aſſembly, notwithſtanding the injuries formerly received; and they were afterwards pleas'd to make a great merit of this lenity of theirs. It was, therefore

therefore, agreed to put out the eyes of the whole male ſex, and thereby reſign in all future time the vanity which they could draw from their beauty, in order to ſecure their authority. We muſt no longer pretend to dreſs and ſhow, ſay they; but then we ſhall be free from ſlavery. We ſhall hear no more tender ſighs; but in return we ſhall hear no more imperious commands. Love muſt for ever leave us; but he will carry ſubjection along with him.

'TIS regarded by ſome as an unlucky circumſtance, ſince the women were reſolved to maim the men, and deprive them of ſome of their ſenſes, in order to render them humble and dependent, that the ſenſe of hearing could not ſerve their purpoſe, ſince 'tis probable the females would rather have attack'd that than the ſight: And I think it is agreed among the learned, that, in a married ſtate, 'tis not near ſo great an inconvenience to loſe the former ſenſe as the latter. However this may be, we are told, by modern anecdotes, that ſome of the *Scythian* women did ſecretly ſpare their huſbands eyes; preſuming, I ſuppoſe, that they could govern them as well by means of that ſenſe as without it. But ſo incorrigible and intractable were theſe men, that their wives were all oblig'd, in a few years, as their youth and beauty decay'd, to imitate the example of their ſiſters; which it was no difficult matter to do in a ſtate where the female ſex had once got the ſuperiority.

I KNOW not if our *Scottiſh* Ladies derive any thing of this humour from their *Scythian* anceſtors;



male, altho' they were oblig'd to be inſeparable companions. And ſo great was the harmony and happineſs flowing from it, that the ANDROGYNES (for ſo *Plato* calls them) or MEN-WOMEN, became inſolent upon their proſperity, and rebell'd againſt the Gods. To puniſh them for this temerity, *Jupiter* could contrive no better expedient, than to divorce the male-part from the female, and make two imperfect beings of the compound, which was before ſo perfect. Hence the origin of men and women, as diſtinct creatures. But notwithſtanding this diviſion, ſo lively is our remembrance of the happineſs which we enjoy'd in our primæval ſtate, that we are never at reſt in this ſituation; but each of theſe halves is continually ſearching thro' the whole ſpecies to find the other half, which was broken from it: And when they meet, they join again with the greateſt fondneſs and ſympathy. But it often happens, that they are miſtaken in this particular; that they take for their half what no way correſponds to them; and that the parts do not meet nor join in with each other, as is uſual in fractures. In this caſe the union is ſoon diſſolv'd, and each part is ſet looſe again to hunt for its loſt half, joining itſelf to every one whom it meets, by way of trial, and enjoying no reſt, till its perfect ſympathy with its partner ſhews, that it has at laſt been ſucceſsful in its endeavours.

WERE I diſpos'd to carry on this fiction of *Plato*, which accounts for the mutual love betwixt the ſexes in ſo agreeable a manner, I would do it by the following allegory.

When *Jupiter* had ſeparated the male from the female, and had quell'd their pride and ambition by ſo ſevere an operation, he could not but repent him of the cruelty of his vengeance, and take compaſſion on poor mortals, who were now become incapable of any repoſe or tranquillity. Such cravings, ſuch anxieties, ſuch neceſſities aroſe, as made them curſe their creation, and think exiſtence itſelf a puniſhment. In vain had they recourſe to every other occupation and amuſement. In vain did they ſeek after every pleaſure of ſenſe, and every refinement of reaſon. Nothing could fill that void, which they felt in their hearts, or ſupply the loſs of their partner, who was ſo fatally ſeparated from them. To remedy this diſorder, and to beſtow ſome comfort, at leaſt, on human race in their forlorn ſituation, *Jupiter* ſent down Love and Hymen to collect the broken halves of human kind, and piece them together, in the beſt manner poſſible. Theſe two deities found ſuch a prompt diſpoſition in mankind to unite again in their primitive ſtate, that they proceeded on their work with wonderful ſucceſs for ſome time; till at laſt, from many unlucky accidents, diſſenſion aroſe betwixt them. The chief counſellor and favourite of *Hymen* was Care, who was continually filling his patron's head with proſpects of futurity; a ſettlement, family, children, ſervants; ſo that little elſe was regarded in all the matches *they* made. On the other hand, *Love* had choſen Pleasure for his favourite, who was as pernicious a counſellor as the other, and would never allow *Love* to look beyond

yond the prefent momentary gratification, or the fatisfying of the prevailing inclination. Thefe two favourites became, in a little time, irreconcileable enemies, and made it their chief bufinefs to undermine each other in all their undertakings. No fooner had *Love* fix'd upon two halves, which he was cementing together, and forming to a clofe union, but *Care* infinuates himfelf, and bringing *Hymen* along with him, diffolves the union produc'd by *Love*, and joins each half to fome other half, which he had provided for it. To be reveng'd of this, *Pleafure* creeps in upon a pair already join'd by *Hymen*; and calling *Love* to his affiftance, they under-hand contrive to join each half by fecret links, to halves, which *Hymen* was wholly unacquainted with. It was not long before this quarrel was felt in its pernicious confequences; and fuch complaints arofe before the throne of *Jupiter*, that he was oblig'd to fummon the offending parties to appear before him, in order to give an account of their proceedings. After hearing the pleadings on both fides, he order'd an immediate reconcilement betwixt *Love* and *Hymen*, as the only expedient for giving happinefs to mankind: And that he might be fure this reconcilement fhould be durable, he laid his ftrict injunctions on them never to join any halves without confulting their favourites *Care* and *Pleafure*, and obtaining the confent of both to the conjunction. Where this order is ftrictly obferv'd, the *Androgyne* is perfectly reftor'd, and human race enjoy the fame happinefs as in their primæval ftate. The feam is fcarce perceiv'd that joins the two beings together; but both of them combine to form one perfect and happy creature.

ESSAY VII.

Of the STUDY *of*. HISTORY.

THERE is nothing which I would recommend more earneſtly to my female readers than the ſtudy of hiſtory, as an occupation, of all others, the beſt ſuited both to their ſex and education; much more inſtructive than their ordinary books of amuſement, and more entertaining than thoſe ſerious compoſitions, which are uſually to be found in their cloſets. Among other important truths, which they may learn from hiſtory, they may be inform'd of two particulars, the knowledge of which may contribute very much to their quiet and repoſe; *That* our ſex, as well as theirs, are far from being ſuch perfect creatures as they are apt to imagine, and, *That* Love is not the only paſſion, which governs the male-world, but is often overcome by avarice, ambition, vanity, and a thouſand other paſſions. Whether they be the falſe repreſentations of mankind in thoſe two particulars, which endear romances and novels ſo much to the fair ſex, I know not; but muſt confeſs, that I am ſorry to ſee them have ſuch an averſion to matter of fact, and ſuch an appetite for falſhood. I remember I was once deſired by a young beauty, for whom I had ſome paſſion, to ſend her ſome novels and romances for her amuſe-

amusement in the country; but was not so [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] the advantage, which [illegible] [illegible] of reading might have given her. [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] to make use of [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] Plutarch's Lives, [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] time, that there was not a word of [illegible] in them from beginning to end. She [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible], till she came to the [illegible] [illegible] Cæsar, whose names she [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] and then [illegible] me for [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] for deceiving her.

I may indeed be told, that the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] such mention to history, as I [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] in the secret history, [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] proper to [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] in their [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] of this [illegible] proof of [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] However this may be, I see not why [illegible] [illegible] might not receive a more proper direction, and lead them to desire accounts of those who lived in past ages as well as of their contemporaries. [illegible] [illegible] Clora, whether Fulvia entertains a secret commerce of Love with Philander or not? [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] reason to be pleased with [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] whisper'd about among [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] had an intrigue with Cæsar, and [illegible] [illegible] Marcus Brutus, [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] reality, he was [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] not the loves of Messalina or [illegible] a proper subject of discourse as any intrigue that [illegible] [illegible] produced of late years?

But

But I know not whence it comes, that I have been thus ſeduc'd into a kind of raillery againſt the ladies: Unleſs, perhaps, it proceed from the ſame cauſe, which makes the perſon, who is the favourite of the company, be often the object of their good-natur'd jeſts and pleaſantries. We are pleas'd to addreſs ourſelves after any manner to one, who is agreeable to us; and, at the ſame time, preſume, that nothing will be taken amiſs by a perſon, who is ſecure of the good opinion and affections of every one preſent. I ſhall now proceed to handle my ſubject more ſeriouſly, and ſhall point out the many advantages, which flow from the ſtudy of hiſtory, and ſhew how well ſuited it is to every one, but particularly to thoſe who are debarr'd the ſeverer ſtudies, by the tenderneſs of their complexion, and the weakneſs of their education. The advantages found in hiſtory ſeem to be of three kinds, as it amuſes the fancy, as it improves the underſtanding, and as it ſtrengthens virtue.

In reality, what more agreeable entertainment to the mind, than to be tranſported into the remoteſt ages of the world, and to obſerve human ſociety, in its infancy, making the firſt faint eſſays towards the arts and ſciences: To ſee the policy of government, and the civility of converſation refining by degrees, and every thing which is ornamental to human life advancing towards its perfection. To remark the riſe, progreſs, declenſion and final extinction of the moſt flouriſh-

flourishing empires: The virtues, which contributed to their greatness; and the vices, which drew on their ruin. In short, to see all human race, from the beginning of time, pass, as it were, in review before us; appearing in their true colours, without any of those disguises, which, during their life-time, so much perplex'd the judgment of the beholders. What spectacle can be imagin'd so magnificent, so various, so interesting? What amusement, either of the senses or imagination, can be compar'd with it? Shall those trifling pastimes, which engross so much of our time, be preferr'd as more satisfactory, and more fit to engage our attention? How perverse must that taste be, which is capable of so wrong a choice of pleasures?

BUT history is a most improving part of knowledge, as well as an agreeable amusement; and a great part of what we commonly call *Erudition*, and value so highly, is nothing but an acquaintance with historical facts. An extensive knowledge of this kind, belongs to men of letters; but I must think it an unpardonable ignorance in persons of whatever sex or condition, not to be acquainted with the history of their own country, along with the histories of ancient *Greece* and *Rome*. A woman may behave herself with good manners, and have even some vivacity in her turn of wit; but where her mind is so unfurnish'd, 'tis impossible her conversation can afford any entertainment to men of sense and reflection.

I MUST add, That hiſtory is not only a valuable part of knowledge, but opens the door to many other parts, and affords materials to moſt of the ſciences. And indeed, if we conſider the ſhortneſs of human life, and our limited knowledge, even of what paſſes in our own time, we muſt be ſenſible, that we ſhould be for ever children in underſtanding, were it not for this invention, which extends our experience to all paſt ages, and to the moſt diſtant nations; making them contribute as much to our improvement in wiſdom, as if they had actually lain under our obſervation. A man acquainted with hiſtory may, in ſome reſpect, be ſaid to have lived from the beginning of the world, and to have been making continual additions to his ſtock of knowledge in every century.

THERE is alſo an advantage in that experience which is acquir'd by hiſtory, above what is learn'd by the practice of the world, that it brings us acquainted with human affairs, without diminiſhing in the leaſt from the moſt delicate ſentiments of virtue. And, to tell the truth, I know not any ſtudy or occupation ſo unexceptionable as hiſtory in this particular. Poets can paint virtue in the moſt charming colours; but, as they addreſs themſelves entirely to the paſſions, they often become advocates for vice. Even philoſophers are apt to bewilder themſelves in the ſubtilty of their ſpeculations; and we have ſeen ſome go ſo far as to deny the reality of all moral diſtinctions.

tions. But I think it a remark worthy the attention of the ſpeculative, that the hiſtorians have been, almoſt without exception, the true friends of virtue, and have always repreſented it in its proper colours, however they may have err'd in their judgments of particular perſons. *Machiavel* himſelf diſcovers a true ſentiment of virtue in his hiſtory of *Florence*. When he talks as a *Politician*, in his general reaſonings, he conſiders poiſoning, aſſaſſination and perjury as lawful arts of power; but when he ſpeaks as an *Hiſtorian*, in his particular narrations, he ſhews ſo keen an indignation againſt vice, and ſo warm an approbation of virtue, in many paſſages, that I could not forbear applying to him that remark of *Horace*, That if you chaſe away nature, though with never ſo great indignity, ſhe will always return upon you. Nor is this combination of hiſtorians in favour of virtue at all difficult to be accounted for. When a man of buſineſs enters into life and action, he is more apt to conſider the characters of men, as they have relation to his intereſt, than as they ſtand in themſelves; and has his judgment warp'd on every occaſion by the violence of his paſſion. When a philoſopher contemplates characters and manners in his cloſet, the general abſtract view of the objects leaves the mind ſo cold and unmov'd, that the ſentiments of nature have no room to play, and he ſcarce feels the difference betwixt vice and virtue. Hiſtory keeps in a juſt medium betwixt theſe extremes, and places the objects in their true point of view. The writers of hiſtory, as well as the readers, are ſufficiently in-

tereſted in the characters and events, to have a lively ſentiment of blame or praiſe; and, at the ſame time, have no particular intereſt or concern to pervert their judgment.

Veræ voces tum demum pectore ab imo
Eliciuntur. Lucret.

ESSAY

ESSAY VIII.

Of the INDEPENDENCY of PARLIAMENT.

I HAVE frequently observ'd in comparing the conduct of the [illegible] and [illegible] parties, that the former are commonly left affirming and dogmatical in conversation, more apt to make [illegible], and tho' not, perhaps, more susceptible of conviction, yet more able to bear contradiction than the latter: who are apt to fly out upon any opposition, and to regard one as a mercenary designing fellow, if he argues with any coolness and impartiality, or makes any concessions to their adversaries. This is a fact, which, I believe, every one may have observ'd, who has been much in companies where political questions have been discuss'd; though, were one to ask the reason of this difference, every party would be apt to assign a different one. Gentlemen in the opposite will ascribe it to the very nature of their party, which, being founded on public spirit, and a zeal for the constitution, cannot easily endure such doctrines, as are of pernicious consequence to liberty. The courtiers, on the other hand, will be apt to put us in mind of the clown mention'd by lord *Shaftesbury*. "A

" clown,

" clown, ſays that * excellent author, once took a " fancy to hear the *Latin* diſputes of doctors at an " univerſity. He was aſk'd what pleaſure he could " take in viewing ſuch combatants, when he could " never know ſo much, as which of the parties had " the better." *For that matter*, reply'd the clown, " *I a'n't ſuch a fool neither, but I can ſee who's the firſt* " *that puts t'other into a paſſion.* Nature herſelf dic- " tated this leſſon to the clown, that he who had the " better of the argument would be eaſy and well-hu- " mour'd: But he who was unable to ſupport his " cauſe by reaſon, would naturally loſe his temper, " and grow violent."

To which of theſe reaſons ſhall we adhere? To neither of them, in my opinion; unleſs we have a mind to inliſt ourſelves, and become zealots in either party. I believe I can aſſign the reaſon of this different conduct of the two parties, without offending either. The country party are plainly moſt popular at preſent, and, perhaps, have been ſo in moſt adminiſtrations: So that, being accuſtom'd to prevail in company, they cannot endure to hear their opinions controverted, but are as confident on the public favour, as if they were ſupported in all their ſentiments by the moſt infallible demonſtration. The courtiers, on the other hand, are commonly ſo run down by popular talkers, that if you ſpeak to them with any moderation, or make them the ſmalleſt conceſſions, they think themſelves extremely beholden to you, and are apt to return the favour by a like mo-

* Miſcellaneous Reflections, p. 107.

deration

I AM led into this train of reflection, by considering some papers wrote upon that grand topic of *court-influence, and parliamentary dependence*, where, in my humble opinion, the country party, besides vehemence and satyre, shew too rigid an inflexibility, and too great a jealousy of making concessions to their adversaries. Their reasonings lose their force, by being carry'd too far; and the popularity of their opinions has seduc'd them to neglect, in some measure, their justness and solidity. The following reasoning will, I hope, serve to justify me in this opinion.

POLITICAL writers have establish'd it as a maxim, That in contriving any system of government, and fixing the several checks and controuls of the constitution, every man ought to be suppos'd a *knave*, and to have no other end, in all his actions, but private interest. By this interest we must govern him, and, by means of it, make him co-operate to public good, notwithstanding his insatiable avarice and ambition. Without this, say they, we shall in vain boast of the advantages of any constitution, and shall find, in the end, that we have no security for our liberties or possessions, except the good-will of our rulers; that is, we shall have no security at all.

'TIS therefore a just *political* maxim, *That every man must be suppos'd a knave:* Though, at the same time, it appears somewhat strange, that a maxim should be true in *politics*, which is false in *fact*. But to satisfy us on this head, we may consider, that men

men are generally more honeſt in their private than in their public character, and will go great lengths to ſerve a party, than when their own private intereſt is alone concern'd. Honour is a great check upon mankind: But where a conſiderable body of men act together, this check is, in a great meaſure, remov'd; ſince a man is ſure to be approv'd of by his own-party, for what promotes the common intereſt, and he ſoon learns to deſpiſe the clamours of his adverſaries. To which we may add, that every court or ſenate is determin'd by the majority; ſo that, if ſelf-intereſt influences only the majority, (as it will always do) the whole ſenate follows the allurements of this ſeparate intereſt, and acts as if it contain'd not one member, who had any regard to public intereſt and liberty.

WHEN there offers, therefore, to our cenſure, and examination, any plan of government, real or imaginary, where the power is diſtributed among ſeveral courts, and ſeveral orders of men, we ſhould always conſider the private intereſt of each court, and each order; and, if we find, that, by the diſtribution of the power, the private intereſt [illegible] operation, concur with the [illegible] that government to [illegible] contrary, the private intereſt [illegible] not check'd, and be not diſ[illegible], we ſhou'd look for nothing [illegible] and tyranny from [illegible] opinion I am juſtify'd by [illegible] as well as by the autho-

rity

ray of all philosophers and politicians, both ancient and modern.

How much [illegible] would [illegible] have sary such a genius as [illegible] have been [illegible] Thus, in a future age, [illegible] and a very [illegible] form of [illegible] government, where the authority [illegible] whenever [illegible] all the rest, and engrossing the whole power of the constitution. Such a government, they would say, [illegible] not be a mixed government. For so great is the natural ambition of men, that they are never satisfied with power; and if one order of men, by pursuing its own interest, can usurp upon every other order, it will certainly do so, and render itself, as far as possible, absolute and uncontroulable.

But, in this opinion, experience shews they would have been mistaken. For this is actually the case with the *British* constitution. The share of power allotted by our constitution to the house of commons is so great, that it absolutely commands all the other parts of the government. The king's legislative power is plainly no proper check to it. For though the king has a negative in the passing of laws, yet this, in fact, is esteem'd of so little moment, that whatever is voted by the two houses, is always suffer'd to be pass'd into a law, and the royal assent is little better than a mere form. The principal weight of the crown lies in the executive power. But besides that the executive power, in every government, altog



altogether ſubordinate to the legiſlative; beſides this, ſay, the exerciſe of this power requires an immenſe expence, and the commons have aſſum'd to themſelves the ſole power of diſpoſing of public money. How eaſy, therefore, would it be for that houſe to wreſt from the crown all theſe powers, one after another, by making every grant of money conditional, and chooſing their time ſo well, that their refuſal of ſubſidies ſhou'd only diſtreſs the government, without giving foreign powers any advantage over us? Did the houſe of commons depend in the ſame manner on the king, and had none of the members any property but from his gift, would not he command all their reſolutions, and be from that moment abſolute? As to the houſe of lords, they are a very powerful ſupport to the crown as long as they are, in their turn, ſupported by it; but both experience and reaſon ſhew us, that they have no force nor authority ſufficient to maintain themſelves alone, without ſuch ſupport.

How, therefore, ſhall we ſolve this paradox? And by what means is this member of our conſtitution confin'd within the proper limits; ſince, from our very conſtitution, it muſt neceſſarily have as much power as it demands, and can only be confin'd by itſelf? How is this conſiſtent with our conſtant experience of human nature? I anſwer, That the intereſt of the body is here reſtrain'd by the intereſt of the individuals, and that the houſe of commons ſtretches not its power, becauſe ſuch an uſurpation would be contrary to the intereſt of the majority of its

its members. The crown has ſo many offices at its diſpoſal, that, when aſſiſted by the honeſt and diſintereſted part of the houſe, it will always command the reſolutions of the whole; ſo far at leaſt, as to preſerve the ancient conſtitution from danger. We may, therefore, give to this influence what name we pleaſe; we may call it by the invidious appellations of *corruption* and *dependence*; but ſome degree and ſome kind of it are inſeparable from the very nature of the conſtitution, and neceſſary to the preſervation of our mix'd government.

INSTEAD then of aſſerting * abſolutely, that the dependence of parliament, in every degree, is an infringement of *Britiſh* liberty, the country-party had better have made ſome conceſſions to their adverſaries, and have only examin'd what was the proper degree of this dependence, beyond which it became dangerous to liberty. But ſuch a moderation is not to be expected of party-men of any kind. After a conceſſion of this nature, all declamation muſt be abandon'd; and a ſerious calm enquiry into the proper degree of court-influence, and parliamentary dependence would have been expected by the readers. And tho' the advantage, in ſuch a controverſy, might poſſibly remain to the *country-party*; yet the victory would not have been ſo compleat as they wiſh for, nor would a true patriot have given an entire looſe to his zeal, for fear of running matters into a contrary extreme, by di-

* See *Diſſertation on Parties*, throughout.

miniſhing

miniſhing too * far the influence of the crown. 'Twas, therefore, thought beſt to deny, that this extreme could ever be dangerous to the conſtitution, or that the crown could ever have too little influence over members of parliament.

ALL queſtions concerning the proper medium betwixt any two extremes are very difficult to be decided; both becauſe it is difficult to find *words* proper to fix this medium, and becauſe the good and ill, in ſuch caſes, run ſo gradually into each other, as even to render our *ſentiments* doubtful and uncertain. But there is a peculiar difficulty in the preſent caſe, which would embarraſs the moſt knowing and moſt impartial examiner. The power of the crown is always lodg'd in a ſingle perſon, either king or miniſter; and as this perſon may have either a greater or leſs degree of ambition, capacity, courage, popularity or fortune, the power, which is too great in one hand, may become too little in another. In pure republics, where the power is diſtributed among ſeveral aſſemblies or ſenates, the checks and controuls are more regular in their operation; becauſe the members of ſuch numerous aſſemblies may be preſum'd to be al-

* By that *influence of the crown*, which I would juſtify, I mean only, that ariſing from the offices and honours which are at the diſpoſal of the crown. As to private *bribery*, it may be conſider'd in the ſame light as the practice of employing ſpies, which is ſcarce juſtifiable in a good miniſter, and is infamous in a bad one: But to be a ſpy, or to be corrupted, is always infamous under all miniſtries, and is to be regarded as a ſhameleſs proſtitution. *Polybius* juſtly eſteems the pecuniary influence of the ſenate and cenſors to be one of the regular and conſtitutional weights, which preſerv'd the balance of the *Roman* government. Lib. 6. cap. 15.

ways

ways nearly equal in capacity and virtue; and 'tis only their number, riches, or authority, which enter into conſideration. But a limited monarchy admits not of any ſuch ſtability; nor is it poſſible to aſſign to the crown ſuch a determinate degree of power, as will, in every hand, form a proper counter-balance to the other parts of the conſtitution. This is an unavoidable diſadvantage, among the many advantages, attending that ſpecies of government.

ESSAY

ESSAY IX.

Whether the BRITISH GOVERNMENT *inclines more to* ABSOLUTE MONARCHY, *or to a* REPUBLIC.

IT affords a violent prejudice against almost every art and science, that no prudent man, however sure of his principles, dares prophesy concerning any event, or foretell the remote consequences of things. A physician will not venture to pronounce concerning the condition of his patient a fortnight or month after: And still less dares a politician foretell the situation of public affairs a few years hence. *Harrington* thought himself so sure of his general principle, *That the balance of power depends on that of property*, that he ventur'd to pronounce it impossible ever to re-establish monarchy in *England:* But his book was scarce publish'd when the king was restor'd; and we see that monarchy has ever since subsisted upon the same footing as before. Notwithstanding this unlucky example, I will venture to examine a very important question, *viz. Whether the* British *government inclines more to absolute monarchy, or to a republic; and in which of these two species of government it*

will most probably terminate? As there seems not to be any great danger of a sudden revolution either way, I shall at least escape the shame attending my temerity, if I should be found to have been mistaken.

THOSE who assert, That the balance of our government inclines towards absolute monarchy, may support their opinion by the following reasons. That property has a great influence on power cannot possibly be denied; but yet the general maxim, *That the balance of the one depends upon the balance of the other*, must be receiv'd with several limitations. 'Tis evident, that much less property in a single hand will be able to counter-balance a greater property in several hands; not only because it is difficult to make many persons combine in the same views and measures; but also because property, when united, causes much greater dependence, than the same property, when dispers'd. An hundred persons, of 1000 *l.* a year a-piece, can consume all their income, and no body shall ever be the better for them, except their servants and tradesmen, who justly regard their profits as the product of their own labour. But a man possess'd of 100,000 *l.* a year, if he has either any generosity, or any cunning, may create a great dependence by obligations, and still a greater by expectations. Hence we may observe, that in all free governments any subject exorbitantly rich has always created a jealousy, even tho' his riches bore no manner of proportion to the riches of the state. *Crassus*'s fortune, if I remember well, amounted only to about * six-

* As interest in *Rome* was higher than with us, this might yield above 100,000 *l.* a year.

teen

een hundred thouſand pound in our money; and yet ve find, that, tho' his genius was nothing extraor-linary, he was able, by means of his riches alone, to counter-balance, during his life-time, the power of *Pompey* as well as of *Cæſar*, who afterwards became maſter of the world. The wealth of the *Medici* made them maſters of *Florence*; tho', 'tis probable, it was very inconſiderable, compar'd to the united pro perty of that opulent republic.

THESE conſiderations are apt to make one en tertain a very magnificent idea of the *Britiſh* ſpirit and love of liberty; ſince we could maintain our free government, during ſo many centuries, againſt our ſovereigns, who, beſides the power and dignity and majeſty of the crown, have always been poſſeſs'd of much more property, than any ſubject has ever enjoy'd in any commonwealth. But it may be ſaid, that this ſpirit, however great, will never be able to ſupport itſelf againſt that immenſe property, which is now lodg'd in the king, and which is ſtill increaſing. Upon a moderate computation, there are near three millions at the diſpoſal of the crown. The civil liſt amounts to near a million; the collection of all taxes to another million; and the employments in the army and navy, along with eccleſiaſtical preferments, to above a third million: An enormous ſum, and what may fairly be computed to be more than a thirtieth part of the whole income and labour of the kingdom. When we add to this immenſe property, the increaſing luxury of the nation, our proneneſs to corruption, along with the great

power and prerogatives of the crown, and tl
mand of ſuch numerous military forces, the
one but muſt deſpair of being able, without
dinary efforts, to ſupport our free governme
longer under all theſe diſadvantages.

On the other hand, thoſe who maintain,
byaſs of the *Britiſh* government leans towar
public, may ſupport their opinion by very
arguments. It may be ſaid, that tho' t
menſe property in the crown, be join'd to t
nity of firſt magiſtrate, and to many oth
powers and prerogatives, which ſhould natura
it a greater influence; yet it really becomes l
gerous to liberty upon that very account.
Britain a republic, and were any private m
ſeſs'd of a revenue, a third, or even a tenth
large as that of the crown, he would very ju
cite jealouſy; becauſe he would infallibly ha
authority in the government: And ſuch an i
authority, not avow'd by the laws, is alwa
dangerous than a much greater authority, v
deriv'd from them. A * man poſſeſs'd of
power, can ſet no bounds to his pretenſion
partizans have liberty to hope for every thin
favour: His enemies provoke his ambition
with his fears, by the violence of their opp
And the government being thrown into a f

* *On ne monte jamais ſi haut que quand on ne ſçait pas* ſaid *Cromwell* to the preſident *de Bellievre.*

De Retz's Me

y corrupted humour in the *state* commonly ge-
s to him. On the contrary, a legal [illegible]
very great, has always *some* [illegible]
ate both the hopes and pretensions of the [illegible]
ti'd of it: The laws must [illegible]
y against its excesses: Such [illegible]
e has much to fear, and [illegible]
gations; And as his legal [illegible]
mited to, he has small temptation [illegible]
unity of extending it further. [illegible]
regard to ambitious [illegible]
be observ'd with regard [illegible]
religion. A new [illegible]
s both opposed and [illegible]
e, that it spreads [illegible]
artizans with great [illegible]
ith'd opinion, [illegible]
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y, that where any [illegible]
agreeable, if not [illegible]
displeasing, [illegible]
cale, the [illegible]
tious people, [illegible]

ſuch a violent government cannot long ſubſi
ſhall, at laſt, after infinite convulſions and civil
find repoſe in abſolute monarchy, which it
have been happier for us to have eſtabliſh'd
ably from the beginning. Abſolute monarchy,
fore, is the eaſieſt death, the true *Euthanaſia*
Britiſh conſtitution.

THUS, if we have reaſon to be more jealc
monarchy, becauſe the danger is more imminent
that quarter; we have alſo reaſon to be more je
of popular government, becauſe that danger is
terrible. This may teach us a leſſon of mode
in all our political controverſies.

one kind of death may be preferable to another, it may be enquir'd, whether it be more desirable for the *British* constitution to terminate in a popular government, or in absolute monarchy? Here I would declare frankly, that tho' liberty be infinitely preferable to slavery, in almost every case; yet I should much rather wish to see an absolute monarch than a republic in this island. For, let us consider, what kind of republic we have reason to expect. The question is not concerning any fine imaginary republic, which a man may form a plan of in his closet. There is no doubt, but a popular government may be imagin'd more perfect than absolute monarchy, or even than our present constitution. But what reason have we to expect that any such government will ever be establish'd in *Britain*, upon the dissolution of our monarchy? If any single person acquire power enough to take our constitution to pieces, and put it up a-new, he is really an absolute monarch; and we have had already an instance of this kind, sufficient to convince us, that such a person will never resign his power, or establish any free government. Matters, therefore, must be trusted to their natural progress and operations; and the house of commons, according to its present constitution, must be the only legislature in such a popular government. The inconveniences, attending such a situation of affairs, present themselves by thousands. If the house of commons, in such a case, ever dissolves itself, which is not to be expected, we may look for a civil war every election. If it continues itself, we shall suffer all the tyranny of a faction, subdivided into new factions. And as

refin'd precepts of philosophy, or even the severest injunctions of religion; but must proceed entirely from the virtuous education of the youth, the effect of wise laws and institutions. I must, therefore, presume to differ from my lord BACON in this particular, and must regard antiquity as somewhat unjust in its distribution of honour, when it made gods of all the inventors of useful arts, such as *Ceres*, *Bacchus*, *Æsculapius*; and dignified legislators, such as *Romulus* and *Theseus*, only with the appellation of demi-gods, and heroes.

As much as legislators and founders of states ought to be honour'd and respected among men, as much ought the founders of sects and factions to be detested and hated; because the influence of factions is directly contrary to that of laws. Factions subvert government, render laws impotent, and beget the fiercest animosities among men of the same nation, who ought to give mutual assistance and protection to each other. And what should render the founders of parties more odious is, the difficulty of extirpating these parties, when once they have taken rise in any state. They naturally propagate themselves for many centuries, and seldom end but by the total dissolution of that government, in which they are planted. They are, besides, seeds which grow most plentifully in the richest soils; and tho' despotic governments be not entirely free from them, it must be confess'd, that they rise more easily, and propagate themselves faster in free governments, where they always infect the legislature itself, which alone could be able, by the steady applica-



application of rewards and punishments, to eradicate them.

FACTIONS or parties may be divided into PERSONAL and REAL; that is, into factions founded on personal friendship or animosity among those who compose the factions, and into those founded on some real difference of sentiment or interest. The reason of this distinction is obvious, tho' I must acknowledge, that parties are seldom found pure and unmixt, either of the one kind or the other. 'Tis not often seen, that a government divides into factions, where there is no difference in the views of these factions, either real or apparent, trivial or material: And in those factions, which are founded on the most real and most material difference, there is always observed to be a great deal of personal animosity or affection. But notwithstanding this mixture, a party may be denominated either personal or real, according to that principle which is predominant, and is found to have the greatest influence.

PERSONAL factions arise most easily in small republics. Every domestic quarrel becomes an affair of state. Love, vanity, emulation, any passion begets public division, as well as ambition and resentment. The *Neri* and *Bianchi* of *Florence*, the *Fregosi* and *Adorni* of *Genoa*, the *Colonnesi* and *Orsini* of modern *Rome*, were parties of this kind.

MEN have such a propensity to divide into personal factions, that the smallest appearance of real

difference will beget them. What can be imagin'd more trivial than the difference betwixt one colour of livery and another in horse-races? Yet this difference begot two most inveterate factions in the *Greek* empire, the *Prasini* and *Veneti*, who never suspended their animosities, till they ruin'd that unhappy government.

We find in the *Roman* history a very remarkable faction betwixt two tribes, the *Pollia* and *Papiria*, which continu'd for the space of near three hundred years, and discover'd itself in their suffrages at every election of magistrates *. This faction was the more remarkable, that it could continue for so long a tract of time; even tho' it did not spread itself, nor draw any of the other tribes into a share of the quarrel. If mankind had not a strong propensity to such divisions, the indifference of the rest of the community must have suppress'd this foolish animosity, that had not any aliment of new benefits and

* As this fact has not been much observ'd by antiquaries or politicians, I shall deliver it in the words of the *Roman* historian. *Populus* Tusculanus *cum conjugibus ac liberis* Romam *venit: Ea multitudo, veste mutata, & specie reorum tribus circuit, genibus se omnium advolvens. Plus itaque misericordia ad pœnæ veniam impetrandam, quam causa ad crimen purgandum valuit. Tribus omnes, præter* Polliam, *antiquarunt legem.* Polliæ *sententia fuit, puberes verberatos necari, liberos conjugesque sub corona lege belli venire: Memoriamque ejus iræ* Tusculanis *in pœnæ tam atrocis auctores manisse ad patris ætatem constat; nec quemquam fere ex* Pollia *tribu candidatum* Papiriam *ferre solitam.* T. Livii, lib. 8. The *Castelani* and *Nicolotti* are two mobbish factions in *Venice*, who frequently box together, and then lay aside their quarrels presently.

injuries, of sympathy and antipathy, which never fail to take place, when the whole state is rent into two equal factions.

NOTHING is more usual than to see parties, which have begun upon a real difference, continue even after that difference is lost. When men are once inlisted on opposite sides, they contract an affection to the persons with whom they are united, and an animosity against their antagonists: And these passions they often transmit to their posterity. The real difference betwixt *Guelf* and *Ghibbelline* was long lost in *Italy*, before these factions were extinguish'd. The *Guelfs* adher'd to the pope, the *Ghibbellines* to the emperor; and yet the family of *Sforsa*, who were in alliance with the emperor, tho' they were *Guelfs*, being expell'd *Milan* by the king * of *France*, assisted by *Jacomo Trivulzio* and the *Ghibbellines*, the pope concurr'd with the latter, and they form'd leagues with the pope against the emperor.

THE civil wars, which arose some few years ago in *Morrocco*, betwixt the *blacks* and *whites*, merely on account of their complexion, are founded on a very pleasant difference. We laugh at them; but I believe, were things rightly examin'd, we afford much more occasion of ridicule to the *Moors*. For pray, what are all the wars of religion, which have prevail'd in this polite and knowing part of the world? They are, in my opinion, more absurd than the

* LEWIS XIIth.

Mocrish civil wars. The difference of complexion is a ſenſible and a real difference: But the difference about an article of faith, which is utterly abſurd and unintelligible, is not a difference of ſentiments, but only a difference of a few phraſes and expreſſions, which one party accepts of, without underſtanding them; and the other refuſes, in the ſame manner. Beſides, I do not find, that the *whites* in *Morocco* ever impos'd on the *blacks* any neceſſity of altering their complexion, or threaten'd them with inquiſitions and penal laws in caſe of obſtinacy: Nor have the *blacks* been more unreaſonable in this particular. But is a man's opinion, where he is able to form a real opinion, more at his diſpoſal than his complexion? And can one be induc'd by force or fear to do more than paint and diſguiſe in the one caſe as well as in the other?

REAL factions may be divided into factions from *intereſt*, from *principle*, and from *affection*. Of all factions, thoſe from intereſt are the moſt reaſonable, and the moſt excuſable. Where two orders of men, ſuch as the nobles and people, have a diſtinct authority in a government, which is not very accurately balanc'd and modell'd, they naturally follow a diſtinct intereſt; nor can we reaſonably expect a different conduct from that degree of ſelfiſhneſs, which is implanted in human nature. It requires very great ſkill in a legiſlator to prevent ſuch factions; and many philoſophers are of opinion, that this ſecret, like the *grand elixir*, or *perpetual motion*, may amuſe men in theory, but can never poſſibly be reduc'd to practice.

tice. In despotic governments, indeed, factions often do not appear; but they are never the less real; or rather, they are more real and more pernicious, upon that very account. The distinct orders of men, nobles and people, soldiers and merchants, have all a distinct interest; but the more powerful oppresses the weaker with impunity, and without resistance; which begets a seeming tranquillity in such governments *.

THERE has been an attempt to divide the *landed* and *trading* interest in *England*; but without success. The interest of these two bodies is not really distinct, and never will be so, till our public debts increase to such a degree, as to become altogether oppressive and intolerable.

PARTIES from *principles*, especially abstract speculative principles, are known only to modern times, and are, perhaps, the most extraordinary and unaccountable *phænomena*, which have ever yet appear'd in human affairs. Where different principles beget a contrariety of conduct, as all different political principles do, the matter may be more easily explain'd. A man, who esteems the true right of government to lie in one man, or one family, cannot easily agree with his fellow-citizen, who thinks, that another man or family is possess'd of this right. Each naturally wishes that right may take place, according to his own notions of it. But where the difference of

* See *Considerations sur le Grandeur & sur la Decadence des Romains.*

principles

principles begets no contrariety of action, but each may follow his own way, without interfering with his neighbour, as happens in all religious controversies; what madness, what fury can beget such unhappy and such fatal divisions?

Two men, travelling on the highway, the one east, the other west, can easily pass each other, if the way be broad enough: But two men, reasoning upon opposite principles of religion, cannot so easily pass, without shocking; tho' one should think, that the way were also, in that case, sufficiently broad, and that each might proceed, without interruption, in his own course. But such is the nature of the human mind, that it always takes hold of every mind that approaches it; and as it is wonderfully strengthen'd and corroborated by an unanimity of sentiments, so is it shock'd and disturb'd by any contrariety. Hence the eagerness, which most people discover in a dispute; and hence their impatience of opposition, even in the most speculative and indifferent opinions.

This principle, however frivolous it may appear, seems to have been the origin of all religious wars and divisions. But, as this principle is universal in human nature, its effects would not have been confin'd to one age, and to one sect of religion, did it not there concur with other more accidental causes, which raise it to such a height, as to produce the highest misery and devastation. Most religions of the ancient world arose in the unknown ages of government, when men were as yet barbarous and uninstructed, and the prince, as well as peasant, was dis-

pos'd

pos'd to receive, with implicite faith, every pious tale or fiction which was offer'd him. The magistrate embrac'd the religion of the people, and entering cordially into the care of sacred matters, naturally acquir'd an authority in them, and united the ecclesiastical with the civil power. But the *Christian* religion arising, while principles directly opposite to it were firmly establish'd in the polite part of the world, who despis'd the nation that first broach'd this novelty; no wonder, that in such circumstances, it was but little countenanc'd by the civil magistrate, and that the priesthood were allow'd to engross all the authority in the new sect. So bad a use did they make of this power, even in those early times, that the persecutions of Christianity may, perhaps * *in part*, be ascrib'd to the violence instill'd by them into their followers. And the same principles of priestly government continuing, after Christianity became the

* I say, *in part*; For 'tis a vulgar error to imagine, that the ancients were as great friends to toleration as the *English* or *Dutch* are at present. The laws against external superstition, amongst the *Romans*, were as ancient as the time of the twelve tables; and the *Jews* as well as *Christians* were sometimes punish'd by them: Tho', in general, these laws were not rigorously executed. Immediately after the conquest of *Gaul*, they forbad all but the natives to be initiated into the religion of the *Druids*; and this was a kind of persecution. In about a century after this conquest, the emperor, *Claudius*, quite abolish'd that superstition by penal laws; which would have been a very grievous persecution, if the imitation of the *Roman* manners had not, before-hand, wean'd the *Gauls* from their ancient prejudices. *Suetonius in vita Claudii*. *Pliny* ascribes the abolition of the Druid superstitions to *Tiberius*, probably because that emperor had taken some steps towards restraining them, (lib. 30. cap. 1.) This is an instance of the usual caution and moderation of the *Romans*

principles begets no contrariety of action, but each may follow his own way, without interfering with his neighbour, as happens in all religious controversies; what madness, what fury can beget such unhappy and such fatal divisions?

Two men, travelling on the highway, the one east, the other west, can easily pass each other, if the way be broad enough: But two men, reasoning upon opposite principles of religion, cannot so easily pass, without shocking; tho' one should think, that the way were also, in that case, sufficiently broad, and that each might proceed, without interruption, in his own course. But such is the nature of the human mind, that it always takes hold of every mind that approaches it; and as it is wonderfully strengthen'd and corroborated by an unanimity of sentiments, so is it shock'd and disturb'd by any contrariety. Hence the eagerness, which most people discover in a dispute; and hence their impatience of opposition, even in the most speculative and indifferent opinions.

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the eſtabliſh'd religion, they have engender'd a ſpirit of perſecution, which has ever ſince been the poiſon of human ſociety, and the ſource of the moſt inveterate factions in every government. Such factions, therefore, on the part of the people, may juſtly be eſteem'd factions of *principle*; but, on the part of the prieſts, who are the prime movers, they are really factions of *intereſt*.

THERE is another cauſe (beſide the authority of the prieſts, and the ſeparation of the eccleſiaſtical and civil powers) which has contributed to render *Chriſtendom* the ſcene of religious wars and diviſions. Religions, that ariſe in ages totally ignorant and barbarous, conſiſt moſtly of traditional tales and fictions, which may be very different in every ſect, without being contrary to each other; and even when they are contrary, every one adheres to the tradition of his own ſect, without much reaſoning or diſputation. But as philoſophy was widely ſpread over the world, at the time when Chriſtianity aroſe, the teachers of the new ſect were oblig'd to form a ſyſtem of ſpeculative opinions; to divide, with ſome accuracy, their articles of faith; and to explain, comment, confute, and confirm with all the ſubtilty of argument and ſcience. From hence naturally aroſe keen-

mans in ſuch caſes; and very different from their violent and ſanguinary method of treating the *Chriſtians*. Hence we may entertain a ſuſpicion, that thoſe furious perſecutions of *Chriſtianity* were, in ſome meaſure, owing to the imprudent zeal and bigotry of the firſt propagators of that ſect; and Eccleſiaſtical hiſtory affords us many reaſons to confirm this ſuſpicion.

neſs

ness in dispute, when the christian religion came to be split into new divisions and heresies: And this keenness assisted the priests in their pernicious policy, of begetting a mutual hatred and antipathy among their deluded followers. Sects of philosophy, in the ancient world, were more zealous than parties of religion; but, in modern times, parties of religion are more furious and enrag'd than the most cruel factions which ever arose from interest and ambition.

I HAVE mention'd parties from *affection* as a kind of *real* parties, beside those from *interest* and *principle*. By parties from affection, I understand those which are founded on the different affections of men towards particular families and persons, whom they desire to rule over them. These parties are often very violent; tho', I must own, it is somewhat unaccountable, that men should attach themselves so strongly to persons, with whom they are no way acquainted, whom perhaps they never saw, and from whom they never receiv'd, nor can ever hope for any favour. Yet this we find often to be the case, and even with men, who, on other occasions, discover no great generosity of spirit, nor are found to be easily transported by friendship beyond their own interest. We are apt, I know not how, to think the relation betwixt us and our sovereign very close and intimate. The splendor of majesty and power bestows an importance on the fortunes even of a single person. And when a man's good-nature gives him not this imaginary interest, his ill-nature will, from spite and opposition to persons whose sentiments are different from his own.

ESSAY

ESSAY XI.

Of the PARTIES *of* GREAT-BRITAIN.

WERE the *British* government propos'd as a subject of speculation to a studious man, he would immediately perceive in it a source of division and party, which it would be almost impossible for it, under any administration, to avoid. The just balance betwixt the republican and monarchical part of our constitution is really, in itself, so extremely delicate and uncertain, that when join'd to mens passions and prejudices, 'tis impossible but different opinions must arise concerning it, even among persons of the best understanding. Those of mild tempers, who love peace and order, and detest sedition and civil wars, will always entertain more favourable sentiments of monarchy, than men of bold and generous spirits, who are passionate lovers of liberty, and think no evil comparable to subjection and slavery. And tho' all reasonable men agree in general to preserve our mix'd government; yet when they come to particulars, some will incline to trust larger powers to the crown, to bestow on it more influence, and to guard against

gainſt its encroachments with leſs caution, than others who are terrified at the moſt diſtant approaches of tyranny and deſpotic power. Thus are there parties of PRINCIPLE involved in the very nature of our conſtitution, which may properly enough be denominated thoſe of † COURT and COUNTRY. The trength and violence of each of theſe parties will much depend upon the particular adminiſtration. An adminiſtration may be ſo bad, as to throw a great majority into the oppoſition; as a good adminiſtration will reconcile to the court many of the moſt paſſionate lovers of liberty. But, however the nation may fluctuate betwixt them, the parties themſelves will always ſubſiſt, as long as we are govern'd by a limited monarchy.

BUT, beſides this difference of *Principle*, thoſe parties are very much fomented by a difference of INTEREST, without which they could ſcarce ever be dangerous or violent. The crown will naturally

† Theſe words have become of general uſe, and therefore I ſhall employ them, without intending to expreſs by them an univerſal blame of the one party, or approbation of the other. The court-party may, no doubt, on ſome occaſions, conſult beſt the intereſt of the country, and the country-party oppoſe it. In like manner, the *Roman* parties were denominated *Optimates* and *Populares*; and *Cicero*, like a true party-man, defines the *Optimates* to be ſuch as, in all their publick conduct, regulated themſelves by the ſentiments of the beſt and worthieſt of the *Romans*: *Pro Sextio, cap.* 45. The term of *Country-party* may afford a favourable definition or etymology of the ſame kind: But it would be folly to draw any argument from that head, and I have no regard to it in employing theſe terms.

beſtow

beſtow all its truſt and power upon thoſe, whoſe principles, real or pretended, are moſt favourable to monarchical government; and this temptation will naturally engage them to go greater lengths than their principles would otherwiſe carry them. Their antagoniſts, who are diſappointed in their ambitious aims, throw themſelves into the party whoſe principles incline them to be moſt jealous of royal power, and naturally carry thoſe principles to a greater length than ſound politics will juſtify. Thus, the *Court* and *Country* parties, which are the genuine offſpring of the *Britiſh* government, are a kind of mixt parties, and are influenced both by principle and by intereſt. The heads of the factions are commonly moſt govern'd by the latter motive; the inferior members of them by the former. I muſt be underſtood to mean this of perſons who have motives for taking party on any ſide. For, to tell the truth, the greateſt part are commonly men who aſſociate themſelves they know not why; from example, from paſſion, from idleneſs. But ſtill it is requiſite, that there be ſome ſource of diviſion, either in principle or intereſt; otherwiſe ſuch perſons would not find parties, to which they could aſſociate themſelves.

As to eccleſiaſtical parties; we may obſerve, that, in all ages of the world, prieſts have been enemies to liberty †, and 'tis certain, that this ſteady conduct of

† This propoſition is true, notwithſtanding, that in the early times of the *Engliſh* government, the clergy were the great and principal oppoſers of the crown: But, at that time, their

of theirs must have been founded on fixt reasons of interest and ambition. Liberty of thinking, and of expressing our thoughts, is always fatal to priestly power, and to those pious frauds, on which it is commonly founded; and, by an infallible connexion, which prevails among every species of liberty, this privilege can never be enjoy'd, at least, has never yet been enjoy'd, but in a free government. Hence it must happen, in such a government as that of *Britain*, that the establish'd clergy, while things are in their natural situation, will always be of the *Court*-party; as, on the contrary, dissenters of all kinds will be of the *Country*-party; since they can never hope for that toleration, which they stand in need of, but by means of our free government. All princes, who have aimed at despotic power, have known of what importance it was to gain the establish'd clergy: As the clergy, on their side, have shewn a great facility of entring into the views of such princes *. *Gustavus Vasa* was, perhaps, the only ambitious monarch, that ever depress'd the church, at the same time, that he discourag'd liberty. But the exorbitant power of the bishops in *Sweden*, who, at that time, overtop'd the crown, along with their attachment to a foreign

their possessions were so immensely great, that they composed a considerable part of the proprietors of *England*, and in many contests were direct rivals of the crown.

* Judæi sibi ipsi reges imposuere; qui mobilitate vulgi expulsi, resumpta per arma dominatione; fugas civium, urbium eversiones, fratrum, conjugum, parentum neces, aliaque solita regibus ausi, superstitionem fovebant; quia honor sacerdotii firmamentum potentiæ assumebatur. *Tacit. Hist. lib.* 5.

family,

family, was the reason of his embracing such an unusual system of politics.

THIS observation concerning the propensity of priests to despotic power, and to the government of a single person, is not true with regard to one sect only. The *Presbyterian* and *Calvinistic* clergy in *Holland* were always profess'd friends to the family of *Orange*; as the *Arminians*, who were esteem'd heretics, were always of the *Louvestein* faction, and zealous for liberty. But if a prince has the choice of both, 'tis easy to see, that he will prefer the episcopal to the presbyterian form of government; both because of the greater affinity betwixt monarchy and episcopacy, and because of the facility which a prince finds, in such a government, of ruling the clergy, by means of their ecclesiastical superiors *.

IF we consider the first rise of parties in *England*, during the civil wars, we shall find, that it was exactly conformable to this general theory, and that the species of government gave birth to these parties, by a regular and infallible operation. The *English* constitution, before that time, had lain in a kind of confusion; yet so, as that the subjects possess'd many noble privileges, which, tho' not, perhaps, exactly bounded and secur'd by law, were universally deem'd, from long possession, to belong to them as their birth-right. An ambitious, or rather an ignorant, prince arose, who esteem'd all these pri-

* Populi imperium juxta libertatem: paucorum dominatio regiæ libidini propior est. *Tacit. Ann. lib.* 6.

vileges

vileges to be conceſſions of his predeceſſors, revocable at pleaſure; and, in proſecution of this principle, he openly acted in violation of liberty, during the courſe of ſeveral years. Neceſſity, at laſt, conſtrain'd him to call a parliament: The ſpirit of liberty aroſe and ſpread itſelf: The prince, being without any ſupport, was oblig'd to grant every thing requir'd of him: And his enemies, jealous and implacable, ſet no bounds to their pretenſions. Here then began thoſe conteſts, in which it was no wonder, that men of that age were divided into different parties; ſince, even at this day, the impartial are at a loſs to decide concerning the juſtice of the quarrel. The pretenſions of the parliament, if yielded to, broke the balance of our conſtitution, by rendering the government almoſt intirely republican. If not yielded to, we were, perhaps, ſtill in danger of deſpotic power, from the ſettled principles and inveterate habits of the king, which had plainly appear'd in every conceſſion that he had been conſtrain'd to make to his people. In this queſtion, ſo delicate and uncertain, men naturally fell to the ſide which was moſt conformable to their uſual principles; and thoſe, who were the moſt paſſionate favourers of monarchy, declar'd for the king, as the zealous friends of liberty ſided with the parliament. The hopes of ſucceſs being nearly equal on both ſides, *intereſt* had no general influence in this conteſt: So that ROUND-HEAD and CAVALIER were merely parties of principle; neither of which diſown'd either monarchy or liberty; but the former party inclin'd moſt to the republican part of our government, and the latter to the monarchical.

cal. In this respect they may be consider'd as court and country-party enflam'd into a civil war, by an unhappy concurrence of circumstances, and by the turbulent spirit of the age. The commonwealth's men, and the partizans of despotic power, lay conceal'd in both parties, and form'd but an inconsiderable part of them.

THE clergy had concurr'd, in a shameless manner, with the king's arbitrary designs, according to their usual maxims in such cases: And, in return, were allow'd to persecute their adversaries, whom they call'd heretics and schismatics. The establish'd clergy were episcopal; the non-conformists presbyterian: So that all things concurr'd to throw the former, without reserve, into the king's party; and the latter into that of the parliament. The *Cavaliers* being the court-party, and the *Round-heads* the country-party, the union was infallible betwixt the former and the establish'd prelacy, and betwixt the latter and presbyterian non-conformists. This union is so natural, according to the general principles of politics, that it requires some very extraordinary situation of affairs to break it.

EVERY one knows the event of this quarrel; fatal to the king first, and to the parliament afterwards. After many confusions and revolutions, the royal family was at last restor'd, and the government establish'd on the same footing as before. *Charles* II. was not made wiser by the dreadful example of his father; but prosecuted the same measures, tho' at first, with more secrecy and caution. New parties

s arose, under the appellations of WHIG and ORY, which have continued ever since to con- und and distract our government. What the na- re is of these parties, is, perhaps, one of the most ficult questions, which can be met with, and is a oof, that history may contain problems, as uncer- in as any, which are to be found in the most abstract ences. We have seen the conduct of these two rties, during the course of seventy years, in a vast riety of circumstances, possess'd of power, and de- iv'd of it, during peace and during war: We meet th persons, who profess themselves of one side or ther, every hour, in company, in our pleasures, in r serious occupations: We ourselves are constrain'd, a manner, to take party; and living in a country the highest liberty, every one may openly declare l his sentiments and opinions: And yet we are at loss to tell the nature, pretensions, and principles the two parties. The question is, perhaps, in it- lf, somewhat difficult; but has been render'd more , by the prejudice and violence of party.

WHEN we compare the parties of *whig* and *tory*, those of *round-head* and *cavalier*, the most obvious ference, which appears betwixt them, consists in the inciples of *passive obedience*, and *indefeasible right*, hich were but little heard of among the *cavaliers*, t became the universal doctrine, and were esteem'd he true characteristic of a *tory*. Were these princi- les push'd into their most obvious consequences, hey imply a formal renunciation of all our liberties, nd an avowal of absolute monarchy; since nothing

can be a greater absurdity than a limited p
which must not be resisted, even when it exce
limitations. But as the most rational principl
often but a weak counterpoise to passion; '
wonder, that these absurd principles, *sufficient*, a
ing to a celebrated * author, *to shock the common j*
a HOTTENTOT or SAMOIEDE, were found too
for that effect. The *tories*, as men, were en
to oppression; and also, as *Englishmen*, they
enemies to despotic power. Their zeal for li
was, perhaps, less fervent than that of their a
nists; but was sufficient to make them forget al
general principles, when they saw themselves c
threaten'd with a subversion of the ancient g
ment. From these sentiments arose the *revol*
an event of mighty consequence, and the
foundation of *British* liberty. The conduct
tories, during that event, and after it, will aff
a true insight into the nature of that party.

IN the *first* place, They appear to have ha
sentiments of true *Britons* in their affection to li
and in their determin'd resolution not to sacri
to any abstract principles whatsoever, or to an
ginary rights of princes. This part of thei
racter might justly have been doubted of befo
revolution, from the obvious tendency of
avow'd principles, and from their almost unbo
compliances with a court, which made little se
its arbitrary designs. The *revolution* shew'd

* Dissertation on parties, *Letter* 2d.

to have been, in this respect, nothing but a genuine *court-party*, such as might be expected in a *British* government: That is, *Lovers of liberty, but greater lovers of monarchy*. It must, however, be confest, that they carry'd their monarchical principles further, even in practice, but more so in theory, than was, in any degree, consistent with a limited government.

Secondly, NEITHER their principles nor affections concurr'd, entirely or heartily, with the settlement made at the *revolution*, or with that which has since taken place. This part of their character may seem contradictory to the former; since any other settlement, in those circumstances of the nation, must probably have been dangerous, if not fatal to liberty. But the heart of man is made to reconcile contradictions; and this contradiction is not greater than that betwixt *passive obedience*, and the *resistance* employ'd at the *revolution*. A *tory*, therefore, since the *revolution*, may be defin'd in a few words to be *a lover of monarchy, tho' without abandoning liberty; and a partizan of the family of* STUART. As a *whig* may be defin'd to be *a lover of liberty, tho' without renouncing monarchy; and a friend to the settlement in the* protestant *line* *.

THESE

* The author above-cited has asserted, that the REAL distinction betwixt *whig* and *tory* was lost at the *revolution*, and that ever since they have continu'd to be mere *personal* parties, like the *Guelfs* and *Ghibbelines*, after the emperors had lost all authority in *Italy*. Such an opinion, were it receiv'd, would turn our whole history into an ænigma.

I shall first mention, as a proof of a real distinction betwixt these parties, what every one may have observ'd or

THESE different views, with regard to the settlement of the crown, were accidental, but natural additions to the principles of the *court* and *country*

heard concerning the conduct and converſation of all his friends and acquaintance on both ſides. Have not the *tories* always bore an avow'd affection to the family of *Stuart*, and have not their adverſaries always oppos'd with vigour that ſucceſſion of that family?

The *tory* principles are confeſſedly the moſt favourable to monarchy. Yet the *tories* have almoſt always oppos'd the court theſe fifty years; nor were they cordial friends to king *William*, even when employ'd by him. Their quarrel, therefore, cannot be ſuppos'd to have lain with the throne, but with the perſon who ſat on it.

They concurr'd heartily with the court during the four laſt years of queen *Anne*. But is any one at a loſs to find the reaſon?

The ſucceſſion of the crown in the *Britiſh* government is a point of too great conſequence to be abſolutely indifferent to perſons, who concern themſelves, in any degree, about the fortune of the public; much leſs can it be ſuppos'd, that the *tory* party, who never valu'd themſelves upon moderation, could maintain a *ſtoical* indifference in a point of ſuch importance. Were they, therefore, zealous for the houſe of *Hanover*? Or was there any thing, that kept an oppoſite zeal from openly appearing, if it did not openly appear, but prudence, and a ſenſe of decency?

'Tis monſtrous to ſee an eſtabliſh'd epiſcopal clergy in declar'd oppoſition to the court, and a non-conformiſt preſbyterian clergy in conjunction with it. What cou'd have produc'd ſuch an unnatural conduct in both? Nothing, but that the former eſpous'd monarchical principles too high for the preſent ſettlement, which is founded on principles of liberty: And the latter, being afraid of the prevalence of thoſe high principles, adher,d to that party, from whom they had reaſon to expect liberty and toleration.

The different conduct of the two parties, with regard to foreign politics, is alſo a proof to the ſame purpoſe. *Holland* has always been moſt favour'd by one, and *France* by the other. In ſhort, the proofs of this kind ſeem ſo palpable and evident, that 'tis almoſt needleſs to collect them.

parties,

parties, which are the genuine parties of the *British* government. A passionate lover of monarchy is apt to be displeas'd at any change of the succession; as favouring too much of a commonwealth: A passionate lover of liberty is apt to think that every part of the government ought to be subordinate to the interests of liberty. 'Tis however remarkable, that though the principles of *whig* and *tory* were both of them of a compound nature; yet the ingredients, which predominated in both, were not correspondent to each other. A *tory* lov'd monarchy, and bore an affection to the family of *Stuart*; but the latter affection was the predominant inclination of the party. A *whig* lov'd liberty, and was a friend to the settlement in the *protestant* line; but the love of liberty was professedly his predominant inclination. The *tories* have frequently acted as republicans, where either policy or revenge has engag'd them to that conduct; and there was no one of that party, who, upon the supposition, that he was to be disappointed in his views with regard to the succession, would not have desir'd to impose the strictest limitations on the crown, and to bring our form of government as near republican as possible, in order to depress the family, which, according to his apprehension, succeeded without any just title. The *whigs*, 'tis true, have also taken steps dangerous to liberty, under colour of securing the succession and settlement of the crown, according to their views: But as the body of the party had no passion for that succession, otherwise than as the means of securing liberty, they have been betray'd into these steps by ig-

norance

norance or frailty, or the intereſt of their lead
The ſucceſſion of the crown was, therefore, the c
point with the *tories:* The ſecurity of our libe
with the *whigs*. Nor is this ſeeming irregularit
all difficult to be accounted for, by our preſent the
Court and *country* parties are the true parents of
and *whig*. But 'tis almoſt impoſſible, that the
tachment of the *court* party to monarchy ſhould
degenerate into an attachment to the monarch; t
being ſo cloſe a connexion betwixt them, and
latter being ſo much the more natural object. F
eaſily does the worſhip of the divinity degene
into a worſhip of the idol? The connexion is
ſo great betwixt liberty, the divinity of the
country party or *whigs*, and any monarch or r
family; nor is it ſo reaſonable to ſuppoſe, that
that party, the worſhip can ſo eaſily be transfe
from the one to the other. Tho' even that woul
no great miracle.

'Tis difficult to penetrate into the thoughts
ſentiments of any particular man; but 'tis almoſt
poſſible to diſtinguiſh thoſe of a whole party, whe
often happens, that no two perſons agree preciſel
the ſame maxims of conduct. Yet I will ventur
affirm, that it was not ſo much PRINCIPLE, o
opinion of indefeaſible right, which attach'd th
ries to the ancient royal family, as AFFECTION
a certain love and eſteem for their perſons.
ſame cauſe divided *England* formerly betwixt
houſes of *York* and *Lancaſter*, and *Scotland* bet
the families of *Bruce* and *Baliol*; in an age, w
poſit

olical disputes were but little in fashion, and when olitical *principles* must of course have had but little fluence on mankind. The doctrine of passive obeience is so absurd in itself, and so opposite to our lierties, that it seems to have been chiefly left to pulit-declaimers, and to their deluded followers among ie vulgar. Men of better sense were guided by *af-ction*; and as to the leaders of this party, 'tis proable, that *interest* was their chief motive, and that hey acted more contrary to their private sentiments, han the leaders of the opposite party. Tho' 'tis alost impossible to maintain with zeal the right of ny person or family, without acquiring a good-will o them, and changing the *principle* into *affection*; 'et this is less natural to people of an elevated stain and liberal education, who have had ample opportunity of observing the weakness, folly, and arogance of monarchs, and have found them to be nohing superior, if not rather inferior, to the rest of nankind. The *interest*, therefore, of being heads of a party does often, with such people, supply the place both of *principle* and *affection*.

SOME, who will not venture to assert, that the *real* difference betwixt *whig* and *tory* was lost at the *revolution*, seem inclin'd to think, that the difference is now abolish'd, and that affairs are so far return'd to their natural state, that there are at present no other parties amongst us but *court* and *country*; that is, men, who by interest or principle are attach'd either to monarchy or to liberty. It must, indeed, be confest, that the *tory* party seem, of late, to have decay'd

much in their numbers; ſtill more in their zeal; and I may venture to ſay, ſtill more in their credit and authority. There are few men of knowledge or learning, at leaſt, few philoſophers, ſince Mr. *Locke* has wrote, who would not be aſham'd to be thought of that party; and in almoſt all companies the name of OLD WHIG is mention'd as an unconteſtable appellation of honour and dignity. Accordingly, the enemies of the miniſtry, as a reproach, call the courtiers, the true *tories*; and as an honour, denominate the gentlemen in the *oppoſition*, the true *whigs*. The *tories* have been ſo long oblig'd to talk in the republican ſtile, that they ſeem to have made converts of themſelves by their hypocriſy, and to have embrac'd the ſentiments, as well as language of their adverſaries. There are, however, very conſiderable remains of that party in *England*, with all their old prejudices; and a proof, that *court* and *country* are not our only parties, is, that almoſt all the diſſenters ſide with the court, and the lower clergy, at leaſt, of the church of *England*, with the oppoſition. This may convince us, that ſome byaſs ſtill hangs upon our conſtitution, ſome extrinſic weight, which turns it from its natural courſe, and cauſes a confuſion in our parties.

I SHALL conclude this ſubject with obſerving, that we never had any *tories* in *Scotland*, according to the proper ſignification of the word, and that the diviſion of parties in this country was really into *whigs* and *jacobites*. A *jacobite* ſeems to be a *tory*, who has no regard to the conſtitution, but is either a zealous

a zealous partizan of absolute monarchy, or at least willing to sacrifice our liberties to the obtaining the succession in that family to which he is attach'd. The reason of the difference betwixt *England* and *Scotland*, I take to be this: Our political and our religious divisions in this country, have been, since the *revolution*, regularly correspondent to each other. The *Presbyterians* were all *whigs* without exception: Those who favour'd *episcopacy*, of the opposite party. And as the clergy of the latter sect were turn'd out of their churches at the *revolution*, they had no motive for making any compliances with the government in their oaths or their forms of prayers, but openly avow'd the highest principles of their party; which is the cause, why their followers have been more bare-fac'd and violent than their brethren of the *tory* party in *England*.

ESSAY XII.

Of SUPERSTITION *and* ENTHUSIASM.

THAT the corruption of the best things produces the worst, is grown into a maxim, and is commonly prov'd, among other instances, by the pernicious effects of *superstition* and *enthusiasm*, the corruptions of true religion.

THESE two species of false religion, tho' both pernicious, are yet of a very different, and even of a contrary nature. The mind of man is subject to certain unaccountable terrors and apprehensions, proceeding either from the unhappy situation of private or public affairs, from ill health, from a gloomy and melancholy disposition, or from the concurrence of all these circumstances. In such a state of mind, infinite unknown evils are dreaded from unknown agents; and where real objects of terror are wanting, the soul, active to its own prejudice, and fostering its predominant inclination, finds imaginary ones, to whose power and malevolence it sets no limits. As these enemies are entirely invisible and unknown, the methods taken to appease them are equally unac-

unaccountable, and consist in ceremonies, observances, mortifications, sacrifices, presents, or in any practice, however absurd and frivolous, which either folly or knavery recommends to a blind and terrify'd credulity. Weakness, fear, melancholy, along with ignorance, are, therefore, the true sources of SUPERSTITION.

BUT the mind of man is also subject to an unaccountable elevation and presumption, proceeding from prosperous success, from luxuriant health, from strong spirits, or from a bold and confident disposition. In such a state of mind, the imagination swells with great, but confus'd conceptions, to which no sublunary beauties or enjoyments can correspond. Every thing mortal and perishable vanishes as unworthy of attention. And a full range is given to the fancy in the invisible regions or world of spirits, where the soul is at liberty to indulge itself in every imagination, which may best suit its present taste and disposition. Hence arise raptures, transports, and surprizing flights of fancy; and confidence and presumption still increasing, these raptures, being altogether unaccountable, and seeming quite beyond the reach of our ordinary faculties, are attributed to the immediate inspiration of that Divine Being who is the object of devotion. In a little time, the inspir'd person comes to regard himself as the chief favourite of the divinity; and when this frenzy once takes place, which is the summit of enthusiasm, every whimsy is consecrated: Human reason, and even morality are rejected as fallacious guides: And

the fanatick madman delivers himself over, blindly, and without reserve, to the suppos'd illapses of the spirit, and to inspirations from above. Hope, pride, presumption, a warm imagination, along with ignorance, are, therefore, the true sources of ENTHUSIASM.

THESE two species of false religion might afford occasion to many speculations; but I shall confine myself, at present, to a few reflections concerning their different influence on government and society.

MY first reflection is, *That superstition is favourable to priestly power, and enthusiasm as much or rather more contrary to it, than sound reason and philosophy.* As superstition is founded on fear, sorrow, and a depression of spirits, it represents the man to himself in such despicable colours, that he appears unworthy, in his own eyes, of approaching the divine presence, and naturally has recourse to any other person, whose sanctity of life, or, perhaps, impudence and cunning, have made him be suppos'd more favour'd by the divinity. To him the superstitious entrust their devotions: To his care they recommend their prayers, petitions, and sacrifices: And, by his means, hope to render their addresses acceptable to their incens'd deity. Hence the origin of * PRIESTS, who may justly be regarded as one of the

* By Priests, I here mean only the pretenders to power and dominion, and to a superior sanctity of character, distinct from

gustful inventions of a timorous and abject superstition, which, ever diffident of itself, dares not offer its own devotions, but ignorantly thinks to recommend itself to the divinity, by the mediation of his pretd friends and servants. As superstition is a favourable ingredient in almost all religions, even most fanatical; there being nothing but philosophy able to conquer entirely these unaccountable terrors; hence it proceeds, that in almost every sect of religion there are priests to be found: But the larger mixture there is of superstition, the higher is the authority of the priesthood. Modern judaism and popery, (especially the latter) being the most unphilosophical and absurd superstitions which have yet been known in the world, are the most enslav'd by their priests. As the church of *England* may justly said to retain a strong mixture of popish superstition, it partakes also, in its original constitution, of a tendency to priestly power and dominion; particularly in the respect it exacts to the sacerdotal character. and tho', according to the sentiments of that church, the prayers of the priest must be accompany'd with those of the laity; yet is he the mouth of the congregation, his person is sacred, and without his presence they would think their public devotions, or the sacraments, and other rites, acceptable to the divinity.

in virtue and good morals. These are very different from *clergymen*, who are set apart, *by the laws*, to the care of sacred matters, and to the conducting our public devotions with greater decency and order. There is no rank of men more to be respected than the latter.

On the other hand, it may be obſerv'd, that all enthuſiaſts have been free from the yoke of eccleſiaſtics, and have expreſt great independence in their devotion; with a contempt of forms, ceremonies, and traditions. The *quakers* are the moſt egregious, tho', at the ſame time, the moſt innocent, enthuſiaſts that have been yet known; and are, perhaps, the only ſect, who have never admitted prieſts amongſt them. The *independents*, of all the *Engliſh* ſectaries, approach neareſt to the *quakers* in fanaticiſm, and in their freedom from prieſtly bondage. The *preſbyterians* follow after, at an equal diſtance in both theſe particulars. In ſhort, this obſervation is founded on the moſt certain experience; and will alſo appear to be founded on reaſon, if we conſider, that as enthuſiaſm ariſes from a preſumptuous pride and confidence, it thinks itſelf ſufficiently qualify'd to *approach* the Divinity, without any human mediator. Its rapturous devotions are ſo fervent, that it even imagines itſelf *actually* to *approach* him by the way of contemplation and inward converſe; which makes it neglect all thoſe outward ceremonies and obſervances, to which the aſſiſtance of the prieſts appears ſo requiſite in the eyes of their ſuperſtitious votaries. The fanatic conſecrates himſelf, and beſtows on his own perſon a ſacred character, much ſuperior to what forms and ceremonious inſtitutions can confer on any other.

My *ſecond* reflection with regard to theſe ſpecies of falſe religion is, *that religions, which partake of*

enthusiasm are, on their first rise, much more furious and violent than those which partake of superstition; but in a little time become much more gentle and moderate. The violence of this species of religion, when excited by novelty, and animated by opposition, appears from numberless instances; of the *anabaptists* in *Germany*, the *camisars* in *France*, the *levellers* and other fanaticks in *England*, and the *covenanters* in *Scotland*. Enthusiasm being founded on strong spirits, and a presumptuous boldness of character, it naturally begets the most extreme resolutions; especially after it rises to that height as to inspire the deluded fanatics with the opinion of divine illuminations, and with a contempt for the common rules of reason, morality and prudence.

'TIS thus enthusiasm produces the most cruel desolations in human society: But its fury is like that of thunder and tempest, which exhaust themselves in a little time, and leave the air more calm and serene than before. When the first fire of enthusiasm is spent, men naturally, in such fanatical sects, sink into the greatest remissness and coolness in sacred matters; there being no body of men amongst them, endow'd with sufficient authority, whose interest is concern'd to support the religious spirit: No rites, no ceremonies, no holy observances, which may enter into the common train of life, and preserve the sacred principles from oblivion. Superstition, on the contrary, steals in gradually and insensibly; renders men tame and submissive; is acceptable to the magistrate, and seems inoffensive to the people: Till at last the

priest,

priest, having firmly establish'd his authority, becomes the tyrant and disturber of human society, by his endless contentions, persecutions, and religious wars. How smoothly did the *Romish* church advance in their acquisition of power? But into what dismal convulsions did they throw all *Europe*, in order to maintain it? On the other hand, our sectaries, who were formerly such dangerous bigots, are now become our greatest free-thinkers; and the *quakers* seem to approach nearly the only regular body of *deists* in the universe, the *literati*, or the disciples of *Confucius* in *China*.

My *third* observation on this head is, *that superstition is an enemy to civil liberty, and enthusiasm a friend to it*. As superstition groans under the dominion of the priests, and enthusiasm is destructive of all ecclesiastical power, this sufficiently accounts for the present observation. Not to mention, that enthusiasm, being the infirmity of bold and ambitious tempers, is naturally accompanied with a spirit of liberty; as superstition, on the contrary, renders men tame and abject, and fits them for slavery. We learn from the *English* history, that, during the civil wars, the *independents* and *deists*, tho' the most opposite in their religious principles; yet were united in their political ones, and were alike passionate for a commonwealth. And since the origin of *whig* and *tory*, the leaders of the *whigs* have either been *deists* or profest *latitudinarians* in their principles; that is, friends to toleration, and indifferent to any particular sect of *christians*: While the sectaries,

who have all a strong tincture of enthusiasm, have always, without exception, concur'd with that party, in the defence of civil liberty. The resemblance in their superstitions long united the high-church *tories* and the *Roman catholics*, in the support of prerogative and kingly power; tho' experience of the tolerating spirit of the *whigs* seems of late to have reconcil'd the *catholics* to that party.

THE *molinists* and *jansenists* in *France* have a thousand unintelligible disputes, which are not worthy the reflection of a man of sense: But what principally distinguishes these two sects, and alone merits attention, is the different spirit of their religion. The *molinists*, conducted by the *jesuites*, are great friends to superstition, rigid observers of external forms and ceremonies, and devoted to the authority of the priests, and to tradition. The *jansenists* are enthusiasts, and zealous promoters of the passionate devotion, and of the inward life; little influenc'd by authority; and, in a word, but half catholics. The consequences are exactly conformable to the foregoing reasoning. The *jesuites* are the tyrants and the slaves of the court: And the *jansenists* preserve alive the small sparks of the love of liberty, which are to be found in the *French* nation.

ESSAY

ESSAY XIII.

Of AVARICE.

'TIS eaſy to obſerve, that comic writers exaggerate every character, and draw their fop, or coward with ſtronger features than are any where to be met with in nature. This moral kind of painting for the ſtage has been often compar'd to the painting for cupolas and ceilings, where the colours are overcharg'd, and every part is drawn exceſſively large, and beyond nature. The figures ſeem monſtrous and diſproportion'd, when ſeen too nigh; but become natural and regular, when ſet at a diſtance, and plac'd in that point of view, in which they are intended to be ſurvey'd. For a like reaſon, when characters are exhibited in theatrical repreſentations, the want of reality removes, in a manner, the perſonages; and rendering them more cold and unentertaining, makes it neceſſary to compenſate, by the force of colouring, what they want in ſubſtance. Thus, we find in common life, that when a man once allows himſelf to depart from truth in his narrations, he never can keep within the bounds of probability; but adds ſtill ſome new circumſtance to render his ſtories more marvellous, and to ſatisfy his imagination. Two

men

men in buckram ſuits became eleven to Sir *John Falſtaff* before the end of his ſtory.

THERE is only one vice, which may be found in life with as ſtrong features, and as high a colouring, as need be employ'd by any ſatyriſt or comic poet; and that is AVARICE. Every day we meet with men of immenſe fortunes, without heirs, and on the very brink of the grave, who refuſe themſelves the moſt common neceſſaries of life, and go on heaping poſſeſſions on poſſeſſions, under all the real preſſures of the ſevereſt poverty. An old uſurer, ſays the ſtory, lying in his laſt agonies, was preſented by the prieſt with the crucifix to worſhip. He opens his eyes a moment before he expires, conſiders the crucifix, and cries, *Theſe jewels are not true; I can only lend ten piſtoles upon ſuch a pledge.* This was probably the invention of ſome epigrammatiſt; and yet every one, from his own experience, may be able to recollect almoſt as ſtrong inſtances of perſeverance in avarice. 'Tis commonly reported of a famous miſer in this city, that finding himſelf near death, he ſent for ſome of the magiſtrates, and gave them a bill of an hundred pounds, payable after his deceaſe; which ſum he intended ſhould be diſpos'd of in charitable uſes; but ſcarce were they gone, when he orders them to be call'd back, and offers them ready money, if they would abate five pounds of the ſum. Another noted miſer in the north, intending to defraud his heirs, and leave his fortune to the building an hoſpital, protracted the drawing of his will from day to day; and 'tis thought, that if thoſe intereſted in it

had

had not paid for the drawing it, he had died inteſtate. In ſhort, none of the moſt furious exceſſes of love and ambition are in any reſpect to be compar'd to the extremes of avarice.

THE beſt excuſe that can be made for avarice is, that it generally prevails in old men, or in men of cold tempers, where all the other affections are extinct; and the mind being incapable of remaining without ſome paſſion or purſuit, at laſt finds out this monſtrouſly abſurd one, which ſuits the coldneſs and inactivity of its temper. At the ſame time, it ſeems very extraordinary, that ſo froſty, ſpiritleſs a paſſion ſhould be able to carry us farther than all the warmth of youth and pleaſure. But if we look more narrowly into the matter, we ſhall find, that this very circumſtance renders the explication of the caſe more eaſy. When the temper is warm, and full of vigour, it naturally ſhoots out more ways than one, and produces inferior paſſions to counter-balance, in ſome degree, its predominant inclination. 'Tis impoſſible for a perſon of that temper, however bent on any purſuit, to be depriv'd of all ſenſe of ſhame, or all regard to the ſentiments of mankind. His friends muſt have ſome influence over him: And other conſiderations are apt to have their weight. All this ſerves to reſtrain him within ſome bounds. But 'tis no wonder that the avaritious man, being, from the coldneſs of his temper, without regard to reputation, to friendſhip, or to pleaſure, ſhould be carry'd ſo far by his prevailing inclination, and ſhould diſplay his paſſion in ſuch ſurprizing inſtances.

ACCORD-

ACCORDINGLY we find no vice ſo irreclaimable as avarice: And tho' there ſcarcely has been a moraliſt or philoſopher, from the beginning of the world to this day, who has not levell'd a ſtroke at it, we hardly find a ſingle inſtance of any perſon's being cur'd of it. For this reaſon, I am more apt to approve of thoſe, who attack it with wit and humour, than of thoſe who treat it in a ſerious manner. There being ſo little hopes of doing good to the people infected with this vice, I would have the reſt of mankind, at leaſt, diverted by our manner of expoſing it: As indeed there is no kind of diverſion, of which they ſeem ſo willing to partake.

AMONG the fables of *Monſieur de la Motte*, there is one levell'd againſt avarice, which ſeems to me more natural and eaſy, than moſt of the fables of that ingenious author. A miſer, ſays he, being dead, and fairly interr'd, came to the banks of the *Styx*, deſiring to be ferry'd over along with the other ghoſts. *Charon* demands his fare, and is ſurpriz'd to ſee the miſer, rather than pay it, throw himſelf into the river, and ſwim over to the other ſide, notwithſtanding all the clamour and oppoſition that could be made to him. All hell was in an uproar; and each of the judges was meditating ſome puniſhment, ſuitable to a crime of ſuch dangerous conſequence to the infernal revenues. Shall he be chain'd to the rock along with *Prometheus*? Or tremble below the precipice in company with the *Danaides*? Or aſſiſt *Siſyphus* in rolling his ſtone? No, ſays *Minos*, none of theſe.

We

We muſt invent ſome ſeverer puniſhment. Let him be ſent back to the earth, to ſee the uſe his heirs are making of his riches.

I HOPE it will not be interpreted as a deſign of ſetting myſelf in oppoſition to this famous author, if I proceed to deliver a fable of my own, which is intended to expoſe the ſame vice of avarice. The hint of it was taken from theſe lines of Mr. *Pope*,

Damn'd to the mines, an equal fate betides
The ſlave that digs it, and the ſlave that hides.

OUR old mother Earth once lodg'd an indictment againſt AVARICE before the courts of heaven, for her wicked and malicious counſel and advice, in tempting, inducing, perſuading, and traiterouſly ſeducing the children of the plaintiff to commit the deteſtable crime of parricide upon her, and, mangling her body, ranſack her very bowels for hidden treaſure. The indictment was very long and verboſe; but we muſt omit a great part of the repetitions and ſynonymous terms, not to tire our reader too much with our tale. *Avarice*, being call'd before *Jupiter* to anſwer to this charge, had not much to ſay in her own defence. The injury was clearly prov'd upon her. The fact, indeed, was notorious, and the injury had been frequently repeated. When therefore the plaintiff demanded juſtice, *Jupiter* very readily gave ſentence in her favour; and his decree was to this purpoſe, That ſince dame *Avarice*, the defendant, had thus grievouſly injur'd dame *Earth*, the

the plaintiff, ſhe was hereby order'd to take that treaſure, of which ſhe had feloniouſly robb'd the ſaid plaintiff, by ranſacking her boſom, and in the ſame manner, as before, opening her boſom, reſtore it back to her, without diminution or retention. From this ſentence, it ſhall follow, ſays *Jupiter* to the by-ſtanders, That, in all future ages, the retainers of *Avarice* ſhall bury and conceal their riches, and thereby reſtore to the earth what they took from her.

ESSAY

ESSAY XIV.

Of the DIGNITY *of* HUMA NATURE.

THERE are certain ſects, which ſecretly fo themſelves in the learn'd world, as well as the political; and tho' ſometimes they come not to open rupture, yet they give a different turn to t ways of thinking of thoſe who have taken party either ſide. The moſt remarkable of this kind a the ſects, that are founded on the different ſentime with regard to the *dignity of human nature*; which a point that ſeems to have divided philoſophers a poets, as well as divines, from the beginning of t world to this day. Some exalt our ſpecies to t ſkies, and repreſent man as a kind of human dei god, who derives his origin from heaven, and r tains evident marks of his lineage and deſce Others inſiſt upon the blind ſides of human natu and can diſcover nothing, except vanity, in whi man ſurpaſſes the other animals, whom he affects much to deſpiſe. If an author poſſeſſes the tale of rhetorick, and declamation, he commonly tak party with the former: If his turn lies towards iro and ridicule, he naturally throws himſelf into t other extreme.

am far from thinking, that all those, who have
ociated human nature, have been enemies to
e, and have expos'd the frailties of their fellow-
ures with any bad intention. On the contrary,
sensible, that a very delicate sense of morals,
cially when attended with somewhat of the *Misan-*
e, is apt to give a man a disgust of the world,
to make him consider the common course of hu-
affairs with too much spleen and indignation.
ift, however, be of opinion, that the sentiments
hose, who are inclin'd to think favourably of
kind, are much more advantageous to virtue,
the contrary principles which give us a mean
ion of our nature. When a man is possess'd of
gh notion of his rank and character in the crea-
, he will naturally endeavour to act up to it, and
scorn to do a base or vicious action, which might
him below that figure which he makes in his
imagination. Accordingly we find, that all our
te and fashionable moralists insist upon this topic,
endeavour to represent vice as unworthy of man,
well as odious in itself.

Women are generally much more flatter'd in their
th than men; which may proceed from this rea-
, among others, that their chief point of honour
consider'd as much more difficult than ours, and
uires to be supported by all that decent pride,
ich can be instill'd into them.

WE find very few disputes which are not founded on some ambiguity in the expression; and I am persuaded, that the present dispute concerning the dignity of human nature, is not more exempt from it than any other. It may, therefore, be worth while to consider, what is real, and what is only verbal, in this controversy.

THAT there is a natural difference betwixt merit and demerit, virtue and vice, wisdom and folly, no reasonable man will deny: But yet 'tis evident, that in affixing the term, which denotes either our approbation or blame, we are commonly more influenc'd by comparison than by any fixt unalterable standard in the nature of things. In like manner, quantity, and extension, and bulk, are by every one acknowledg'd to be real things: But when we call any animal *great* or *little*, we always form a secret comparison betwixt that animal and others of the same species; and 'tis that comparison which regulates our judgment concerning its greatness. A dog and a horse may be of the very same size, while the one is admir'd for the greatness of its bulk, and the other for the smallness. When I am present, therefore, at any dispute, I always consider with myself, whether it be a question of comparison or not that is the subject of the controversy; and if it be, whether the disputants compare the same objects together, or talk of things that are widely different. As the latter is commonly the case, I have long since learnt to neglect such disputes as manifest abuses of leisure,

ſure, the moſt valuable preſent that could be made to mortals.

IN forming our notions of human nature, we are very apt to make a compariſon betwixt men and animals, which are the only creatures endow'd with thought that fall under our ſenſes. Certainly this compariſon is very favourable to mankind. On the one hand we ſee a creature, whoſe thoughts are not limited by any narrow bounds, either of place or time; who carries his reſearches into the moſt diſtant regions of this globe, and beyond this globe, to the planets and heavenly bodies; looks backward to conſider the firſt origin of human race; caſts his eyes forward to ſee the influence of his actions upon poſterity, and the judgments which will be form'd of his character a thouſand years hence; a creature, who traces cauſes and effects to a great length and intricacy; extracts general principles from particular appearances; improves upon his diſcoveries; corrects his miſtakes; and makes his very errors profitable. On the other hand, we are preſented with a creature the very reverſe of this; limited in its obſervations and reaſonings to a few ſenſible objects which ſurround it; without curioſity, without foreſight; blindly conducted by inſtinct, and arriving in a very ſhort time at its utmoſt perfection, beyond which it is never able to advance a ſingle ſtep. What a wide difference is there betwixt theſe creatures! And how exalted a notion muſt we entertain of the former, in compariſon of the latter!

THERE are two means commonly emp
deſtroy this concluſion: *Firſt*, By making a
repreſentation of the caſe, and inſiſting on
the weakneſſes of human nature. And *seco*
forming a new and ſecret compariſon betw
and beings of the moſt perfect wiſdom. Am
other excellencies of man, there is this one rem
that he can form a notion of perfections m
yond what he has experience of in himſelf;
not limited in his conception of wiſdom and
He can eaſily exalt his notions, and conceiv
gree of knowledge, which, when compar'd to
will make the latter appear very contemptib
will cauſe the difference betwixt that and t
city of animals, in a manner, to diſappear
niſh. Now this being a point, in which all th
is agreed, that human underſtanding falls i
ſhort of perfect wiſdom: 'Tis proper we
know when this compariſon takes place, that
not diſpute, where there is no real difference
ſentiments. Man falls much ſhorter of perf
dom, and even of his own ideas of perfect
than animals do of man; but yet the la
ference is ſo conſiderable, that nothing but
pariſon with the former, can make it appear
moment.

'TIS alſo very uſual to *compare* one man wi
ther; and finding very few whom we can call
virtuous, we are apt to entertain a contempt
tion of our ſpecies in general. That we may

ible of the fallacy of this way of reaſoning, we nay obſerve, that the honourable appellations of wiſe and virtuous, are not annex'd to any particular legree of thoſe qualities of *wiſdom* and *virtue*; but riſe altogether from the compariſon we make betwixt one man and another. When we find a man, who arrives at ſuch a pitch of wiſdom as is very uncommon, we pronounce him a wiſe man: So that to ay, there are few wiſe men in the world, is really to ay nothing; ſince 'tis only by their ſcarcity, that hey merit that appellation. Were the loweſt of our pecies as wiſe as *Tully*, or my lord *Bacon*, we ſhould till have reaſon to ſay, that there are few wiſe men. For in that caſe we ſhould exalt our notions of wiſdom, and ſhould not pay a ſingular honour to any one, who was not ſingularly diſtinguiſh'd by his talents. In like manner, I have heard it obſerv'd by thoughtleſs people, that there are few women poſſeſt of beauty, in compariſon of thoſe who want it; not conſidering, that we beſtow the epithet of *beautiful* only on ſuch as poſſeſs a degree of beauty, that is common to them with a few. The ſame degree of beauty in a woman is call'd deformity, which is treated as real beauty in one of our ſex.

As 'tis uſual, in forming a notion of our ſpecies, to *compare* it with the other ſpecies above or below it, or to compare the individuals of the ſpecies among themſelves; ſo we often compare together the different motives or actuating principles of human nature, in order to regulate our judgment concerning it. And indeed, this is the only kind of compariſon

which is worth our attention, or decides any thing in the present question. Were the selfish and vicious principles of human nature so much predominant above the social and virtuous, as is asserted by some philosophers, we ought undoubtedly to entertain a contemptible notion of human nature. There is much of a dispute of words in all this controversy. When a man denies the sincerity of all public spirit or affection to a country and community, I am at a loss what to think of him. Perhaps he never felt this passion in so clear and distinct a manner as to remove all his doubts concerning its force and reality. But when he proceeds afterwards to reject all private friendship; if no interest or self-love intermixes itself, I am then confident he abuses terms, and confounds the ideas of things; since it is impossible for any one to be so selfish, or rather so stupid, as not to make a difference betwixt one man and another, and give some preference to qualities, which engage his approbation and esteem. Is he also, say I, as insensible to anger as he pretends to be to friendship? And does injury and wrong no more affect him than kindness or benefits? Impossible: He does not know himself: He has forgot the movements of his mind; or rather he makes use of a different language from the rest of his countrymen, and calls not things by their proper names. What say you of natural affection? (I subjoin) Is that also a species of self-love? Yes: All is self-love. *Your* children are lov'd only because they are yours: *Your* friend for a like reason: And *your* country engages you only so far as it has a connexion with *yourself*: Were the idea

of

of ſelf remov'd, nothing would affect you: You would be altogether inactive and inſenſible: Or if you ever gave yourſelf any movement, it would only be from vanity, and a deſire of fame and reputation to this ſame ſelf. I am willing, reply I, to receive your interpretation of human actions, provided you admit the facts. That ſpecies of ſelf-love, which diſplays itſelf in kindneſs to others, you muſt allow to have great influence, and even greater, on many occaſions, than that which remains in its original ſhape and form. For how few are there, who, having a family, children, and relations, do not ſpend more on the maintenance and education of theſe than on their own pleaſures? This, indeed, you juſtly obſerve, may proceed from their ſelf love, ſince the proſperity of their family and friends is one, or the chief of their pleaſures, as well as their chief honour. Be you alſo one of theſe ſelfiſh men, and you are ſure of every one's good opinion and good will; or not to ſhock your nice ears with theſe expreſſions, the ſelf-love of every one, and mine amongſt the reſt, will then incline us to ſerve you, and ſpeak well of you.

IN my opinion, there are two things which have led aſtray thoſe philoſophers, who have inſiſted ſo much on the ſelfiſhneſs of man. In the *firſt* place, they found, that every act of virtue or friendſhip was attended with a ſecret pleaſure: From whence they concluded, that friendſhip and virtue could not be diſintereſted. But the fallacy of this is obvious. The virtuous ſentiment or paſſion produces the plea-

ſure, and does not ariſe from it. I feel a pleaſure in doing good to my friend, becauſe I love him; but do not love him for the ſake of that pleaſure.

In the *ſecond* place, it has always been found, that the virtuous are far from being indifferent to praiſe; and therefore they have been repreſented as a ſet of vain-glorious men, who had nothing in view but the applauſes of others. But this alſo is a fallacy. 'Tis very unjuſt in the world, when they find any tincture of vanity in a laudable action, to depreciate it upon that account, or aſcribe it entirely to that motive. The caſe is not the ſame with vanity, as with other paſſions. Where avarice or revenge enters into any ſeemingly virtuous action, 'tis difficult for us to determine how far it enters, and 'tis natural to ſuppoſe it the ſole actuating principle. But vanity is ſo nearly ally'd to virtue, and to love the fame of laudable actions approaches ſo near the love of laudable actions for their own ſake, that theſe paſſions are more capable of mixture, than any other kinds of affection; and 'tis almoſt impoſſible to have the latter without ſome degree of the former. Accordingly we find, that this paſſion for glory is always warp'd and vary'd according to the particular taſte or ſentiment of the mind on which it falls. *Nero* had the ſame vanity in driving a chariot, that *Trajan* had in governing the empire with juſtice and ability. To love the glory of virtuous actions is a ſure proof of the love of virtuous actions.

ESSAY XV.

Of LIBERTY *and* DESPOTISM.

THOSE who employ their pens on political subjects, free from party-rage, and party-prejudices, cultivate a science, which, of all others, contributes most both to public utility, and to the private satisfaction of those who addict themselves to the study of it. I am apt, however, to entertain a suspicion, that the world is still too young to fix many general truths in politics, which will remain true to the latest posterity. We have not as yet had experience of above three thousand years; so that not only the art of reasoning is still defective in this science, as well as in all others, but we even want sufficient materials upon which we can reason. 'Tis not fully known, of what degrees of refinement, either in virtue or vice, human nature is susceptible; nor what may be expected of mankind from any great revolution in their education, customs, or principles. *Machiavel* was certainly a great genius; but having confin'd his study to the furious and tyrannical governments of ancient times, or to the little disorderly principalities of *Italy*, his reasonings, especially upon monarchical government, have been found ex-

tremely defective; and there ſcarce is any his *prince*, which ſubſequent experience h tirely refuted. *A weak prince*, ſays he, *is of receiving good counſel; for if he conſult wi he will not be able to choose among their diff ſels. If he abandon himſelf to one, that mi perhaps, have capacity; but he will not be lo ſter: He will be ſure to diſpoſſeſs his maſter, himſelf and his own family upon the throne.* tion this, among innumerable inſtances, of of that politician, proceeding, in a great from his having liv'd in too early an a world, to be a good judge of political tr moſt all the princes of *Europe* are at preſent by their miniſters, and have been ſo for centuries; and yet no ſuch event has ever or can poſſibly happen. *Sejanus* might p throning the *Cæſars*; but *Fleury*, tho' ever ſ could not, while in his ſenſes, entertain hopes of diſpoſſeſſing the *Bourbons*.

TRADE was never eſteem'd an affair 'till the laſt century; and there ſcarcel ancient writer on politics, who has made of it *. Even the *Italians* have kept a ſilence with regard to it; though it has no the chief attention, as well of miniſters of of ſpeculative reaſoners. The great opuler deur, and military atchievements of the two

* *Xenophon* mentions it; but with a doubt if it advantage to a ſtate. Εἰδὲ καὶ ἐμπορία ὀφελεῖ τι Xen. Hiero. *Plato* totally excludes it from his republic. De legibus lib. 4.

powers, seem first to have instructed mankind in the vast importance of an extensive commerce.

HAVING, therefore, intended in this essay to have made a full comparison of liberty and despotism, and to have shewn the great advantages of the former above the latter; I began to entertain a suspicion, that no man in this age was sufficiently qualify'd for such an undertaking; and that whatever any one should advance on that head would, in all probability, be refuted by further experience, and be rejected by posterity. Such mighty revolutions have happen'd in human affairs, and so many events have arisen, contrary to the expectation of the ancients, that they are sufficient to beget the suspicion of still further changes.

IT had been observ'd by the ancients, that all the arts and sciences arose among free nations; and, that the *Persians* and *Egyptians*, notwithstanding all their ease, opulence and luxury, made but faint efforts towards a relish in those finer pleasures, which were carry'd to such perfection by the *Greeks*, amidst continual wars, attended with poverty, and the greatest simplicity of life and manners. It had also been observ'd, that as soon as the *Greeks* lost their liberty, tho' they encreas'd mightily in riches, by means of the conquests of *Alexander*; yet the arts, from that moment, declin'd among them, and have never since been able to raise their head in that climate. Learning was transplanted to *Rome*, the only free nation at that time in the universe; and having

met with so favourable a soil, it made pr
shoots for above a century; till the decay of
produc'd also the decay of letters, and sprea
barbarism over the world. From these two
ments, of which each was double in its ki
shew'd the fall of learning in despotic gover
as well as its rise in popular ones, *Longinus*
himself sufficiently justify'd, in asserting, that
and sciences could never flourish, but in a f
vernment: And in this opinion, he has been f
by several eminent writers * in our own count
either confin'd their view merely to ancien
or entertain'd too great a partiality in favour
form of government, which is establish'd amc

But what would these writers have said, tc
stances of modern *Rome* and of *Florence?* Of
the former carry'd to perfection all the finer
sculpture, painting and music, as well as poet
they groan'd under slavery, and under the sla
priests: While the latter made the greatest pro
the arts and sciences, after they began to lc
liberty by the usurpations of the family of the
Ariosto, *Tasso*, *Galilæo*, no more than *Rapha*
Michael Angelo, were not born in republics. A
the *Lombard* school was famous as well as the
yet the *Venetians* have had the smallest shar
honours, and seem rather inferior to the other
in their genius for the arts and sciences.
establish'd his school at *Antwerp*, not at *Am*

* Mr. *Addison* and Lord *Shaftsbury*.

Dresden, not *Hamburgh*, is the centre of politeness in *Germany*.

BUT the most eminent instance of the flourishing of learning in despotic governments, is that of FRANCE, which scarce ever enjoy'd any establish'd liberty, and yet has carry'd the arts and sciences as near perfection as any other nation. The *English* are, perhaps, better philosophers; the *Italians* better painters and musicians; the *Romans* were better orators: But the *French* are the only people, except the *Greeks*, who have been at once philosophers, poets, orators, historians, painters, architects, sculptors, and musicians. With regard to the stage, they have excell'd even the *Greeks*, who have far excell'd the *English*. And, in common life, they have, in a great measure, perfected that art, the most useful and agreeable of any, *l'Art de Vivre*, the art of society and conversation.

IF we consider the state of the sciences and polite arts in our own country, *Horace*'s observation, with regard to the *Romans*, may, in a great measure, be apply'd to the *British*,

——*Sed in longum tamen ævum*
Manserunt, hodieque manent vestigia ruris.

THE elegance and propriety of stile have been very much neglected among us. We have no dictionary of our language, and scarce a tolerable grammar. The first polite prose we have, was wrote by

a man who is ſtill alive *. As to *Strat*, *L* even *Temple*, they knew too little of the rul to be eſteem'd very elegant writers. The *Bacon*, *Harrington* and *Milton*, is altogether pedantic; tho' their ſenſe be excellent. this country, have been ſo much occupy' great diſputes of *Religion*, *Politics* and *l* that they had no reliſh for the minute obſ of grammar and criticiſm. And tho' this thinking muſt have conſiderably improv'd and our talent of reaſoning beyond thoſe nations; it muſt be confeſt, that even in thoſ above-mention'd, we have not any ſtand which we can tranſmit to poſterity: And tl we have to boaſt of, are a few eſſays towar juſt philoſophy; which, indeed, promiſe ve but have not, as yet, reach'd any degree fection.

It has become an eſtabliſh'd opinion, t merce can never flouriſh but in a free gov and this opinion ſeems to be founded on and larger experience than the foregoi regard to the arts and ſciences. If we tr merce in its progreſs thro' *Tyre*, *Athens*, *Syra thage*, *Venice*, *Florence*, *Genoa*, *Antwerp*, *England*, &c. we ſhall always find it to ha ſeat in free governments. The three greate towns now in the world, are *London*, *Amſter Hamburgh*; all free cities, and proteſta that is, enjoying a double liberty. It m ever, be obſerv'd, that the great jealouſy e

* Dr. *Swift*.

of late, with regard to the commerce of *France*, seems to prove, that this maxim is no more certain and infallible, than the foregoing, and that the subjects of an absolute prince may become our rivals in commerce, as well as in learning.

DURST I deliver my opinion in an affair of so much uncertainty, I would assert, that, notwithstanding the efforts of the *French*, there is something pernicious to commerce inherent in the very nature of absolute government, and inseparable from it: Tho' the reason I would assign for this opinion, is somewhat different from that which is commonly insisted on. Private property seems to me almost as secure in a civiliz'd *European* monarchy, as in a republic; nor is danger much apprehended, in such a government, from the violence of the sovereign; more than we commonly dread harm from thunder, or earthquakes, or any accident the most unusual and extraordinary. Avarice, the spur of industry, is so obstinate a passion, and works its way thro' so many real dangers and difficulties, that 'tis not likely it will be scarr'd by an imaginary danger, which is so small, that it scarce admits of calculation. Commerce therefore, in my opinion, is apt to decay in absolute governments, not because it is there less *secure*, but because it is less *honourable*. A subordination of ranks is absolutely necessary to the support of monarchy. Birth, titles, and place, must be honour'd above industry and riches. And while these notions prevail, all the considerable traders will be tempted to throw up their commerce, in order to purchase

purchàſe ſome of thoſe employments, to which privileges and honours are annex'd.

SINCE I am upon this head of the alterations which time has produc'd, or may produce in politics, I muſt obſerve, that all kinds of government, free and deſpotic, ſeem to have undergone, in modern times, a great change to the better, with regard both to foreign and domeſtic management. The *balance of power* is a ſecret in politics fully known only to the preſent age; and I muſt add, that the internal POLICE of the ſtate has alſo receiv'd great improvements within the laſt century. We are inform'd by *Salluſt*, that *Cataline*'s army was much augmented by the acceſſion of the highwaymen about *Rome*; tho' I believe, that all of that profeſſion, who are at preſent diſpers'd over *Europe*, would not amount to a regiment. In *Cicero*'s pleadings for *Milo*, I find this argument, among others, made uſe of to prove, that his client had not aſſaſſinated *Clodius*. Had *Milo*, ſays he, intended to have kill'd *Clodius*, he had not attack'd him in the day-time, and at ſuch a diſtance from the city: He had way-laid him at night, near the ſuburbs [illegible] it might have been pretended, that [illegible] by robbers; and the frequency of the [illegible] have favour'd the deceit. This is [illegible] of the looſe police of *Rome*, and of [illegible] of theſe robbers; ſince *Cicero* [illegible] attended with thirty ſlaves, [illegible]m'd, and ſufficiently accu[illegible]er in the frequent tumults [illegible] tribune.

[illegible] *Orat. pro Milone.*

BUT

parliaments, and in popular governments a source of degeneracy, which in time will bring these species of government still nearer an equality. The grounds of this, which arise in France, the most perfect model of pure monarchy, proceed not from the number or weight of the taxes, beyond what are to be met with in free countries; but from the expensive, unequal, arbitrary, and intricate method of levying them, by which the industry of the poor, especially of the peasants and farmers, is, in a great measure, discourag'd, and agriculture render'd a beggarly and a slavish employment. But to whose advantage do these abuses tend? If to that of the nobility, they might be esteem'd inherent in that form of government; since the nobility are the true supports of monarchy; and 'tis natural their interest should be more consulted, in such a constitution, than that of the people. But the nobility are, in reality, the principal losers by this oppression; since it ruins their estates, and beggars their tenants. The only gainers by it are the *Financiers*, a race of men despis'd and hated by the nobility and the whole kingdom. If a prince or a minister, therefore, should arise, endow'd with sufficient discernment to know his own and the public interest, and with sufficient force of mind to break thro' ancient customs, we might expect to see these abuses remedy'd; in which case, the difference betwixt their absolute government and our free one, would not appear so considerable as at present.

The source of degeneracy, which may be remark'd in free governments, consists in the practice of contracting

tracting debt, and mortgaging the public revenues, by which taxes may, in time, become altogether intolerable, and all the property of the [illegible] into the hands of the public [illegible] modern date. The *Athenians*, [illegible] public, paid near two hundred [illegible] of money, which any emergent [illegible] cessary for them to borrow [illegible] *phon* *. Among the moderns, [illegible] the practice of borrowing [illegible] and have well nigh ruin'd themselves by it. Absolute princes have also contracted debts; but as an absolute prince may play the bankrupt when he pleases, his people can never be oppress'd by his debts. In popular governments, the people, and chiefly those who have the highest offices, being always the public creditors, 'tis impossible the state can ever make use of this remedy, which, however it may be sometimes necessary, is always cruel and barbarous. This, therefore, seems to be an inconvenience, which nearly threatens all free governments; especially our own, at the present juncture of affairs. And what a strange contrivance is this, to increase our frugality of the public money, lest, for want of it, we be reduc'd, by the multiplicity of taxes, to curse our free government, and wish ourselves in the same state of servitude with all the nations that surround us!

* Κτῆσιν δὲ ἀπ' οὐδενὸς [illegible] ἐν περιτελίσσοιν τὴν [illegible] ναῖον πλείστα [illegible] μεγὰν περιτελίσσοντες, [illegible] τῶν ἀθρόοιαν [illegible] ΠΟΡΟΙ.

ESSAY XVI.

Of ELOQUENCE.

THOSE, who consider the periods and revolutions of human kind, as represented in history, are entertain'd with a spectacle full of pleasure and variety, and see, with surprize, the manners, customs, and opinions of the same species susceptible [illegible] prodigious changes in different periods of [illegible] It may, however, be observ'd, that in *civil* [illegible] there is found a much greater uniformity than [illegible] history of learning and science, and that the negotiations and politics of one age resemble those of another, than the taste, wit, and speculative principles. Interest and ambition, honour and shame, friendship and enmity, gratitude and revenge, are [illegible] ome movers in all public transactions [illegible] sions are of a very stubborn and [illegible] comparison of the sentiments [illegible] which are easily vary'd by education [illegible] le. The *Goths* were much more [illegible] *mans*, in taste and science, than is [illegible] rtue.

BUT

BUT not to compare together nations ſo widely different, that they may almoſt be eſteem'd of a different ſpecies; it may be obſerv'd, that even this latter period of human learning, is, in many reſpects, of an oppoſite character to the ancient; and that if we be ſuperior in philoſophy, we are ſtill, notwithſtanding all our refinements, much inferior in eloquence.

IN ancient times, no work of genius was thought to require ſo great parts and capacity, as the ſpeaking in public; and ſome eminent writers have pronounc'd the talents, even of a great poet or philoſopher, to be of an inferior nature to thoſe requiſite for ſuch an undertaking. *Greece* and *Rome* produc'd, each of them, but one accompliſh'd orator; and whatever praiſes the other celebrated ſpeakers might merit, they were ſtill eſteem'd much inferior to theſe great models of eloquence. 'Tis obſervable, that the ancient critics could ſcarce find two orators, in any age, who deſerv'd to be plac'd preciſely in the ſame rank, and poſſeſs'd the ſame degree of merit. *Calvus*, *Cælius*, *Curio*, *Hortenſius*, *Cæſar* roſe one above another: But the greateſt of that age was inferior to *Cicero*, the moſt eloquent ſpeaker who had ever appear'd in *Rome*. Thoſe of fine taſte, however, pronounc'd this judgment of the *Roman* orator, as well as of the *Grecian*, that both of them ſurpaſs'd in eloquence all that had ever appear'd, but that they were far from reaching the perfection of their art, which was infinite, and not only exceeded human force

force to attain, but human imagination to conceive. *Cicero* declares himself dissatisfy'd with his own performances; nay, even with those of *Demosthenes*. *Ita sunt avidæ & capaces meæ aures*, says he, *& semper aliquid immensum, infinitumque desiderant*.

This single circumstance is sufficient to make us apprehend the wide difference betwixt ancient and modern eloquence, and let us see how much the latter is inferior to the former. Of all the polite and learned nations, *Britain* alone possesses a popular government, or admits into the legislature such numerous assemblies as can be suppos'd to lie under the dominion of eloquence. But what has *Britain* to boast of in this particular? In enumerating all the great men, who have done honour to our country, we exult in our poets and philosophers: But what orators are ever mention'd? Or where are the monuments of their genius to be met with? There are found, indeed, in our histories, the names of several, who directed the resolutions of our parliament: But neither themselves nor others have taken the pains to preserve their speeches; and the authority which they possess'd seems to have been owing to their experience, wisdom, or power, more than to their talents for oratory. At present, there are above half a dozen speakers in the two houses, who, in the judgment of the public, have reach'd very near the same pitch of eloquence; and no man pretends to give any one the preference to the rest. This seems to me a certain proof, that none of them have attain'd much beyond a mediocrity in their art, and that the species of eloquence, which they

they aſpire to, gives no exerciſe to the ſublimer faculties of the mind, but may be reach'd by ordinary talents and a ſlight application. A hundred cabinet-makers in *London* can work a table or a chair equally well; but no one poet can write verſes with ſuch ſpirit and elegance as Mr. *Pope*.

WE are told, that when *Demoſthenes* was to plead, all ingenious men flock'd to *Athens* from the moſt remote parts of *Greece*, as to the moſt celebrated ſpectacle of the world *. At *London*, you may ſee men ſauntering in the court of requeſts, while the moſt important debate is carrying on in the two houſes; and many do not think themſelves ſufficiently compenſated, for the loſing of their dinners, by all the eloquence of our moſt celebrated ſpeakers. When old *Cibber* is to act, the curioſity of the public is more excited, than when our prime miniſter is to defend himſelf from a motion for his removal or impeachment.

EVEN a perſon unacquainted with the noble remains of ancient orators, may judge, from a few ſtrokes, that the ſtile or ſpecies of their eloquence was infinitely more ſublime than that which modern

* Ne illud quidem intelligunt, non modo ita memoriæ proditum eſſe, ſed ita neceſſe fuiſſe, cum *Demoſthenes* dicturus eſſet, ut concurſus, audiendi cauſa, ex tota *Græcia* fierent. At cum iſti *Attici* dicunt, non modo a corona (quod eſt ipſum miſerabile) ſed etiam ab advocatis relinquuntur.

Cicero de Claris Oratoribus.

orators

orators aſpire to. How abſurd would it appear, in our temperate and calm ſpeakers, to make uſe of an *Apoſtrophe*, like that noble one of *Demoſthenes*, ſo much celebrated by *Quinctilian* and *Longinus*, when, juſtifying the unſucceſsful battle of *Chæronea*, he breaks out, *No, my Fellow-Citizens, No: You have not err'd. I ſwear by the* manes *of thoſe heroes, who fought for the ſame cauſe in the plains of* MARATHON *and* PLATÆA. Who could now endure ſuch a bold and poetical figure, as that which *Cicero* employs, after deſcribing in the moſt tragical terms the crucifixion of a *Roman* citizen. *Should I paint the horrors of this ſcene, not to* Roman *citizens, not to the allies of our ſtate, not to thoſe who have ever heard of the* Roman *Name, not even to men, but to brute-creatures; or, to go farther, ſhould I lift up my voice, in the moſt deſolate ſolitude, to the rocks and mountains, yet ſhould I ſurely ſee thoſe rude and inanimate parts of nature mov'd with horror and indignation at the recital of ſo enormous an action**. With what a blaze of eloquence muſt ſuch a ſentence be ſurrounded to give it grace, or cauſe it to make any impreſſion on the hearers! And what noble art and ſublime talents are requiſite to arrive, by juſt degrees, at a ſentiment ſo bold and exceſſive: To inflame

* *The original is*; Quod ſi hæc non ad cives Romanos, non ad aliquos amicos noſtræ civitatis, non ad eos qui populi Romani nomen audiſſent; denique, ſi non ad homines, veram ad beſtias; aut etiam, ut longius progrediar, ſi in aliqua deſertiſſima ſolitudine, ad ſaxa & ad ſcopulos hæc conqueri & deplorare vellem, tamen omnia muta atque inanima, tant & tam indigna rerum atrocitate commoverentur. Cic. in ver.

the

ence, so as to make them accompany the in such violent passions, and such elevated ions: And to conceal, under a torrent of ce, the artifice, by which all this is effec-

ABLE to this vehemence of thought and ex-, was the vehemence of action, observed in ient orators. The *supplosio pedis*, or stamping e foot, was one of the most usual and mode-stures which they made use of *; tho' that is teem'd too violent, either for the senate, bar, oit, and is only admitted into the theatre, to pany the most violent passions, which are there nted.

is somewhat at a loss to what cause we may so sensible a decline of eloquence in latter The genius of mankind, at all times, is, ps, equal: The moderns have applied them-, with great industry and success, to all the arts and sciences: And one of the most learn'd is of the universe possesses a popular govern-; which seems requisite for the full display of noble talents: But notwithstanding all these ntages, our progress in eloquence is very incon-

Ubi dolor? Ubi ardor animi, qui etiam ex infantium is elicere voces & querelas solet? nulla perturbatio, nulla corporis: frons non percussa, non femur; pedis *minimum est*) nulla supplosio. Itaque tantum abfuit ut in-mares nostros animos; somnum isto loco vix tenebamus.

Cicero de Claris Oratoribus.

ſiderable, in compariſon of the advances, ı have made in all the other parts of learnin

SHALL we aſſert, that the ſtrains of an quence are unſuitable to our age, and not t tated by modern orators? Whatever reaſon made uſe of to prove this, I am perſuaded be found, upon examination, to be unſoun ſatisfactory.

Firſt, IT may be ſaid, that in ancient ti ring the flouriſhing period of the *Greek* ar learning, the municipal laws, in every ſta but few and ſimple, and the deciſion of ca in a great meaſure, left to the equity and ſenſe of the judges. The ſtudy of the laws then a laborious occupation, requiring tl gery of a whole life to finiſh it, and utterly patible with every other ſtudy or profeſſio great ſtateſmen and generals among the were all lawyers; and *Cicero*, to ſhew the fa this ſcience, declares, that, in the midſt o occupations, he would undertake, in a few make himſelf a compleat civilian. Now, pleader addreſſes himſelf to the equity of his he has much more room to diſplay his el than where he muſt draw his arguments fr laws, ſtatutes, and precedents. In the forn many circumſtances muſt be taken in, many conſiderations regarded; and even favour a nation, which it belongs to the orator, by his eloquence, to conciliate, may be diſguis'd u

appearance of equity. But, how ſhall a modern lawyer have leiſure to quit his toilſome occupations, in order to gather the flowers of *Parnaſſus*? Or, what opportunity ſhall he have of diſplaying them, amidſt the rigid and ſubtile arguments, objections, and replies, which he is oblig'd to make uſe of? The greateſt genius, and greateſt orator, who ſhould pretend to plead before the *Chancellor*, after a month's ſtudy of the laws, would only labour to make himſelf ridiculous.

I AM ready to own, that this circumſtance, of the multiplicity and intricacy of laws, is a diſcouragement to eloquence in modern times: But I aſſert, that it will not account intirely for the decline of that noble art. It may baniſh oratory from *Weſtminſter-Hall*, but not from either houſe of parliament. Among the *Athenians*, the *Areopagites* expreſly forbad all allurements of eloquence; nor do we find, in the *Greek* orations wrote in the *judiciary* form, ſuch a bold and rhetorical ſtile as appears in the *Roman*. But to what a pitch did the *Athenians* carry their eloquence in the *deliberative* kind, when affairs of ſtate were canvaſt, and the liberty, happineſs, and honour of the nation were the ſubjects of debate? Diſputes of this nature elevate the genius above all others, and give the fulleſt ſcope to eloquence; and ſuch diſputes are very frequent in this nation.

Secondly, IT may be pretended, that the decline of eloquence is owing to the ſuperior good ſenſe of the moderns, who reject, with diſdain, all thoſe rhe-

ice; but they took a different way of eluding . They hurry'd away with such a torrent of su-ie and pathetic, that they left their hearers no ire to perceive the artifice, by which they were iv'd. Nay, to consider the matter aright, they e not deceiv'd by any artifice. The orator, by force of his own genius and eloquence, first in-i'd himself with anger, indignation, pity, for-; and then communicated those impetuous move-its to his audience.

DOES any man pretend to have more good sense *Julius Cæsar?* Yet that haughty conqueror, we w, was so subdu'd by the charms of *Cicero*'s elo-nce, that he was, in a manner, constrain'd to nge his settled purpose and resolution, and to ab-e a criminal, whom, before that orator appear'd, was determin'd to condemn.

OME objections, I own, notwithstanding his vast ess, may lie against some passages of the *Roman* or. He is too florid and rhetorical: His figures too striking and palpable: His divisions drawn fly from the rules of the school: And his wit ains not always the artifice even of a pun, rhyme, jingle of words. The *Grecian* address'd himself n audience much less refin'd than the *Roman* senate udges. The lowest vulgar of *Athens* were his reigns, and the arbiters of his eloquence †. Yet

Longinus, cap. 15.

The orators form'd the taste of the *Athenian* people, not people of the orators. *Gorgias Leontinus* was very taking with

ing the heights of ancient eloquence, or rejected all ſuch endeavours, as unſuitable to the ſpirit of modern aſſemblies? A few ſucceſsful attempts of this nature might rouze up the genius of the nation, excite the emulation of the youth, and accuſtom our ears to a more ſublime and more pathetic elocution, than what we have been hitherto entertain'd with. There is certainly ſomething accidental in the firſt riſe and the progreſs of the arts in any nation. I doubt if a very ſatisfactory reaſon can be given, why ancient *Rome*, while it receiv'd all its arts from *Greece*, could attain only to a taſte or reliſh of ſtatuary, painting and architecture, without reaching the practice of theſe noble arts: While modern *Rome* has been excited, by a few remains found among the ruins of antiquity, and has carry'd theſe arts to the greateſt perfection. Had ſuch a cultivated genius for oratory, as *Waller*'s for poetry, ariſen during the civil wars, when liberty began to be fully eſtabliſh'd, and popular aſſemblies to enter into all the moſt material points of government; I am perſuaded ſo illuſtrious an example would have given a quite different turn to *Britiſh* eloquence, and made us reach the perfection of the ancient model. Our orators would then have done honour to their country, as well as our poets and philoſophers, and *Britiſh Ciceros* have appear'd as well as *Britiſh Plutarchs* and *Virgils*.

I HAVE confeſt that there is ſomething accidental in the origin and progreſs of the arts in any nation; and yet I cannot forbear thinking, that if the other

learn'd and polite nations of *Europe* had poſſeſt the ſame advantages of a popular government, they would probably have carry'd eloquence to a greater height than it has yet reach'd in *Britain*. The *French* ſermons, eſpecially thoſe of *Flechier* and *Boſſuet*, are much ſuperior to the *Engliſh* in this particular; and in both of them there are many ſtrokes of the moſt ſublime poetry. None but private cauſes, in that country, are ever debated before their parliament or courts of judicature; but notwithſtanding this diſadvantage, there appears a ſpirit of eloquence in many of their lawyers, which, with proper cultivation and encouragement, might riſe to the greateſt height. The pleadings of *Patru* are very elegant, and give us room to imagine what ſo fine a genius could have perform'd in queſtions concerning public liberty or ſlavery, peace or war, who exerts himſelf with ſuch ſucceſs, in debates concerning the price of an old horſe, or a goſſiping ſtory of a quarrel betwixt an abbeſs and her nuns. For, 'tis remarkable, that this polite writer, tho' eſteem'd by all the men of wit in his time, was never employ'd in the moſt conſiderable cauſes of their courts of judicature, but liv'd and dy'd in poverty: From an ancient prejudice induſtriouſly propagated by the dunces in all countries, *That a man of genius is unfit for buſineſs*. The diſorders produc'd by the factions againſt *cardinal Mazarine*, made the parliament of *Paris* enter into the diſcuſſion of public affairs; and during that ſhort interval, there appear'd many ſymptoms of the revival of ancient eloquence. The *avocat general*, *Talon*, in an oration, invok'd on his knees the ſpirit of

of St. *Lewis* to look down with compassion on his divided and unhappy people, and to inspire them, from above, with the love of concord and unanimity *. The members of the *French* academy have attempted to give us models of eloquence in their harangues at their admittance: But, having no subject to discourse upon, they have run altogether into a fulsome strain of panegyric and flattery, the most barren of all subjects. Their stile, however, is commonly, on these occasions, very elevated and sublime, and might reach the greatest heights, were it employ'd on a subject more favourable and engaging.

THERE are some circumstances, I confess, in the *English* temper and genius, which are disadvantageous to the progress of eloquence, and render all attempts of that kind more dangerous and difficult among them than among any other nation. The *English* are conspicuous for *good-sense*, which makes them very jealous of any attempts to deceive them by the flowers of rhetoric and elocution. They are also peculiarly *modest*; which makes them consider it as a piece of arrogance to offer any thing but reason to public assemblies, or attempt to guide them by passion or fancy. I may, perhaps, be allow'd to add, that the people in general are not remarkable for delicacy of taste, or for sensibility to the charms of the muses. Their *musical parts*, to use the expression of a noble author, are but indifferent. Hence their comic poets, to move them, must have recourse

* *De Retz*'s Memoirs.

to obſcenity; their tragic poets to blood and ſlaughter: And hence their orators, being depriv'd of any ſuch reſource, have abandon'd altogether the hopes of moving them, and have confin'd themſelves to plain argument and reaſoning.

THESE circumſtances, join'd to particular accidents, may, perhaps, have retarded the growth of eloquence in this kingdom; but will not be able to prevent its ſucceſs, if ever it appear amongſt us: And one may ſafely pronounce, that this is a field, in which the moſt flouriſhing lawrels may yet be gather'd, if any youth of accompliſh'd genius, thoroughly acquainted with all the polite arts, and not ignorant of public buſineſs, ſhould appear in parliament, and accuſtom our ears to an eloquence more commanding and pathetic. And to confirm me in this opinion, there occur two conſiderations, the one deriv'd from ancient, the other from modern times.

'TIS ſeldom or never found, when a falſe taſte in poetry or eloquence prevails among any people, that it has been preferr'd to a true, upon compariſon and reflection. It commonly prevails merely from ignorance of the true, and from the want of perfect models, to lead men into a juſter apprehenſion, and more refin'd reliſh of thoſe productions of genius. When *theſe* appear, they ſoon unite all ſuffrages in their favour, and, by their natural and powerful charms, gain over, even the moſt prejudic'd, to the love and admiration of them. The principles of every

every passion, and of every sentiment, is in every man; and when touch'd properly, they rise to life, and warm the heart, and convey that satisfaction by which a work of genius is distinguish'd from the adulterate beauties of a capricious wit and fancy. And if this observation be true, with regard to all the liberal arts, it must be peculiarly so, with regard to eloquence; which, being merely calculated for the public, and for men of the world, cannot, with any pretext of reason, appeal from the people to more refin'd judges; but must submit to the public verdict, without reserve or limitation. Whoever, upon comparison, is deem'd by a common audience the greatest orator, ought most certainly to be pronounc'd such, by men of science and erudition. And tho' an indifferent orator may triumph for a long time, and be esteem'd altogether perfect by the vulgar, who are satisfy'd with his accomplishments, and know not in what he is defective: Yet, whenever the true genius arises, *he* draws to him the attention of every one, and immediately appears superior to his rival.

NOW, to judge, by this rule, ancient eloquence, that is, the sublime and passionate, is of a much juster taste than the modern, or the argumentative and rational; and, if properly executed, will always have more command and authority over mankind. We are satisfy'd with our mediocrity, because we have had no experience of any thing better: But the ancients had experience of both, and, upon comparison, gave the preference to that kind, of which they have left us such applauded models. For, if I am not

mistaken, our modern eloquence is of the same stil or species with that which ancient critics denominate *Attic* eloquence, that is, calm, elegant and subtil which instructed the reason more than affected th passions, and never rais'd its tone above argument c common discourse. Such was the eloquence of *Lysi* among the *Athenians*, and of *Calvus* among the *Ro mans*. These were esteem'd in their time; but whe compar'd with *Demosthenes* and *Cicero*, were eclips'd like a taper when set in the rays of a meridian sun Those latter orators possess'd the same elegance, and subtility, and force of argument, with the former; but what render'd them chiefly admirable, was that pathetic and sublime, which, on proper occasions, they threw into their discourse, and by which they commanded the resolutions of their audience.

Of this species of eloquence we have scarce had any instances in *Britain*, at least in our public speakers. In our writers, we have had some instances, which have met with great applause, and might assure our ambitious youth of equal or superiour glory in attempts for the revival of ancient eloquence. My lord *Bolingbroke*'s productions, with all their defects in argument, method, and precision, contain a force and energy, which our orators scarce ever aim at; tho' 'tis evident, that such an elevated stile has much better grace in a speaker than in a writer, and is assur'd of a more prompt and more astonishing success. 'Tis there seconded by the graces of voice and action: The movements are mutually communicated by sympathy, betwixt the orator and the audience: And the

the very aspect of a large assembly, attentive to the discourse of one man, must inspire him with a peculiar elevation, sufficient to give a propriety to the strongest figures and expressions. 'Tis true, there is a great prejudice against *set-speeches*; and a man can scarce escape ridicule, who repeats a discourse, as a school-boy his lesson, and takes no notice of any thing which has been advanc'd in the course of the debate. But where is the necessity of falling into this absurdity? A public speaker must know beforehand the question under debate. He may compose all the arguments, objections, and answers, such as he thinks will be most proper for his discourse *. If any thing new occur, he may supply it from his invention; nor will the difference be very apparent betwixt his elaborate and his extemporary compositions. The mind naturally continues with the same *impetus* or *force*, which it has acquir'd by its motion; as a vessel, once impell'd by the oars, carries on its course for some time, when the original impulse is suspended.

I SHALL conclude this subject with observing, that even tho' our modern orators should not elevate their stile, or aspire to a rivalship with the ancient; yet there is a material defect in most of their speeches, which they might correct, without departing from that compos'd air of argument and reasoning, to

* The first of the *Athenians*, who compos'd and wrote his speeches was *Pericles*, a man of business and a man of sense, if ever there was one Πρῶτος γραπτὸν λόγον ἐν δικαστηρίῳ ἔδωκε, τῶν περὶ αὐτῷ σχεδιαζόντων, Suidas in Περίκλης.

which

which they limit their ambition. Their great affectation of extemporary discourses has made them reject all order and method, which seems so requisite to argument, and without which 'tis scarce possible to produce an intire conviction on the mind. 'Tis not, that one would recommend many formal divisions in a public discourse, unless the subject very evidently offer them: But 'tis easy, without this formality, to observe a method, and make that method conspicuous to the hearers, who will be infinitely pleas'd to see the arguments rise naturally from one another, and will retain a more thorough persuasion, than can arise from the strongest reasons, which are thrown together in confusion.

ESSAY

ESSAY XVII.

Of the RISE *and* PROGRESS *of the* ARTS *and* SCIENCES.

THERE is nothing, which requires greater nicety, in our enquiries concerning human affairs, than to diſtinguiſh exactly what is owing to *chance*, and what proceeds from *cauſes*; nor is there any ſubject, in which an author is more apt to deceive himſelf, by falſe ſubtilties and refinements. To ſay, that any event is deriv'd from chance, cuts ſhort all farther enquiry concerning it, and leaves the writer in the ſame ſtate of ignorance with the reſt of mankind. But when the event is ſuppos'd to proceed from certain and ſtable cauſes, he may then diſplay his ingenuity, in aſſigning theſe cauſes; and as a man of any ſubtility can never be at a loſs in this particular, he has thereby an opportunity of ſwelling his volumes, and diſcovering his profound knowledge, in obſerving what eſcapes the vulgar and ignorant.

THE diſtinguiſhing betwixt chance and cauſes muſt depend upon every particular man's ſagacity, in conſidering every particular incident. But, if I were to aſſign any general rule to help us in applying this

this distinction, it would be the following, *What pends upon a few persons is, in a great measure, to ascrib'd to chance, or secret and unknown causes: W arises from a great number, may often be accounted by determinate and known causes.*

THERE may two very natural reasons be assig for this rule. *First*, If you suppose a dye to ha any byass, however small, to a particular side, t byass, though, perhaps, it may not appear in a f throws, will certainly prevail in a great numb and will cast the balance intirely to that side. In li manner, when any *causes* beget a particular incli tion or passion, at a certain time, and among a c tain people; tho' many individuals may escape t contagion, and be rul'd by passions peculiar to the selves; yet the multitude will certainly be infect with the common passion, and be govern'd by it all their actions.

Secondly, THOSE principles or causes, which a fitted to operate on a multitude, are always of a gr ser and more stubborn nature, less subject to acciden and less influenc'd by whim and private fancy, th those which operate on a few only. The latter a commonly so delicate and refin'd, that the smallest i cident in the health, education, or fortune of a par cular person, is sufficient to divert their course, a retard their operation; nor is it possible to reduce th to any general maxims or observations. Their i fluence at one time, will never assure us concerni their influence at another; even tho' all the gene circumstances should be the same in both cases.

T

To judge by this rule, the domeſtic and the gradual revolutions of a ſtate, muſt be a more proper object of reaſoning and obſervation, than the foreign and the violent, which are commonly produc'd by ſingle perſons, and are more influenc'd by whim, folly, or caprice, than by general paſſions and intereſts. The depreſſion of the lords, and riſe of the commons in *England*, after the ſtatutes of alienations, and the increaſe of trade and induſtry, are more eaſily accounted for by general principles, than the depreſſion of the *Spaniſh*, and riſe of the *French* monarchy, after the death of *Charles Quint*. Had *Harry* IV. Cardinal *Richelieu*, and *Loüis* XIV. been *Spaniards*; and *Philip* II, III, and IV, and *Charles* II. been *Frenchmen*, the hiſtory of theſe two nations had been intirely revers'd.

For the ſame reaſon, 'tis more eaſy to account for the riſe and progreſs of commerce in any kingdom, than for that of learning; and a ſtate, which ſhould apply itſelf to the encouragement of the one, would be much more aſſur'd of ſucceſs, than one which ſhould cultivate the other. Avarice, or the deſire of gain, is an univerſal paſſion, which operates at all times, in all places, and upon all perſons: But curioſity, or the love of knowledge, has a very limited influence, and requires youth, leiſure, education, genius, and example, to make it govern any perſon. You will never want bookſellers, while there are buyers of books: But there may frequently be readers, where there are no authors. Multitudes of people,

neceſſity

neceſſity and liberty, have begot commerce in *Holland*: But ſtudy and application have ſcarce produc'd any eminent writers.

We may, therefore, conclude, that there is no ſubject, in which we muſt proceed with more caution, than in tracing the hiſtory of the arts and ſciences; leſt we aſſign cauſes which never exiſted, and reduce what is merely contingent to ſtable and univerſal principles. Thoſe, who cultivate the ſciences in any ſtate, are always few in number: The paſſion, which governs them, limited: Their taſte and judgment tender and eaſily perverted: And their application diſturb'd with the ſmalleſt accident. Chance, therefore, or ſecret and unknown cauſes, muſt have a great influence on the riſe and progreſs of all the refin'd arts.

But there is a reaſon, which induces me not to aſcribe the matter altogether to chance. Tho' the perſons, who cultivate the ſciences with ſuch aſtoniſhing ſucceſs, as to attract the admiration of poſterity, be always few, in all nations and all ages; 'tis impoſſible but a ſhare of the ſame ſpirit and genius muſt be antecedently diffus'd thro' the people among whom they ariſe, in order to produce, form, and cultivate, from their earlieſt infancy, the taſte and judgment of thoſe eminent writers. The maſs cannot be altogether inſipid, from which ſuch refin'd ſpirits are extracted *. *There is a God within us*, ſays *Ovid*, who

* Eſt Deus in nobis; agitante caleſcimus illo:
Impetus hic, ſacræ ſemina mentis habet.
Ovid, Faſt. Lib. I.

breathes

breathes that divine fire, by which we are animated. Poets, in all ages, have advanc'd this claim to inſpiration. There is not, however, any thing ſupernatural in the caſe. Their fire is not kindled from heaven. It only runs along the earth; is caught from one breaſt to another; and burns brighteſt, where the materials are beſt prepar'd, and moſt happily diſpos'd. The queſtion, therefore, concerning the riſe and progreſs of the arts and ſciences, is not altogether a queſtion concerning the taſte, genius, and ſpirit of a few, but concerning thoſe of a whole people; and may, therefore, be accounted for, in ſome meaſure, by general cauſes and principles. I grant, that a man, who ſhould enquire why ſuch a particular poet, as *Homer*, for inſtance, exiſted in ſuch a place, at ſuch a time, would throw himſelf head-long into chimæra, and could never treat of ſuch a ſubject, without a multitude of falſe ſubtilties and refinements. He might as well pretend to give a reaſon, why ſuch particular generals, as *Fabius* and *Scipio*, liv'd in *Rome* at ſuch a time, and why *Fabius* came into the world before *Scipio*. For ſuch incidents as thoſe, no other reaſon can be given but that of *Horace*.

Scit genius, natale comes, qui temperat aſtrum,
Naturæ Deus humanæ, mortalis in unum——
—Quodque caput, vultu mutabilis, albus & ater.

BUT, I am perſuaded, that in many caſes very good reaſons might be given, why ſuch a particular nation is more polite and learn'd, at a particular time,

time, than any of its neighbours. At least, this is so curious a subject, that it were a pity to abandon it intirely, before we have found, whether or not it be susceptible of reasoning, and can be reduc'd to any general principles. I shall, therefore, proceed to deliver a few observations on this subject, which I submit, with entire deference, to the censure and examination of the learned.

My first observation is, *That it is impossible for the arts and sciences to arise, at first, among any people, unless that people enjoy the blessing of a free government.*

In the first ages of the world, when men are, as yet, barbarous and ignorant, they seek no farther security against mutual violence and injustice, than the choice of some rulers, few or many, in whom they place an implicite confidence, without providing any security, by laws or political institutions, against the violence and injustice of these rulers. If the authority be center'd in a single person, and if the people, by conquest or generation, increase to a great multitude, the monarch, finding it impossible, in his own person, to execute every office of sovereignty, in every place, must delegate his authority to inferior magistrates, who preserve peace and order in their particular districts. As experience and education have not yet refin'd the judgments of men to any considerable degree, the prince, who is himself unrestrain'd, never dreams of restraining his ministers, but delegates his full authority to every one, whom he sets over any portion of the people. All general laws

are

are attended with inconveniencies, when apply'd to particular cases; and it requires great penetration and experience, both to perceive that these inconveniencies are fewer than what result from full discretionary powers in every magistrate; and also, to discern what general laws are, upon the whole, attended with fewest inconveniencies. This is a matter of so great difficulty, that men may have made some advances, even in the sublime arts of poetry and eloquence, where a rapidity of genius and imagination assists their progress, before they have arriv'd at any great refinement in their municipal laws, where frequent trials, and diligent observation can alone direct their improvements. It is not, therefore, to be suppos'd, that a barbarous monarch, unrestrain'd and uninstructed, will ever become a legislator, or think of restraining his *Bashas* in every province, or even his *Cadis* in every village. We are told, that the late *Czar*, tho' actuated with a noble genius, and smit with the love and admiration of *European* arts; yet profess'd an esteem for the *Turkish* policy in this particular, and approv'd of such summary decisions of causes, as are practised in that barbarous monarchy, where the judges are not restrain'd by any methods, forms, or laws. He did not perceive, how contrary such a practice would have been to all his other endeavours for refining his people. Despotic power, in all cases, is somewhat oppressive and debasing; but 'tis altogether ruinous and intolerable, when contracted into a small compass; and becomes still worse, when the person, who possesses it, knows that the time of his authority is limited and uncertain.

Habet

Habet subjectos tanquam suos; viles, ut alienos *. He governs the subjects with full authority, as if they were his own; and with negligence or tyranny, as belonging to another. A people govern'd after such a manner are *slaves*, in the full and proper sense of the word; and 'tis impossible they can ever aspire to any refinements of taste or reason. They dare not so much as pretend to enjoy the necessaries of life, in plenty or security.

To expect, therefore, that the arts and sciences should ever take their first rise in a monarchy, is to expect a contradiction. Before these refinements have been study'd, the monarch is ignorant and uninstructed; and, not having knowledge sufficient to make him sensible of the necessity of balancing his government upon general laws, he delegates his full powers to all inferior magistrates. This barbarous policy debases the people, and for ever prevents all improvement. Were it possible, that, before science was known in the world, a monarch could possess so much wisdom as to become a legislator, and govern his people by law, not by the arbitrary will of their fellow subjects, it might be possible for that species of government to be the first nursery of arts and sciences. But in that supposition there seems to be a manifest repugnancy.

'Tis possible, that a republic, in its infant state, may be supported by as few laws as a barbarous monarchy, and may entrust as unlimited an authority to

* *Tacit.* Hist. Lib. 1.

its

ts magiſtrates or judges. But, beſides that the frequent elections of theſe magiſtrates by the people, are a conſiderable check upon their authority; 'tis impoſſible, but, in time, the neceſſity of reſtraining the magiſtrates, in order to preſerve liberty, muſt at laſt appear, and give riſe to general laws and ſtatutes. The *Roman* conſuls, for ſome time, decided all cauſes, without being confin'd by any poſitive ſtatutes, till the people, bearing this yoke with impatience, created the *decemvirs*, who promulgated the *twelve tables*; a body of laws, which, tho', perhaps, they were not equal in bulk to one *Engliſh* act of parliament, were almoſt the only written rules which regulated property and puniſhment, for ſome ages, in that famous republic. They were, however, ſufficient, along with the forms of a free government, to ſecure the lives and properties of the citizens; to exempt one man from the dominion of another; and to protect every one from the violence or tyranny of his fellow citizens. In ſuch a ſituation the ſciences may raiſe their heads, and flouriſh: But never can have being amidſt ſuch a ſcene of oppreſſion and ſlavery, as always reſults from barbarous monarchies, where the people alone are reſtrain'd by the authority of the magiſtrates, and the magiſtrates are not reſtrain'd by any law or ſtatute. An unlimited deſpotiſm of this nature, while it exiſts, effectually puts a ſtop to all improvements, and keeps men from attaining that knowledge, which is requiſite to inſtruct them in the advantages ariſing from a better police, and more moderate authority.

HERE then are the advantages of republics. Tho' a republic ſhou'd be barbarous, it neceſſarily, by an infallible operation, gives riſe to LAW, even before mankind have made any conſiderable advances in the other ſciences. From law ariſes ſecurity: From ſecurity curioſity: And from curioſity knowledge. The latter ſteps of this progreſs may be more accidental; but the former are altogether neceſſary. A republic, without laws, can never have any duration. On the contrary, in a monarchical government, law ariſes not neceſſarily from the forms of the government. Monarchy, when abſolute, contains even ſomething repugnant to law. Great wiſdom and reflection can alone reconcile them. But ſuch a degree of wiſdom can never be expected, before the greater refinements and improvements of human reaſon. Theſe refinements require curioſity, ſecurity and law. The *firſt* growth, therefore, of the arts and ſciences can never be expected in deſpotic governments.

ACCORDING to the neceſſary progreſs of things, law muſt precede ſcience. In republics law may precede ſcience, and may ariſe from the very nature of the government. In monarchies it ariſes not from the nature of the government, and cannot precede ſcience. An abſolute prince, who is barbarous, renders all his miniſters and magiſtrates as abſolute as himſelf: And there needs no more to prevent, for ever, all induſtry, curioſity and ſcience.

THERE

THERE are other causes, which discourage the ise of the refin'd arts in despotic governments; ho' I take the want of laws, and the delegation of all powers to every petty magistrate, to be the principal. Eloquence certainly arises more naturally in popular governments: Emulation too, in every accomplishment, must be there more animated and enliven'd: And genius and capacity have a fuller scope and career. All these causes render free governments the only proper *nursery* for the arts and sciences.

THE second observation which I shall make on this head, is, *That nothing is more favourable to the rise of politeness and learning, than a number of neighbouring independent states connected together by commerce and policy*. The emulation, which naturally rises among those neighbouring states, is an obvious source of improvement: But what I wou'd chiefly insist on is the stop, which such limited territories give both to *power* and to *authority*.

EXTENDED governments, where a single person has great influence, become soon despotic; but small ones change naturally into commonwealths. A large government is accustom'd by degrees to tyranny; because each act of violence is at first perform'd upon a part, which, being distant from the majority, is not taken notice of, nor excites any violent ferment. Besides, a large government, tho' the whole be discontented, may, by a lit-

tle art, be kept in obedience; becauſe each part, being ignorant of the reſolutions of the reſt, is afraid to begin any commotion or inſurrection. Not to mention, that there is a ſuperſtitious reverence for princes, which mankind naturally fall into when they do not often ſee the ſovereign, and when many of them become not acquainted with him, ſo as to perceive his weakneſſes. And as large ſtates can afford a great expence, in order to ſupport the pomp of majeſty; this is a kind of faſcination on mankind, and naturally contributes to the enſlaving of them.

In a ſmall government, any act of oppreſſion is immediately known thro' the whole: The murmurs and diſcontents, proceeding from it, are eaſily communicated: And the indignation riſes the higher, that the ſubjects are not apt to apprehend, in ſuch ſtates, that the diſtance is very wide betwixt themſelves and their ſovereign. "No man," ſaid the prince de *Condé*," "is a hero to his *Valet de Chambre*." 'Tis certain, that admiration and acquaintance are altogether incompatible with regard to any mortal creature. *Antigonus*, being complimented by his flatterers, as a deity, and as the ſon of that glorious planet, which illuminates the univerſe. *Upon that head*, ſays he, *you may conſult the perſon that empties my cloſe ſtool.* Sleep and love convinc'd *Alexander*, that he was not a God: But I ſuppoſe that ſuch as attended him daily, cou'd eaſily, from the numberleſs weakneſſes to which he was ſubject, have given him many other ſtill more convincing proofs of his humanity.

But

BUT the divisions into small states are favourable to learning, by stopping the progress of *authority*, as well as that of *power*. Reputation is often as great a fascination upon mankind as sovereignty, and is equally destructive to the freedom of thought and examination. But where a number of neighbouring states have a great intercourse of arts and commerce, their mutual jealousy keeps them from receiving too lightly the law from each other, in matters of taste or of reasoning, and makes them examine every work of art with the greatest care and accuracy. The contagion of popular opinion spreads not so easily from one place to another. It readily receives a check in some state or other, where it concurs not with the prevailing prejudices. And nothing but nature and reason, or at least, what bears them a strong resemblance, can force its way thro' all obstacles, and unite the most rival nations into an esteem and admiration of it.

GREECE was a cluster of little principalities, which soon became republics; and being united both by their near neighbourhood, and by the ties of the same language and interest, they enter'd into the closest intercourse of commerce and of learning. There concurr'd a happy climate, a soil not unfertile, and a most harmonious and comprehensive language; so that every circumstance, among that people, seem'd to favour the rise of the arts and sciences. Each city produc'd its several artists and philosophers, who refus'd to yield the preference to those of the

neighbouring republics: Their contentions and debates ſharpen'd the wits of men: A variety of objects was preſented to the judgment, while each challeng'd the preference to the reſt: And the ſciences, not being dwarf'd by the reſtraint of authority, were enabled to make ſuch conſiderable ſhoots, as are, even at this time, the objects of our admiration. After the *Roman chriſtian* or *catholic* church had ſpread itſelf over the civiliz'd world, and had engroſt all the learning of the times; being really one large ſtate within itſelf, and united under one head; this variety of ſects immediately diſappear'd, and the *Peripatetic* philoſophy was alone admitted into all the ſchools, to the utter depravation of every kind of learning. But mankind having, at length, thrown off this yoke, affairs are now return'd nearly to the ſame ſituation as before, and *Europe* is at preſent a copy at large, of what *Greece* was formerly a pattern in miniature. We have ſeen the advantage of this ſituation in ſeveral inſtances. What check'd the progreſs of the *Carteſian* philoſophy, to which the *French* nation ſhew'd ſuch a ſtrong propenſity towards the end of the laſt century, but the oppoſition made to it by the other nations of *Europe*, who ſoon diſcover'd the weak ſides of that philoſophy? The ſevereſt ſcrutiny, which *Newton*'s theory has undergone, proceeded not from his countrymen but from foreigners; and if it can overcome the obſtacles which it meets with at preſent in all parts of *Europe*, it will probably go down triumphant to the lateſt poſterity. The *Engliſh* are become ſenſible of the ſcandalous licentiouſneſs of their ſtage, from the example

example of the *French* decency and morals. The *French* are convinc'd, that their theatre has become ſomewhat effeminate, by too much love and gallantry; and begin to approve of the more maſculine taſte of ſome of their neighbouring nations.

IN *China* there ſeems to be a pretty conſiderable ſtock of politeneſs and ſcience, which, in the courſe of ſo many centuries, might naturally be expected to ripen into ſomething more perfect and finiſh'd, than what has yet ariſen from them. But *China* is one vaſt empire, ſpeaking one language, govern'd by one law, and ſympathizing in the ſame manners. The authority of any teacher, ſuch as *Confucius*, was propagated eaſily from one corner of the empire to another. None had courage to reſiſt the torrent of popular opinion. And poſterity were not bold enough to diſpute what had been univerſally receiv'd by their anceſtors. This ſeems to be one natural reaſon, why the ſciences have made ſo ſlow a progreſs in that mighty empire *.

IF

* If it be aſkt how we can reconcile to the foregoing principles the happineſs, riches, and good police of the *Chineſe*, who have always been govern'd by a ſole monarch, and can ſcarce form an idea of a free government; I would anſwer, that tho' the *Chineſe* government be a pure monarchy, it is not, properly ſpeaking, abſolute. This proceeds from a peculiarity of the ſituation of that country: They have no neighbours, except the *Tartars*, from whom they were, in ſome meaſure, ſecur'd, at leaſt ſeem'd to be ſecur'd, by their famous wall, and by the great ſuperiority of their numbers. By this means, military diſcipline has always been much neglected amongſt them; and their ſtanding forces are mere

If we consider the face of the globe, *Europe*, of all the four parts of the world, is the most broken by seas, rivers, and mountains; and *Greece* of all countries of *Europe*. Hence these regions were naturally divided into several distinct governments. And hence the sciences arose in *Greece*; and *Europe* has been hitherto the most constant habitation of them.

I have sometimes been inclin'd to think, that interruptions in the periods of learning, were they not attended with such a destruction of ancient books, and the records of history, wou'd be rather favourable to the arts and sciences, by breaking the progress of authority, and dethroning the tyrannical usurpers over human reason. In this particular, they have the same influence, as interruptions in political governments and societies. Consider the blind submission of the ancient philosophers to the several masters in each school, and you will be convinc'd,

militia, of the worst kind; and unfit to suppress any general insurrection in countries so extremely populous. The sword, therefore, may properly be said to be always in the hands of the people, which is a sufficient restraint upon the monarch, and obliges him to lay his *mandarins* or governors of provinces under the restraint of general laws, in order to prevent those rebellions, which we learn from history to have been so frequent and dangerous in that government. Perhaps, a pure monarchy of this kind, were it fitted for defence against sovereign enemies, would be the best of all governments, as having both the tranquillity attending kingly power, and the moderation and liberty of popular assemblies.

that

hat no good cou'd ever be expected from a hundred centuries of such a servile philosophy. Even the *Eclectics*, who arose about the age of *Augustus*, notwithstanding their professing to chuse freely what pleas'd them from every different sect, were yet, in the main, as slavish and dependent as any of their brethren; since they sought for truth, not in nature, but in the several schools; where they suppos'd she must necessarily be found, tho' not united in a body, yet dispers'd in parts. Upon the revival of learning, those sects of *Stoics* and *Epicureans*, *Platonists* and *Pythagoreans* cou'd never regain any credit or authority; and, at the same time, by the example of their fall, kept men from submitting; with such blind deference, to those new sects, which have attempted to gain an ascendant over them.

The *third* observation, which I shall form on this head, of the rise and progress of the arts and sciences, is, *That tho' the only proper* Nursery *of these noble plants be a free government, yet they may be transplanted into any government; and that a republic is most favourable to the growth of the sciences, and a civiliz'd monarchy to that of the polite arts.*

To balance a large state or society, whether monarchical or republican, on general laws, is a work of so great difficulty, that no human genius, however comprehensive, is able, by the mere dint of reason and reflection, to effect it. The judgments of many must unite in this work: Experience must guide their labour: Time must bring it to perfec-

tion: And the feeling of inconveniencies muſt co
the miſtakes, which they inevitably fall into, in t
firſt trials and experiments. Hence the imp
bility appears, that this undertaking ſhould be
gun and carry'd on in any monarchy; ſince fu
form of government, e're civiliz'd, knows no c
ſecret in policy, than that of entruſting unlim
powers with every governor or magiſtrate,
ſubdividing the people into ſo many claſſes
orders of ſlavery. From ſuch a ſituation, no
provements can ever be expected in the ſciences
the liberal arts, in laws, and ſcarce in the ma
arts or manufactures. The ſame barbariſm and
norance, with which the government commence
propagated to all poſterity, and can never come
period by the efforts or ingenuity of ſuch unhi
ſlaves.

But tho' Law, the ſource of all ſecurity
happineſs, ariſes late in any government, and i
ſlow product of order and of liberty, it is not
ſerv'd with the ſame difficulty, with which it is
duc'd; but when it has once taken root, is a h
plant, which will ſcarce ever periſh thro' the ill cu
of men, or the rigour of the ſeaſons. The ar
luxury, and much more the liberal arts, whicl
pend on a refin'd taſte or ſentiment, are eaſily
becauſe they are always reliſh'd by a few only, w
leiſure, fortune and genius fit them for ſuch an
ments. But what is profitable to every m
and in common life, when once diſcover'd,
ſcarce ever periſh, but by the total ſubverſio
ſoc

ſociety, and by ſuch furious inundations of barbarous invaders, as obliterate all memory of former arts and civility. Imitation alſo is apt to tranſport theſe coarſer and more uſeful arts from one climate to another, and make them precede the refin'd arts in their progreſs; tho' perhaps they ſprang after them in their firſt riſe and propagation. From theſe cauſes proceed civiliz'd monarchies, where the arts of government, firſt invented in free ſtates, are preſerv'd, to the mutual advantage and ſecurity of ſovereign and ſubject.

However perfect, therefore, the monarchical form may appear to ſome politicians, it owes all it's perfection to the republican; nor is it poſſible, that a pure deſpotiſm, eſtabliſh'd among a barbarous people, can ever, by its native force and energy, refine and poliſh itſelf. It muſt borrow its laws, and methods, and inſtitutions, and conſequently its ſtability and order, from free governments. Theſe advantages are the ſole growth of republics. The extenſive deſpotiſm of a barbarous monarchy, by entering into the detail of the government, as well as into the principal points of adminiſtration, for ever prevents all ſuch improvements.

In a civiliz'd monarchy, the prince alone is unreſtrain'd in the exerciſe of his authority, and poſſeſſes alone a power, which is not bounded by any thing but cuſtom, example, and the ſenſe of his own intereſt. Every miniſter or magiſtrate, however eminent, muſt ſubmit to the general laws, which

govern the whole ſociety, and muſt exert the authority delegated to him after the manner, which is preſcrib'd. The people depend on none but their ſovereign, for the ſecurity of their property. He is ſo far remov'd from them, and is ſo much exempt from private jealouſies or intereſts, that this dependence is not felt. And thus a ſpecies of government ariſes, to which, in a high political rant, we may give the name of *Tyranny*, but which, by a juſt and prudent adminiſtration, may afford tolerable ſecurity to the people, and may fulfil moſt of the ends of political ſociety.

But tho' in a civiliz'd monarchy, as well as in a republic, the people have ſecurity for the enjoyment of their property; yet in both theſe forms of government, thoſe who poſſeſs the ſupreme authority have the diſpoſal of many honours and advantages, which excite the ambition and avarice of mankind. The only difference is, that in a republic, the candidates for offices muſt look downwards, to gain the ſuffrages of the people; in a monarchy, they muſt turn their attention upwards, to court the good graces and favour of the great. To be ſucceſsful in the former way, 'tis neceſſary for a man to make himſelf *uſeful*, by his induſtry, capacity, or knowledge: To be proſperous in the latter way, 'tis requiſite for him to render himſelf *agreeable*, by his wit, complaiſance, or civility. A ſtrong genius ſucceeds beſt in republics: A refined taſte in monarchies. And conſequently the ſciences are the

the more natural growth of the one, and the polite arts of the other.

Not to mention, that monarchies, receiving their chief ſtability from a ſuperſtitious reverence to prieſts and princes, have almoſt always abrig'd the liberty of reaſoning, with regard to religion and politics, and conſequently metaphyſics and morals. All theſe form the moſt conſiderable branches of ſcience. Mathematics and natural philoſophy, which only remain, are not half ſo valuable.

There is a very great connection among all the arts, which contribute to pleaſure; and the ſame delicacy of taſte, which enables us to make improvements in one, will not allow the others to remain altogether rude and barbarous. Amongſt all the arts of converſation, no one pleaſes more than mutual deference or civility, which leads us to reſign our own inclinations to thoſe of our companion, and to curb and conceal that preſumption and arrogance ſo natural to the human mind. A good-natur'd man, who is well educated, practiſes this civility to every mortal, without premeditation or intereſt: But, in order to render that valuable quality general among any people, it ſeems neceſſary to aſſiſt the natural diſpoſitions by ſome general motive. Where power riſes upwards from the people to the great, as in all republics, ſuch refinements of civility are apt to be little practis'd, ſince the whole ſtate are, by that means, brought near to a level, and every member of it is render'd, in a great meaſure, inde-

[illegible] of another. The people have the advantage of the authority of their suffrages: The great, of the superiority of their station. But in a civilized monarchy there is a long train of dependence from the prince to the peasant, which is not great enough to make property precarious, or depress the mind of the meanest: but is sufficient to beget in every one an inclination to please his superiors, and to form himself upon those models, which are most acceptable to persons of condition and education. Politeness of manners, therefore, arises most naturally in monarchies and courts; and where that flourishes, none of the liberal arts will be altogether neglected or despised.

The republics in *Europe* are at present noted for want of politeness. *The good manners of a* Swiss *made* [illegible] in Holland *, is another expression for rusticity among the *French*. The *English*, in some degree, fall under the same censure, notwithstanding their learning and genius. And if the *Venetians* be an exception to the rule, they owe it, perhaps, to their communication with the other *Italians*. Most of whole governments beget a dependence more than sufficient [illegible] civilizing their manners.

[illegible] fault to pronounce any judgment concerning the refinements of the ancient republics in [illegible] war: But I am apt to suspect, that the arts

* [illegible] Rousseau.

if converſation were not brought ſo near perfection amongſt them as the arts of writing and compoſition. The ſcurrility of the ancients, in many instances, is quite ſhocking, and exceeds all belief. Their vanity too is often not a little offenſive *; as well as the common licentiouſneſs and immodeſty of their ſtile, *Quicunque impudicus, adulter, ganeo, manu, ventre*, pene, *bona patria laceraverat*, ſays *Salluſt* in one of the graveſt and moſt moral paſſages of his hiſtory. *Nam fuit ante Helenam Cunnus teterrima belli Cauſa*, is an expreſſion of *Horace*, in tracing the origin of moral good and evil. *Ovid* and *Lucretius* † are almoſt as licentious in their ſtile as my lord *Rocheſter*; tho' the former were fine gentlemen and delicate writers, and the latter, from the corruptions of that court, in which he liv'd, ſeems to have thrown off all regard to ſhame and decency. *Juvenal* inculcates modeſty with great zeal; but ſets a very bad example of it, if we conſider the impudence of his expreſſions.

I shall alſo be ſo bold, as to affirm, That among the ancients, there was not much delicacy

* 'Tis needleſs to cite *Cicero* or *Pliny* on this head: They are too much noted: But one is a little ſurpriz'd to find *Arrian*, a very grave, judicious writer, interrupt the thread of his narration all of a ſudden to tell his readers that he himſelf is as eminent among the *Greeks* for eloquence as *Alexander* was for arms. Lib. 1.

† This poet (See lib. 4. 1165) recommends a very extraordinary cure for love, and what one expects not to meet with in ſo elegant and philoſophical a poem. It ſeems to have been the original of ſome of Dr. *Swift*'s beautiful and cleanly images. The elegant *Catullus* and *Phædrus* fall under the ſame cenſure.

of

pendent of another. The people have the advantage, by the authority of their suffrages: The great, by the superiority of their station. But in a civiliz'd monarchy, there is a long train of dependence from the prince to the peasant, which is not great enough to render property precarious, or depress the minds of the people; but is sufficient to beget in every one an inclination to please his superiors, and to form himself upon those models, which are most acceptable to people of condition and education. Politeness of manners, therefore, arises most naturally in monarchies and courts; and where that flourishes, none of the liberal arts will be altogether neglected or despis'd.

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'TIS difficult to pronounce any judgment concerning the refinements of the ancient republics in this particular: But I am apt to suspect, that the arts

* *C'est la politesse d'un Suisse*
En Hollande civilisé. Rousseau.

of

of conversation were not brought so near perfection amongst them as the arts of writing and composition. The scurrility of the ancients, in many instances, is quite shocking, and exceeds all belief. Their vanity too is often not a little offensive *; as well as the common licentiousness and immodesty of their stile, *Quicunque impudicus, adulter, ganeo, manu, ventre*, pene, *bona patria laceraverat*. says *Sallust* in one of the gravest and most moral passages of his history. *Nam fuit ante Helenam Cunnus teterrima belli Causa*, is an expression of *Horace*, in tracing the origin of moral good and evil. *Ovid* and *Lucretius* † are almost as licentious in their stile as my lord *Rochester*; tho' the former were fine gentlemen and delicate writers, and the latter, from the corruptions of that court, in which he liv'd, seems to have thrown off all regard to shame and decency. *Juvenal* inculcates modesty with great zeal; but sets a very bad example of it, if we consider the impudence of his expressions.

I shall also be so bold, as to affirm, That among the ancients, there was not much delicacy

* 'Tis needless to cite *Cicero* or *Pliny* on this head: They are too much noted: But one is a little surpriz'd to find *Arrian*, a very grave, judicious writer, interrupt the thread of his narration all of a sudden to tell his readers that he himself is as eminent among the *Greeks* for eloquence as *Alexander* was for arms. Lib. 1.

† This poet (See lib. 4. 1165) recommends a very extraordinary cure for love, and what one expects not to meet with in so elegant and philosophical a poem. It seems to have been the original of some of Dr. *Swift*'s beautiful and cleanly images. The elegant *Catullus* and *Phædrus* fall under the same censure.

of

of breeding, or that polite deference and respect, which civility obliges us either to express or counterfeit towards the persons whom we converse with. *Cicero* was certainly one of the politest gentlemen of his age; and yet I must confess I have frequently been shockt with the poor figure under which he represents his friend *Atticus*, in those dialogues, where he himself is introduc'd as a speaker. That learned and virtuous *Roman*, whose dignity, tho' he was only a private gentleman, was inferior to that of no one in *Rome*, is there shewn in rather a more pitiful light than *Philalethes*'s friend in our modern dialogues. He is a humble admirer of the orator, pays him frequent compliments, and receives his instructions, with all the deference that a scholar owes to his master *. Even *Cato* is treated in somewhat a cavalier manner in the dialogues *de finibus*. And 'tis remarkable, that *Cicero*, being a great sceptic in matters of religion, and unwilling to determine any thing on that head among the different sects of philosophy, introduces his friends disputing concerning the being and nature of the gods, while he is only a hearer; because, forsooth, it would have been an impropriety for so great a genius as himself, had he spoke, not to have said something decisive on the subject, and have carry'd every thing before him, as he always does on other occasions. There is also a spirit of dialogue observ'd in the eloquent books *de Oratore*, and a tolerable equality maintain'd among

* Att. *Non mihi videtur ad beate vivendum satis esse virtutem.* Mar. *At hercule* Bruto *meo videtur; cujus ego judicium, pace tua dixerim, longe antepono tuo.* Tusc. Quæ. lib. 5.

the

the ſpeakers: But then theſe ſpeakers are the great men of the age preceding the author, and he recounts the conference as only from hearſay.

One of the moſt particular details of a real dialogue, which we meet with in antiquity is related by *Polybius* *, when *Philip*, king of *Macedon*, a prince of wit and parts, met with *Titus Flamininus*, one of the politeſt of the *Romans*, as we learn from *Plutarch* †, accompany'd with ambaſſadors from almoſt all the *Greek* cities. The *Ætolian* ambaſſador very abruptly tells the king, that he talkt like a fool or a madman (ληρεις) *That's evident*, ſays his majeſty, *even to a blind man*; which was a raillery on the blindneſs of his excellency. Yet all this paſt not the uſual bounds: For the conference was not diſturb'd; and *Flamininus* was very well diverted with theſe ſtrokes of humour. At the end, when *Philip* crav'd a little time to conſult with his friends, of whom he had none preſent, the *Roman* general, being deſirous alſo to ſhow his wit, as the hiſtorian ſays, tells him, *that perhaps the reaſon, why he had none of his friends with him, was becauſe he had murder'd them all*; which was actually the caſe. This unprovok'd piece of brutality is not condemn'd by the hiſtorian, caus'd no farther reſentment in *Philip*, than to excite a *Sardonian* ſmile, or what we call a grin, and hinder'd him not from renewing the conference next day. *Plutarch* ‡ too mentions this raillery amongſt the witty and agreeable ſayings of *Flamininus*.

* Lib. 17. † In vita Flamin. ‡ In vita Flamin.

'Tis

'Tis but an indifferent compliment, which *Horace* pays to his friend *Grosphus*, in the ode addreſt to him. *No one*, ſays he, *is happy in every reſpect. And I may perhaps enjoy ſome advantages, which you are deprivʼd of. You poſſeſs great riches: Your bellowing herds cover the* Silician *plains: Your chariot is drawn by the fineſt horſes: And you are arrayʼd in the richeſt purple. But the indulgent fates, with a ſmall inheritance, have given* ME *a fine genius, and have endowʼd me with a contempt for the malignant judgments of the vulgar* *. *Phædrus* ſays to his patron, *Eutychus, If you deſign to read my works, I ſhall be pleasʼd: If not, I ſhall, at leaſt, have the advantage of pleaſing poſterity* †. I am apt to think, that a modern poet wouʼd not have been guilty of ſuch an impropriety as that which may be obſervʼd in *Virgil*'s addreſs to *Auguſtus*, when, after a great deal of extravagant flattery, and after having deifyʼd the emperor, according to the

* ——— *Nihil eſt ab omni*
Parte beatum.
Abſtulit clarum cita mors Achillem,
Longa Tithonum minuit ſenectus,
Et mihi forſan, tibi quod negarit,
Porriget hora.
Te greges centum, Siculæque circum
Mugiunt vaccæ: tibi tollit, hinni-
Tum apta quadrigis equa: te bis Afro
Murice tinctæ
Veſtiunt lanæ: mihi parva rura, &
Spiritum Graiæ tenuem Camœnæ
Parca non mendax dedit & malignum
Spernere vulgus. Lib. 2. Ode 16.

† *Quem ſi leges, lætabor; ſin autem minus,*
Habebunt certe quo ſe oblectent poſteri.

cuſtom

tom of those times, he, at last, places this god the same level with himself. *By your gracious l*, says he, *render my undertaking prosperous; and ing pity*, along with me, *of the Swains ignorant husbandry, bestow your favourable influence on this rk* *. Had men, in that age, been accustom'd to serve such niceties, a writer so delicate as *Virgil* ould certainly have given a different turn to this ntence. The court of *Augustus*, however polite,

* *Ignarosque viæ* mecum *miseratus agrestes*
Ingredere, & votis jam nunc assuesce vocari.

One would not say to a prince or great man, *When you d I were in such a place, we saw such a thing happen.* But *hen you were in such a place, I attended on you: And such a ing happen'd.*

Here I cannot forbear mentioning a piece of delicacy ob-rv'd in *France*, which seems to me excessive and ridiculous, ou must not say, *That is a very fine dog, madam.* But, *ndam, that is a very fine dog.* They think it indecent, that ose words, *dog* and *madam* should be coupled together in e sentence; tho' they have no reference to each other in e sense.

After all, I acknowledge, that this reasoning from single ssages of ancient authors may seem fallacious; and that e foregoing arguments cannot have great force, but with ose who are well acquainted with these writers, and know e truth of the general position. For instance, what absur-ity would it be to assert, that *Virgil* understood not the orce of the terms he employs, and could not chuse his pithets with propriety? because in the following lines, ddrest also to *Augustus*, he has fail'd in that particular, and as ascrib'd to the *Indians* a quality, which seems, in a manner, o turn his hero into ridicule.

——— *Et te, maxime Cæsar,*
Qui nunc extremis Asiæ jam victor in oris
Imbellem *avertis Romanis arcibus Indum.*

Georg. Lib. II.

had

had not yet, it ſeems, wore off the manners of
republic.

CARDINAL *Wolſey* apologiz'd for his fam
piece of inſolence, in ſaying, EGO ET REX ME
I and my king, by obſerving, that this expreſſion
exactly conformable to the *Latin* idiom, and t
a *Roman* always nam'd himſelf before the Perſon
whom, or of whom he ſpake. Yet this ſeems
have been an inſtance of want of civility among t
people. The ancients made it a rule, That
perſon of the greateſt dignity ſhould be mentio
firſt in the diſcourſe; inſomuch, that we find,
ſpring of a quarrel and jealouſy betwixt the *Rom*
and *Ætolians*, to have been a poet's naming
Ætolians before the *Romans*, in celebrating a vict
gain'd by their united arms over the *Macedonian*
Thus *Livia* diſguſted *Tiberius*, by placing her o
name before his in an inſcription †.

No advantages in this world are pure and unm
In like manner, as modern politeneſs, which is
turally ſo ornamental, runs often into affectat
and foppery and diſguiſe and inſincerity; ſo
ancient ſimplicity, which is naturally ſo amia
and affecting, often degenerates into ruſticity
abuſe, ſcurrility and obſcenity.

IF the ſuperiority in politeneſs ſhould be allo
to modern times, the modern notions of *gallan*

* *Plut.* in vita Flaminini. † *Tacit.* ann. lib.
cap. 64.

d *honour*, the natural product of courts and monarchies, will probably be assign'd as the causes of s refinement. No one denies these inventions to modern *: But some of the most zealous partizans the ancients, have asserted them to be foppish d ridiculous, and a reproach, rather than an hon-ur to the present age †. It may here be proper examine this question, with regard both to llantry and honour. We shall begin with gal-ntry.

Nature has implanted in all living creatures affection betwixt the sexes, which even in the rcest and most rapacious animals, is not merely ssin'd to the satisfaction of the bodily appetite, it begets a friendship and mutual sympathy, which ns thro' the whole tenor of their lives. Nay, it ay farther be observ'd, that even in those species, here nature limits the indulgence of this appetite one season and to one object, and forms a kind marriage or association betwixt a single male d female, there is yet a visible complacency and nevolence, which extends farther, and mutually ftens the affections of the sexes towards each her ‡. How much more must this have place in man,

* In the *Self-Tormentor* of *Terence*, *Clinias*, whenever he omes to town, instead of waiting on his mistress, sends for er to come to him.

† My Lord *Shaftsbury*, see his *Moralists*.

‡ *Tutti gli altri animai, che sono in terra,*
O che vivon quieti & stanno in pace;
O si vengon a rissa, & si fan guerra,
A la femina il masebio non la face.

L'ola

man, where the confinement of the appetite is not natural; but either proceeds accidentally from some strong charm of love, or arises from reflections on duty and convenience? Nothing, therefore, can proceed less from affectation than the passion of gallantry. 'Tis *natural* in the highest degree. Art and education, in the most elegant courts, make no more alteration on it, than on all the other laudable passions. They only turn the mind more towards it: They refine it; they polish it; and give it a proper grace and expression.

But gallantry is as *generous* as it is *natural*. To correct such gross vices, as lead us to commit a real injury to others, is the part of morals, and the object of the most ordinary education. Where *that* is not attended to, in some degree, no human society can subsist. But in order to render conversation, and the intercourse of minds more easy and agreeable, Good-manners have been invented, and have carry'd the matter somewhat farther. Wherever nature has given the mind a propensity to any vice, or to any passion disagreeable to others, refin'd breeding has taught men to throw the byass on the opposite side, and to preserve, in all their behaviour, the appearance of sentiments contrary to those which they naturally incline to. Thus, as we are naturally proud and selfish, and apt to assume the preference above

L'orsa con l'orso al bosco sicura erra,
La Leonessa appresso il Leon giace,
Con Lupo vive il Lupa sicura.
Ne la Giuvenca ha del Torel paura.

Ariosto Canto 5.

others

e man is taught to behave with deference
with whom he converses, and to yield
y to them in all the common incidents
like manner, wherever a person's situa
urally beget any disagreeable suspicion
ne part of good-manners to prevent it,
display of sentiments, directly contrary
hich he is apt to be jealous. Thus,
v their infirmities, and naturally dread
m the youth: Hence, well-educated
ole the instances of respect and defe-
r elders. Strangers and foreigners are
ection: Hence, in all polite countries,
the highest civilities, and are intitled to
e in every company. A man is lord
mily, and his guests are, in a manner,
s authority: Hence, he is always the
in the company; attentive to the wants
; and giving himself all the trouble, in
se, which may not betray too visible an
or impose too much constraint on his
llantry is nothing but an instance of the
is and refin'd attention. As nature has
ne superiority above *woman*, by endow-
h greater strength both of mind and

uent mention in ancient authors of that ill-
the master of the family's eating better bread
tter wine at table, than he afforded his guests,
ifferent mark of the civility of those ages.
tt. . *Plinii lib.* 14. *cap.* 13. *Also Plinii Epist.*
ede conductis, Saturnalia, &c. There is scarce
urope at present so unciviliz'd as to admit of

body,

body, 'tis his part to alleviate that ſuperiority, as much as poſſible, by the generoſity of his behaviour, and by a ſtudy'd deference and complaiſance for all her inclinations and opinions. Barbarous nations diſplay this ſuperiority, by reducing their females to the moſt abject ſlavery; by confining them, by beating them, by ſelling them, by killing them. But the male-ſex, among a polite people, diſcover their authority in a more generous, tho' not a leſs evident manner; by civility, by reſpect, by complaiſance, and, in a word, by gallantry. In good company, you need not aſk, Who is the maſter of the feaſt? The man, who ſits in the loweſt place, and who is always induſtrious in helping every one, is moſt certainly the perſon. We muſt either condemn all ſuch inſtances of generoſity, as ſoppiſh and affected, or admit of gallantry among the reſt. The ancient *Muſcovites* wedded their wives with a whip, inſtead of a wedding-ring. The ſame people, in their own houſes, took always the precedency above foreigners, even * foreign ambaſſadors. Theſe two inſtances of their generoſity and politeneſs are much of a piece.

GALLANTRY is not leſs conſiſtent with *wiſdom* and *prudence*, than with *nature* and *generoſity*; and, when under proper regulations, contributes, more than any other invention, to the *entertainment* and *improvement* of the youth of both ſexes. In all vegetables, 'tis obſervable, that the flower and the

* See, *Relation of three embaſſies*, by the earl of *Carlile*.

ſeed

ſeed are always connected together; and in like manner, among every ſpecies of animals, nature has founded on the love betwixt the ſexes their ſweeteſt and beſt enjoyment. But the ſatisfaction of the bodily appetite is not alone of great value; and even in brute creatures, we find, that their play and dalliance, and other expreſſions of fondneſs, form the greateſt part of the entertainment. In rational beings, we muſt certainly admit the mind for a conſiderable ſhare. Were we to rob the feaſt of all its garniture of reaſon, diſcourſe, ſympathy, friendſhip, and gaiety, what remains would ſcarce be worth acceptance, in the judgment of the truly elegant and luxurious.

WHAT better ſchool for manners, than the company of virtuous women; where the mutual endeavour to pleaſe muſt inſenſibly poliſh the mind, where the example of the female ſoftneſs and modeſty muſt communicate itſelf to their admirers, and where the delicacy of that ſex puts every one on his guard, leſt he give offence by any breach of decency?

I MUST confeſs, That my own particular choice rather leads me to prefer the company of a few ſelect companions, with whom I can, calmly and peaceably, enjoy the feaſt of reaſon, and try the juſtneſs of every reflection, whether gay or ſerious, that may occur to me. But as ſuch a delightful ſociety is not every day to be met with, I muſt think, that mixt companies, without the fair-ſex, are the moſt

inſipid

insipid entertainment in the world, and destitute of gaiety and politeness, as much as of sense and reason. Nothing can keep them from excessive dulness but hard drinking; a remedy worse than the disease.

AMONG the ancients, the character of the fair-sex was consider'd as altogether domestic, nor were they regarded as part of the polite world, or of good company. This, perhaps, is the true reason why the ancients have not left us one piece of pleasantry, that is excellent, (unless one may except the banquet of *Xenophon*, and the dialogues of *Lucian*) tho' many of their serious compositions are altogether inimitable. *Horace* condemns the coarse railleries and cold jests of *Plautus:* But, tho' the most easy, agreeable, and judicious writer in the world, is his own talent for ridicule very striking or refin'd? This, therefore, is one considerable improvement, which the polite arts have receiv'd from gallantry, and from courts, where it first arose.

THE point of *honour*, or duelling, is a modern invention, as well as *gallantry*; and by some esteem'd equally useful for the refining of manners: But how it has contributed to that effect, I am at a loss to determine. Conversation, among the greatest rustics, is not commonly infested with such rudeness as can give occasion to duels, even according to the most refin'd laws of this fantastic honour; and, as to the other smaller indecencies, which are the most offensive, because the most frequent, they can never be cur'd

n'd by the practice of duelling. But these notions are only *vulgar*: They are also *pernicious*. By separating the man of honour from the man of virtue, the most profligates have got something to value themselves upon, and have been able to keep themselves in countenance, tho' guilty of the most shameful and most dangerous vices. They are debauchees, spendthrifts, and never pay a farthing they owe: But they are men of honour; and therefore are to be receiv'd as gentlemen in all companies.

There are some of the parts of modern honour, which are the most essential parts of morality; such as fidelity, the observing promises, and telling truth. These points of honour Mr. *Addison* had in his eye, when he made *Juba* say,

Honour's a sacred tye, the law of kings,
The noble mind's distinguishing perfection,
That aids and strengthens virtue, when it meets her,
And imitates her actions where she is not:
It ought not to be sported with.

These lines are very beautiful: But I am afraid, that Mr. *Addison* has here been guilty of that impropriety of sentiment, with which, on other occasions, he has so justly reproach'd our poets. The ancients certainly never had any notion of *honour* as distinct from *virtue*.

But, to return from this digression, I shall advance as a *fourth* observation on this head, of the rise

and progreſs of the arts and ſciences, *That when th arts and ſciences come to perfection in any ſtate, fro that moment they naturally, or rather neceſſarily declin and ſeldom or never revive in that nation, where th formerly flouriſh'd.*

It muſt be confeſt, that this maxim, tho' conform able to experience, may, at firſt ſight, be eſteem' very contrary to reaſon. If the natural genius o mankind be the ſame in all ages, and in almoſt a countries, (as I am of opinion it is) it muſt ver much forward and cultivate this genius, to be poſſe of exact patterns in every art, which may regulat the taſte, and fix the objects of imitation. The mo dels left us by the ancients gave birth to all the art about 200 years ago, and have mightily advanc' their progreſs in every country of *Europe:* Why ha they not a like effect during the reign of *Trajan* an his ſucceſſors, when they were much more entire and were ſtill admir'd and ſtudy'd by the whol world? So late as the emperor *Juſtinian*, the Poe by way of diſtinction, was underſtood, among th *Greeks*, to be *Homer*; among the *Romans*, *Virgi* Such admiration ſtill remain'd for theſe divine ge niuſes; tho' no poet had appear'd for many centurie who could juſtly pretend to have imitated them.

A man's genius is always, in the beginning o his life, as much unknown to himſelf as to other and 'tis only after frequent trials, attended with ſu ceſs, that he dares think himſelf equal to thoſe unde takings, in which they who have ſucceeded, hav

ſi

fixt the admiration of mankind. If his own nation be already poſſeſt of many models of eloquence, he naturally compares his own juvenile exerciſes with theſe; and being ſenſible of the infinite diſproportion betwixt them, is diſcourag'd from any further attempts, and never aims at a rivalſhip with thoſe authors, whom he ſo much admires. A noble emulation is the ſource of every excellence. Admiration and modeſty naturally extinguiſh this emulation. And no one is ſo liable to an exceſs of admiration and modeſty, as a truly great genius.

NEXT to emulation, the greateſt encourager of the noble arts is praiſe and glory. A writer is animated with new force, when he hears the applauſes of the world for his former productions; and, being rouz'd by ſuch a motive, he often reaches a pitch of perfection, which is equally ſurpriſing to himſelf and to his readers. But when the poſts of honour are all occupy'd, his firſt attempts are but coldly receiv'd by the public; being compar'd to productions, which are both in themſelves more excellent, and have already the advantage of an eſtabliſh'd reputation. Were *Moliere* and *Corneille* to bring upon the ſtage at preſent their early productions, which were formerly ſo well receiv'd, it would diſcourage the young poets, to ſee the indifference and diſdain of the public. The ignorance of the age alone could have given admiſſion to the *prince of Tyre*; but 'tis to that we owe *the Moor*: Had *every man in his humour* been rejected, we had never ſeen *Volpone*.

PERHAPS it may not be for the advantage of any nation, to have the arts imported from their neighbours in too great perfection. This extinguishes emulation, and sinks the ardour of the generous youth. So many perfect models of *Italian* painting brought into *Britain*, instead of exciting our artists, is the cause of their small progress in that noble art. The same, perhaps, was the case of *Rome*, when it receiv'd the arts from *Greece*. That multitude of polite productions in the *French* language, dispersi all over *Germany* and the *North*, hinder these nations from cultivating their own language, and keep them still dependent on their neighbours for those elegant entertainments.

'TIS true, the ancients had left us models in every kind of writing, which are highly worthy of admiration. But besides that they were wrote in languages, which were known only to the learned; besides this, I say, the comparison is not so perfect nor intire betwixt modern wits, and those who liv'd in so remote an age. Had *Waller* been born in *Rome*, during the reign of *Tiberius*, his first productions had been despis'd, when compar'd to the finish'd odes of *Horace*. But in this island the superiority of the *Roman* poet diminish'd nothing from the fame of the
We esteem'd ourselves sufficiently happy,
limate and language could produce but a
of so excellent an original.

IN

In ſhort, the arts and ſciences, like ſome plants, require a freſh ſoil; and however rich the land may be, and however you may recruit it by art or care, it will never, when once exhauſted, produce any thing that is perfect or finiſh'd in the kind.

ESSAY XVIII.

The EPICUREAN *.

'TIS a great mortification to the vanity of man, that his utmoſt art and induſtry can never equal the meaneſt of nature's productions, either for beauty or value. Art is only the underworkman, and is employ'd to give a few ſtrokes of embelliſhment to thoſe pieces, which come from the hand of the maſter. Some of the drapery may be of his drawing; but he is not allow'd to touch the principal figure. Art may make a ſuit of clothes: But nature muſt produce a man.

EVEN in thoſe productions, which are commonly denominated works of art, we find, that the nobleſt of the kind are beholden for their chief beauty to the

* Or, *the man of elegance and pleaſure.* The intention of this and the three following eſſays is not ſo much, to explain accurately the ſentiments of the ancient ſects of philoſophy, as to deliver the ſentiments of ſects, that naturally form themſelves in the world, and entertain different ideas of human life and of happineſs. I have given each of them the name of the philoſophical ſect, to which it bears the greateſt affinity.

force

force and happy influence of nature. To the *Oestrum* or native enthusiasm of the poets, we owe whatever is admirable in their productions. The greatest genius, where nature at any time fails him (for she is not equal) throws aside the lyre, and hopes not, from the rules of art, to reach that divine harmony, which must proceed from her inspiration alone. How poor are those songs, where a happy flow of fancy has not furnish'd materials for art to embellish and refine!

BUT of all the fruitless attempts of art, no one is so ridiculous, as that which the severe philosophers have undertaken, the producing an *artificial happiness*, and making us be pleas'd by rules of reason, and by reflection. Why did none of them claim the reward, which *Xerxes* promis'd to him, who could invent a new pleasure. Unless, perhaps, they invented so many pleasures for their own use, that they despis'd riches, and stood in no need of any enjoyments, which the rewards of that monarch could procure them. I am apt, indeed, to think, that they were not willing to furnish the *Persian* court with a new pleasure, by presenting it with so new and unusual an object of ridicule. Their speculations, when confin'd to theory, and gravely deliver'd in the schools of *Greece*, might excite admiration in their ignorant pupils: But the attempting to reduce such principles to practice would soon betray their absurdity.

YOU pretend to make me happy by reason, and by rules of art. You must, then, create me anew



ness of well-doing, and of despising all assistance and all supplies from external objects. This is the voice of PRIDE, not of NATURE. And 'twere well, if even this pride could support itself, and communicate a real *inward* pleasure, however melancholy or severe. But this impotent pride can do no more than regulate the *outside*; and with infinite pains and attention compose the language and countenance to a philosophical dignity, in order to deceive the ignorant vulgar. The heart, mean while, is empty of all enjoyment: And the mind, unsupported by its proper objects, sinks into the deepest sorrow and melancholy. Miserable, but vain mortal! Thy mind be happy within itself! With what resources is it endow'd to fill so immense a void, and supply the place of all thy bodily senses and faculties? Can thy head subsist without thy other members? In such a situation,

What foolish figure must it make?
Do nothing else but sleep *and* ake.

Into such a lethargy, or such a melancholy, must thy mind be plung'd, when depriv'd of foreign occupations and enjoyments.

KEEP me, therefore, no longer in this violent constraint. Confine me not within myself; but point out to me those objects and pleasures, which afford the chief enjoyment. But why do I apply to you, proud and ignorant sages, to shew me the road to happiness? Let me consult my own

passions and inclinations. In them must I read the dictates of nature; not in your frivolous discourses.

But see, propitious to my wishes, the divine, the amiable * Pleasure, the supreme Love of GODS and men, advances towards me. At her approach, my heart beats with genial heat, and every sense and every faculty is dissolv'd in joy; while she pours around me all the embellishments of the spring, and all the treasures of the autumn. The melody of her voice charms my ears with the softest music, as she invites me to partake of those delicious fruits, which, with a smile that diffuses a glory on the heavens and the earth, she presents to me. The spritive *Cupids*, who attend her, or fan me with their odoriferous wings, or pour on my head the most fragrant oils, or offer me their sparkling nectar in golden goblets. O! for ever let me spread my limbs on this bed of roses, and thus, thus feel the delicious moments, with soft and downy steps, glide along. But cruel chance! Whither do you fly so fast? Why do my ardent wishes, and that load of pleasures, which you labour under, rather hasten than retard your unrelenting pace? Suffer me to enjoy this soft repose, after all my fatigues in search of happiness. Suffer me to satiate myself with these delicacies, after the pains of so long and so foolish an abstinence.

* *Dea voluptas.* Lucret.

But

But [illegible] me. The [illegible] hue: The [illegible] wine, [illegible] senses [illegible] the [illegible] She beckons to her [illegible] sistance. The gay [illegible] and brings along the whole [illegible] Welcome, [illegible] nions, to these [illegible] repast. Your presence has [illegible] hue, and to the fruit its [illegible] The vapours of this sprightly nectar do now again play around my heart; while you partake of my delights, and discover in your chearful looks, the pleasure which you receive from my happiness and satisfaction. The like do I receive from yours; and encourag'd by your joyous presence, shall again renew the feast, with which, from too much enjoyment, my senses were well-nigh sated; while the mind kept not pace with the body, nor afforded relief to her o'er-birthen'd partner.

In our chearful discourses, better than in the formal reasonings of the schools, is true wisdom to be found. In our friendly endearments, better than in the hollow debates of statesmen and pretended patriots, does true virtue display itself. Forgetful of the past, secure of the future, let us here enjoy the present; and while we yet possess a being, let us be

time good, beyond the power of fate or fortune. To-morrow will bring its own pleasures along with it. Or should it disappoint our fond wishes, we shall at least enjoy the pleasure of reflecting on the pleasures of to-day.

FEAR NOT, my friends, that the barbarous dissonance of *Bacchus*, and of his revellers, should break in upon this entertainment, and confound us with their turbulent and clamorous pleasures. The sprightly muses wait around; and with their charming symphony, sufficient to soften the wolves and tigers of the savage desert, inspire a soft joy into every bosom. Peace, harmony, and concord reign in this retreat; nor is the silence ever broke but by the music of our songs, or the chearful accents of our friendly voices.

BUT HARK! the favourite of the muses, the gentle [illegible], strikes the lyre; and while he accompanies [illegible] harmonious notes with his more harmonious song, he inspires us with the same happy debauch of fancy, by which he is himself transported. "Ye happy youth," [illegible] "Ye favour'd of heaven †, while the wanton [illegible] pours upon you all her blooming honours, let [illegible] seduce you, with her delusive blaze, to pass [illegible] and dangers this delicious season, this

[illegible] imitation of the *Syrens* song in *Tasso*.

Giovinetti, [illegible] Aprile & Maggio
[illegible] & verdi spoglie, &c.
Gerusalemme liberata; *Canto 14.*

" prime

"prime of life. Wisdom points out to you the "road to pleasure: Nature too beckens to you to "follow her in that smooth and flowry path. Will "you shut your ears to their commanding voice? "Will you harden your heart to their soft allure-"ments? Oh, deluded mortals, thus to lose your "youth; thus to throw away so invaluable a pre-"sent, to trifle with so perishing a blessing. Con-"template well your recompence. Consider that "glory, which so allures your proud hearts, and "seduces you with your own praises. 'Tis an "echo, a dream, nay the shadow of a dream, "which is dissipated by every wind, and lost by "every contrary breath of the ignorant and ill-"judging multitude. You fear not, that even "death itself shall ravish it from you. But behold! "while you are yet alive, calumny bereaves you "of it; ignorance neglects it; nature enjoys it "not; fancy alone, renouncing every pleasure, "receives this airy recompence, empty and unstable "as herself."

THUS the hours pass unperceiv'd along, and lead in their wanton train all the pleasures of sense, and all the joys of harmony and friendship. Smiling *innocence* closes the procession; and while she presents herself to our ravish'd eyes, she embellishes the whole scene, and renders the view of these pleasures as transporting, after they have past us, as when, with laughing countenances, they were yet advancing towards us.

BUT

BUT the ſun has ſunk below the horizon; darkneſs ſtealing ſilently upon us, has now bury nature in an univerſal ſhade. " Rejoice, my fri " continue your repaſt, or change it for ſoft re " Tho' abſent, your joy or your tranquillity " ſtill be mine." *But whither do you go? Or new pleaſures call you from our ſociety? Is there agreeable without your friends? And can aught in which we partake not?* " Yes, my friends " joy, which I now ſeek, admits not of your " cipation. Here alone I wiſh your abſence: " here alone can I find a ſufficient compenſatio " the loſs of your ſociety."

BUT I have not advanc'd far thro' the ſha the thick wood, which ſpreads a double night a me, e're, methinks, I perceive thro' the gloon charming *Cælia*, the miſtreſs of my wiſhes, wanders impatient thro' the grove, and prev the appointed hour, ſilently chides my tardy But the joy, which ſhe receives from my pre beſt pleads my excuſe; and diſſipating every a and every angry thought, leaves room for noug mutual joy and rapture. With what words, m one, ſhall I expreſs my tenderneſs, or deſcrib emotions which now warm my tranſported b Words are too faint to deſcribe my love; and if, you feel not the ſame flame within you, in vai I endeavour to convey to you a juſt conception But your every word and every motion ſuffice move this doubt; and while they expreſs you

ſion, ſerve alſo to enflame mine. How amiable this ſolitude, this ſilence, this darkneſs! no objects now importune the raviſh'd ſoul. The thought, the ſenſe, all full of nothing but our mutual happineſs, wholly poſſeſs the mind, and convey a pleaſure, which deluded mortals vainly ſeek for in every other enjoyment.——

BUT why does your boſom heave with theſe ſighs, while tears bathe your glowing cheeks? Why diſtract your heart with ſuch vain anxieties? Why ſo often aſk me, *How long my love ſhall yet endure?* Alas, my *Cælia*, Can I reſolve this queſtion? *Do I know how long my life ſhall yet endure?* But does this alſo diſturb your tender breaſt? And is the image of our frail mortality for ever preſent with you, to throw a damp on your gayeſt hours, and poiſon even thoſe joys which love inſpires. Conſider rather, that if life be frail, if youth be tranſitory, we ſhould well employ the preſent moment, and loſe no part of ſo periſhable an exiſtence. Yet a little moment, and *theſe* ſhall be no more. We ſhall be, as if we had never been. Not a memory of us be left upon earth; and even the fabulous ſhades below will not afford us a habitation. Our fruitleſs anxieties, our vain projects, our uncertain ſpeculations ſhall all be ſwallow'd up and loſt. Our preſent doubts, concerning the original cauſe of all things, muſt never, alas! be reſolv'd. This alone we may be certain of, that if any governing mind preſide over the univerſe, he muſt be pleas'd to ſee us fulfil the ends of our being,

and

and enjoy that pleasure, for which alone we were created. Let this reflection give ease to your anxious thoughts; but render not your joys too serious, by dwelling for ever upon it. 'Tis sufficient, once, to be acquainted with this philosophy, in order to give an unbounded loose to love and jollity, and remove all the scruples of a vain superstition: But while youth and passion, my fair-one, prompt our eager desires, we must find gayer subjects of discourse, to intermix with these amorous caresses.

ESSAY

ESSAY XIX.

The STOIC *.

THERE is this obvious and material difference in the conduct of nature, with regard to man and other animals, that having endow'd the former with a ſublime celeſtial ſpirit, and having given him an affinity with ſuperior beings, ſhe allows not ſuch noble faculties to lye lethargic or idle; but urges him, by neceſſity, to employ, on every emergence, his utmoſt *art* and *induſtry*. Brute creatures have many of their neceſſities ſupply'd by nature, being cloath'd and arm'd by this beneficent parent of all things: And where their own *induſtry* is requiſite on any occaſion, nature, by implanting inſtincts, ſtill ſupplies them with the *art*, and guides them to their good, by her unerring precepts. But man, expos'd naked and indigent to the rude elements, riſes ſlowly from that helpleſs ſtate, by the care and vigilance of his parents; and having attain'd his utmoſt growth and perfection, reaches only a capacity of ſubſiſting, by his own care and vigilance. Every thing is ſold to ſkill and labour; and where nature furniſhes the

* Or the man of action and virtue.

materials,

materials, they are ſtill rude and unfiniſh'd, till induſtry, ever active and intelligent, refines them from their brute ſtate, and fits them for human uſe and convenience.

ACKNOWLEDGE, therefore, O man, the beneficence of nature: For ſhe has given thee that intelligence which ſupplies all thy neceſſities. But let not indolence, under the falſe appearance of gratitude, perſuade thee to reſt contented with her preſents. Wou'd'ſt thou return to the raw herbage for thy food, to the open ſky for thy covering, and to ſtones and clubs for thy defence againſt the ravenous animals of the deſert? Then return alſo to thy ſavage manners, to thy timorous ſuperſtition, to thy brutal ignorance; and ſink thyſelf below thoſe animals, whoſe condition thou admireſt, and wou'd'ſt ſo fondly imitate.

THY kind parent, nature, having given thee art and intelligence, has fill'd the whole globe with materials for theſe talents to work upon: Hearken to her voice, which ſo plainly tells thee, that thou thyſelf ſhou'd'ſt alſo be the object of thy induſtry, and that by art and attention thou can'ſt alone acquire that ability, which will raiſe thee to thy proper ſtation in the univerſe. Behold this artizan, who converts a rude and ſhapeleſs ſtone into a noble metal; and molding that metal by his cunning hands, creates, as it were by magic, every weapon for his defence, and every utenſil for his convenience. He has not this ſkill from nature: Uſe and practice have taught

it

ıim: And if thou wou'dſt emulate his ſucceſs, thou .ſt follow his laborious footſteps.

BUT while thou *ambitiouſly* aſpireſt to the perfect- ; thy bodily powers and faculties, wou'd'ſt thou *only* neglect thy mind, and from a prepoſterous th, leave it ſtill rude and uncultivated, as it came ›m the hands of nature? Far be ſuch folly and gligence from every rational being. If nature .s been frugal in her gifts and endowments, there the more need of art to ſupply her defects. If ſhe .s been generous and liberal, know that ſhe ſtill ex- ſts induſtry and application on our part, and re- nges herſelf in proportion to our negligent ingrati- de. The richeſt genius, like the moſt fertile ſoil, hen uncultivated, ſhoots up into the rankeſt weeds; ıd inſtead of vines and olives for the pleaſure and ſe of man, produces to its ſlothful owner the moſt bundant crop of poiſons.

THE great end of all human induſtry, is the at- inment of happineſs. For this were arts invented, iences cultivated, laws ordain'd, and ſocieties mo- ell'd, by the profoundeſt wiſdom of patriots and le- iſlators. Even the lonely ſavage, who lyes expos'd › the inclemency of the elements, and the fury of 'ild beaſts, forgets not, for a moment, this grand bject of his being. Ignorant as he is of every art f life, he keeps ſtill in view the end of all thoſe rts, and eagerly ſeeks for felicity amidſt that dark- eſs with which he is inviron'd. But as much as the vildeſt ſavage is inferior to the poliſh'd citizen, who under

under the protection of laws, enjoys every convenience which industry has invented; so much is this citizen himself inferior to the man of virtue, and the true philosopher, who governs his appetites, subdues his passions, and has learn'd, from reason, to set a just value on every pursuit and enjoyment. For is there an art and apprenticeship requisite for every other attainment? And is there no art of life, no rule, no precepts to direct us in this principal concern? Can no particular pleasure be attain'd without skill; and can the whole be regulated without reflection or intelligence, by the blind guidance of appetite and instinct? Surely then no mistakes are ever committed in this affair; but every man, however dissolute and negligent, proceeds in the pursuit of happiness, with as unerring a motion, as that which the celestial bodies observe, when, conducted by the hand of the almighty, they roll along the etherial plains. But if mistakes be often, be inevitably committed, let us register these mistakes; let us consider their causes; let us weigh their importance; let us enquire for their remedies. When from this we have fix'd all the rules of conduct, we are *philosophers*: When we have reduc'd these rules to practice, we are *sages*.

Like many subordinate artists, employ'd to form the several wheels and springs of a machine: Such are those who excel in all the particular arts of life. *He* is the master workman, who puts those several parts together, moves them according to just harmony and proportion, and produces true felicity as the result of their conspiring order.

While

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

new charms? Begin by curing yourself of this lethargic indolence; the task is not difficult: You need but taste the sweets of honest labour. Proceed to learn the just value of every pursuit; long study is not requisite: Compare, tho' but for once, the mind to the body, virtue to fortune, and glory to pleasure. You will then perceive the advantages of industry: You will then be sensible what are the proper objects of your industry.

In vain do you seek repose from beds of roses: In vain do you hope for enjoyment from the most delicious wines and fruits. Your indolence itself becomes a fatigue: Your pleasure itself creates disgust. The mind, unexercis'd, finds every delight insipid and loathsome; and 'ere yet the body, full of noxious humours, feels the torment of its multiply'd diseases, your nobler part is sensible of the invading poison, and seeks in vain to relieve its anxiety by new pleasures, which still augment the fatal malady.

I need not tell you, that by this eager pursuit of pleasure, you more and more expose yourself to fortune and accidents, and rivet your affections on external objects, which chance may, in a moment, ravish from you. I shall suppose, that your indulgent stars favour you still with the enjoyment of your riches and possessions. I prove to you, that even in the midst of your luxurious pleasures, you are unhappy; and that, by too much indulgence, you are incapable of enjoying what prosperous fortune still allows you to possess.

BUT ſurely the inſtability of fortune is a conſideration not to be over-look'd or neglected. Happineſs cannot poſſibly exiſt, where there is no ſecurity; and ſecurity can have no place, where fortune has any dominion. Tho' that unſtable deity ſhould not exert her rage againſt you, the dread of it would ſtill torment you; would diſturb your ſlumbers, haunt your dreams, and throw a damp on the jollity of your moſt delicious banquets.

THE temple of wiſdom is ſeated on a rock, above the rage of the fighting elements, and inacceſſible to all the malice of man. The rolling thunder breaks below; and thoſe more terrible inſtruments of human fury reach not to ſo ſublime a height. The ſage, while he breathes that ſerene air, looks down with pleaſure, mixt with compaſſion, on the errors of miſtaken mortals, who blindly ſeek for the true path of life, and purſue riches, nobility, honour, or power for genuine felicity. The greateſt part he beholds diſappointed of their fond wiſhes: Some lament, that having once poſſeſs'd the object of their deſires, it is raviſh'd from them by envious fortune: And all complain, that even their own vows, tho' granted, cannot give them happineſs, or relieve the anxiety of their diſtracted minds.

BUT does the ſage preſerve himſelf always in this philoſophic indifference, and reſt contented with lamenting the miſeries of mankind, without ever imploying himſelf for their relief? Does he conſtantly

indulge

indulge this ſevere wiſdom, which, by pretending to elevate him above human accidents, does in reality harden his heart, and render him careleſs of the intereſts of mankind, and of ſociety? No: he knows, that in this ſullen *Apathy*, neither true wiſdom nor true happineſs are to be found. He feels too ſtrongly the charm of the ſocial affections ever to counteract ſo ſweet, ſo natural, ſo virtuous a propenſity. Even when, bath'd in tears, he laments the miſeries of human r[illegible], of his country, of his friends, and unable to give ſuccour, can only relieve them by compaſſion; he yet rejoices in the generous diſpoſition, and feels a ſatisfaction ſuperior to that of the moſt indulg'd ſenſe. So engaging are the ſentiments of humanity, that they brighten up the very face of ſorrow, and operate like the ſun, which ſhining on a duſky cloud or falling rain, paints on them the moſt glorious colours which are to be found in the whole circle of nature.

BUT 'tis not here alone, that the ſocial virtues diſplay their energy. With whatever ingredient you [illegible]hem, they are ſtill predominant. As ſorrow [illegible]vercome them, ſo neither can ſenſual pleaſure [illegible] them. The joys of love, however furious [illegible]nultuous, baniſh not the tender ſentiments of [illegible]hy and affection. They even derive their chief [illegible]m that generous paſſion; and when pre- [illegible] afford nothing to the unhappy mind but [illegible] diſguſt. Behold this ſprightly deban- [illegible] profeſſes a contempt of all other pleaſures [illegible] wine and jollity: Separate him from his

compa-

companions, like a spark from a fire, where before it contributed to the general blaze: His alacrity suddenly extinguishes; and tho' surrounded with every other means of delight, he lothes the sumptuous banquet, and prefers even the most abstracted study and speculation, as more agreeable and entertaining.

BUT the social passions never afford such transporting pleasures, or make so glorious an appearance in the eyes both of GOD and man, as when, shaking off every earthly mixture, they associate themselves with the sentiments of virtue, and prompt us to laudable and worthy actions. As harmonious colours mutually give and receive a lustre by their friendly union; so do these ennobling sentiments of the human mind. See the triumph of nature in parental affection! What selfish passion; what sensual delight is a match for it! Whether a man exults in the prosperity and virtue of his offspring, or flies to their succour, thro' the most threatning and tremendous dangers?

PROCEED still in purifying the generous passion, you will still the more admire its shining glories. What charms are there in the harmony of minds, and in a friendship founded on mutual esteem and gratitude! What satisfaction in relieving the distrest, in comforting the afflicted, in raising the fallen, and in stopping the career of cruel fortune, or of more cruel man, in their insults over the good and virtuous! But what supreme joy in the victories over vice as well as misery, when, by virtuous example or

wiſe exhortation, our fellow-creatures are taught to govern their paſſions, reform their vices, and ſubdue their worſt enemies, which inhabit within their own boſoms?

But theſe objects are ſtill too limited for the human mind, which, being of celeſtial origin, ſwells with the divineſt and moſt enlarg'd affections, and carrying its attention beyond kindred and acquaintance, extends its benevolent wiſhes to the moſt diſtant poſterity. It views liberty and laws as the ſource of human happineſs, and devotes itſelf with the utmoſt alacrity, to their guardianſhip and protection. Toils, dangers, death itſelf carry their charms, when we brave them for the public good, and ennoble that being, which we generouſly ſacrifice for the intereſts of our country. Happy the man, whom indulgent fortune allows to pay to virtue what he owes to nature, and to make a generous gift of what muſt otherwiſe be raviſh'd from him by cruel neceſſity!

In the true ſage and patriot are united whatever can diſtinguiſh human nature, or elevate mortal man to a reſemblance with the divinity. The ſofteſt benevolence, the moſt undaunted reſolution, the tendereſt ſentiments, the moſt ſublime love of virtue, all theſe animate ſucceſſively his tranſported boſom. What ſatisfaction, when he looks within, to find the moſt turbulent paſſions tun'd to juſt harmony and concord, and every jarring ſound baniſh'd from this enchanting muſic! If the contemplation, even of inanimate

beauty, be so delightful; if it ravishes the
en when the fair form is foreign to us:
ıst be the effects of moral beauty? And
ıence must it have, when it embellishes our
d, and is the result of our own reflection
ıry?

*where is the reward of virtue? And what
has nature provided for such important sa-
t those of life and fortune, which we must of-
o it?* Oh, sons of earth! Are you ignorant
lue of this celestial mistress? And do you
nquire for her portion, when you observe
ine charms? But know, that nature has
ılgent to human weakness, and has not left
ırite-child naked and unendow'd. She has
virtue of the richest dowry; but being care-
the allurements of interest shou'd engage
ırs, as were insensible of the native worth
ine a beauty, she has wisely provided, that
y can have no charms but in the eyes of
ɔ are already transported with the love of
GLORY is the portion of virtue, the sweet
ıf honourable toils, the triumphant crown,
vers the thoughtful head of the disinterested
ɔr the dusty brow of the victorious warrior.
by so sublime a prize, the man of virtue
wn with contempt on all the allurements of
and all the menaces of danger. Death
es its terrors, when he considers, that its
ı extends only over a part of him, and that,
of death and time, the rage of the ele-

ments, and the endless vicissitude of human affairs, he is assur'd of an immortal fame among all the sons of men.

THERE surely is a being who presides over the universe; and, with infinite wisom and power, has reduc'd the jarring elements into just order and proportion. Let speculative reasoners dispute, how far this beneficent being extends his care, and whether he prolongs our existence beyond the grave, in order to bestow on virtue its just reward, and render it fully triumphant. The man of morals, without deciding any thing on so dubious a subject, is satisfy'd with that portion which is mark'd out to him by the supreme disposer of all things. Gratefully he accepts of that farther reward prepar'd for him; but if disappointed, he thinks not virtue an empty name; but justly esteeming it it's own reward, he gratefully acknowledges the bounty of his creator, who by calling him forth into existence, has thereby afforded him an opportunity of once acquiring so invaluable a possession.

ESSAY XX.

The PLATONIST *.

TO ſome philoſophers it appears matter of ſurprize, that all mankind, poſſeſſing the ſame ture, and being endow'd with the ſame faculties, ould yet differ ſo widely in their purſuits and inclitions, and that one ſhould utterly condemn what is ndly ſought after by another. To ſome it appears atter of ſtill more ſurprize, that a man ſhould differ widely from himſelf at different times; and, after ſſection, reject with diſdain what, before, was the ject of all his vows and wiſhes. To me this ſeriſh uncertainty and irreſolution, in human conct, ſeems altogether unavoidable; nor can a ratioıl ſoul, made for the contemplation of the ſupreme ing, and of his works, ever enjoy tranquillity or tisfaction, while detain'd in the ignoble purſuits of nſual pleaſure or popular applauſe. The divinity a boundleſs ocean of bliſs and glory: Human inds are ſmaller ſtreams, which ariſing at firſt om this ocean, ſeek ſtill, amid all their wanderg, to return to it, and to loſe themſelves in that

* Or, the man of contemplation and *philoſophical* devotn.

immenſity of perfection. When check'd in this natural courſe, by vice or folly, they become furious and enrag'd; and, ſwelling to a torrent, do then ſpread horror and devaſtation on the neighbouring plains.

In vain, by pompous phraſe and paſſionate expreſſion, each recommends his own purſuit, and invites the credulous hearers to an imitation of his life and manners. The heart belies the countenance, and ſenſibly feels, even amid the higheſt ſucceſs, the unſatisfactory nature of all thoſe pleaſures, which detain it from it's true object. I examine the voluptuous man before enjoyment; I meaſure the vehemence of his deſire, and the importance of his object; I find that all his happineſs proceeds only from that hurry of thought which takes him from himſelf, and turns his view from his guilt and miſery. I conſider him a moment after; he has now enjoy'd the pleaſure, which he fondly ſought after. The ſenſe of his guilt and miſery returns upon him with double anguiſh: His mind tormented with fear and remorſe; his body depreſt with diſguſt and ſatiety.

But a more auguſt, at leaſt a more haughty perſonage preſents himſelf boldly to our cenſure; and, aſſuming the title of a philoſopher and man of morals, offers to ſubmit to the moſt rigid examination. He challenges, with a viſible, tho' conceal'd impatience, our approbation and applauſe; and ſeems offended, that we ſhould heſitate a moment before we

break

break out into admiration of his virtue. Seeing this impatience, I hesitate still more: I begin to examine the motives of his seeming virtue: But behold! e'er I can enter upon this enquiry, he flings himself from me; and addressing his discourse to that crowd of heedless auditors, fondly abuses them by his magnificent pretensions.

O PHILOSOPHER! thy wisom is vain, and thy virtue unprofitable. Thou seekest the ignorant applauses of men, not the solid reflections of thy own conscience, or the more solid approbation of that being, who, with one regard of his all-seeing eye, penetrates the universe. Thou surely art conscious of the hollowness of thy pretended probity, whilst calling thyself a citizen, a son, a friend, thou forgettest thy higher sovereign, thy true father, thy greatest benefactor. Where is the adoration due to such infinite perfection, whence every thing good and valuable is deriv'd? Where is the gratitude, owing to thy creator, who call'd thee forth from nothing, who plac'd thee in all these relations to thy fellow-creatures, and requiring thee to fulfil the duty of each relation, forbids thee to neglect what thou owest to himself, the most perfect being, to whom thou art connected by the closest tye?

BUT thou art thyself thy own idol: Thou worshippest thy *imaginary* perfections: Or rather, sensible of thy *real* imperfections, thou seekest only to deceive the world, and to please thy fancy, by multiplying thy ignorant admirers. Thus not contented

with neglecting what is most excellent in the universe, thou desirest to substitute in his place what is most vile and contemptible.

CONSIDER all the works of men's hands; all the inventions of human wit, in which thou affectest so nice a discernment: Thou wilt find, that the most perfect production still proceeds from the most perfect thought, and that 'tis MIND alone, which we admire, while we bestow our applause on the graces of a well-proportion'd statue, or the symmetry of a noble pile. The statuary, the architect comes still in view, and makes us reflect on the beauty of his art and contrivance, which, from a heap of unform'd matter, cou'd extract such expressions and proportions. This superior beauty of thought and intelligence thou thyself acknowledgest, while thou inviteſt us to contemplate, in thy conduct, the harmony of affections, the dignity of sentiments, and all those graces of a mind, which chiefly merit our attention. But why stoppest thou short? Seest thou nothing farther that is valuable? Amid thy rapturous applauses of beauty and order, art thou still ignorant where is to be found the most consummate beauty, the most perfect order? Compare the works of art with those of nature. The one are but imitations of the other. The nearer art approaches to nature, the more perfect is it esteem'd. But still, how wide are its nearest approaches, and what an immense interval may be observ'd betwixt them? Art copies only the outside of nature, leaving the inward and more admirable springs and principles;

ples; as exceeding her imitation, as beyond her comprehenſion. Art copies only the minute productions of nature, deſpairing to reach that grandeur and magnificence, which are ſo aſtoniſhing in the maſterly works of her original. Can we then be ſo blind, as not to diſcover an intelligence and a deſign in the exquiſite and moſt ſtupendous contrivance of the univerſe? Can we be ſo ſtupid, as not to feel the warmeſt raptures of worſhip and adoration, upon the contemplation of that intelligent being, ſo infinitely good and wiſe?

THE moſt perfect happineſs, ſurely, muſt ariſe from the contemplation of the moſt perfect object. But what more perfect than beauty and virtue? And where is beauty to be found equal to that of the univerſe? Or virtue, which can be compar'd to the benevolence and juſtice of the deity? If aught can diminiſh the pleaſure of this contemplation, it muſt be either the narrowneſs of our faculties, which conceals from us the greateſt part of theſe beauties and perfections; or the ſhortneſs of our lives, which allows not time ſufficient to inſtruct us in them. But 'tis our comfort, that if we imploy worthily the faculties here aſſign'd us, they will be enlarg'd in another ſtate of exiſtence, ſo as to render us more ſuitable worſhippers of our maker: And that the taſk, which can never be finiſh'd in time, will be the buſineſs of an eternity.

ESSAY XXI.

The SCEPTIC.

I HAVE long entertain'd a great ſuſpicion, with regard to the deciſions of philoſophers upon all ſubjects, and found in myſelf a greater inclination to diſpute, than aſſent to their concluſions. There is one miſtake, to which they ſeem liable, almoſt without exception; they confine too much their principles, and make no account of that vaſt variety, which nature has ſo much affected in all her operations. When a philoſopher has once laid hold of a favourite principle, which perhaps accounts for many natural effects, he will extend the ſame principle over the whole creation, and reduce to it every phænomenon, tho' by the moſt violent and abſurd reaſoning. Our own mind being narrow and contracted, we cannot extend our conception to the variety and extent of nature; but imagine, that ſhe is as much bounded in her operations, as we are in our ſpeculations.

BUT if ever this infirmity of philoſophers is to be ſuſpected on any occaſion, 'tis in their reaſonings concerning human life, and the methods of attaining happineſs. In that caſe, they are led aſtray, not

not only by the narrowness of their understandings, but also by that of their passions. Almost every one has a predominant inclination, to which all his other desires and affections submit, and which governs him, tho', perhaps, with some intervals, thro' the whole course of his life. 'Tis difficult for him to apprehend, that any thing, which appears totally indifferent to him, can ever give enjoyment to any person, or can possess charms, which altogether escape his observation. His own pursuits are always, in his account, the most engaging: The objects of his passion, the most valuable: And the road which he pursues, the only one that leads to happiness.

BUT wou'd these prejudic'd reasoners reflect a moment, there are many obvious instances and arguments, sufficient to undeceive them, and make them enlarge their maxims and principles. Do they not see the vast variety of inclinations and pursuits among our species, where each man seems fully satisfy'd with his own course of life, and wou'd esteem it the greatest unhappiness to be confin'd to that of his neighbour? Do they not feel in themselves, that what pleases at one time, displeases at another, by the change of inclination; and that it is not in their power, by their utmost efforts, to recall that taste or appetite, which formerly bestow'd charms on what now appears indifferent or disagreeable? What is the meaning therefore of those general preferences of the town or country life, of a life of action or one of pleasure, of retirement or society; when, besides the different inclinations of different men, every one's

experience may convince him, that each of these kinds of life is agreeable in its turn, and that their variety or their judicious mixture, chiefly contributes to the rendering all of them agreeable.

BUT shall this business be allow'd to go altogether at adventures? And must a man consult only his humour and inclination, in order to determine his course of life, without ever employing his reason, to inform him what road is preferable, and leads most surely to happiness? Is there no difference then betwixt one man's conduct and another?

I ANSWER, There is a great difference. One man, following his inclinations, in chusing his course of life, may imploy much surer means for succeeding than another, who is led by his inclination into the same course of life, and pursues the same object. *Are riches the chief object of your desires?* Acquire skill in your profession; be diligent in the exercise of it; and enlarge the circle of your friends and acquaintance; avoid pleasure and expence, and never be generous, but with a view of gaining more than you cou'd save by frugality. *Wou'd you acquire the publick esteem?* Guard equally against the extremes of arrogance and fawning. Let it appear that you set a value upon yourself, but without despising others. If you fall into either of the extremes, you either provoke men's pride by your insolence, or teach them to despise you by your timorous submission, and by the mean opinion which you seem to entertain of yourself.

THESE,

THESE, you say, are the maxims of common prudence and discretion; what every parent inculcates on his child, and what every man of sense pursues in the course of life, which he has chosen. —What is it then you desire more? Do you come to a philosopher, as to a *cunning man*, to learn something by magic or witchcraft, beyond what can be known by common prudence and discretion?—Yes; we come to a philosoper to be instructed. How we shall chuse our ends, more than the means for attaining these ends: We want to know, what desires we shall satisfy, what passions we shall comply with, what appetites we shall indulge. As to the rest, we trust to common sense, and the general maxims of the world, for our instruction.

I AM sorry, then, I have pretended to be a philosopher: For I find your questions very perplexing; and am in danger, if my answer be too rigid and severe, of passing for a pedant and scholastic; if it be too easy and free, of being taken for a preacher of vice and immorality. However, to satisfy you, I shall deliver my opinion upon the matter, and only desire you to esteem it of as little consequence as I do myself. By that means you will neither think it worthy of your ridicule nor your anger.

IF we can depend upon any principle, which we learn from philosophy, this, I think, may be consider'd as certain and undoubted, That there is nothing, in itself, valuable or despicable, desireable or hateful,

ful, beautiful or deformed; but that these attributes arise from the particular constitution and fabric of human sentiments and affections. What seems the most delicious food to one animal, appears loathsome to another: What affects the feeling of one with delight, produces uneasiness to another. This is confessedly the case with regard to all the bodily senses: But if we examine the matter more accurately, we shall find, that the same observation holds even where the mind concurs with the body, and mingles its sentiments with the exterior appetites.

Desire this passionate lover to give you a character of his mistress: He will tell you, that he is at a loss for words to describe her charms, and will ask you very seriously, If ever you was acquainted with a goddess or an angel? If you answer, that you never was: He will then say, That 'tis impossible for you to form a conception of such divine beauties as those which his charmer possesses; so complete a shape; such proportion'd features; so engaging an air; such sweetness of disposition; such gaiety of humour. You can infer nothing, however, from all this discourse, but that the poor man is in love; and that the general appetite betwixt the sexes, which nature has infus'd into all animals, is in him determin'd to a particular object by some qualities, which gave him pleasure. The same divine creature, not only to a different animal, but also to a different man, appears a mere mortal being, and is beheld with the utmost indifference.

NATURE has given all animals a like prejudice in favour of their offspring. As ſoon as the helpleſs infant ſees the light, tho' in every other eye it appears a deſpicable and a miſerable creature, it is regarded by its fond parent with the utmoſt affection, and is prefer'd to every other object, however perfect or accompliſh'd. The paſſion alone, ariſing from the original ſtructure and formation of human nature, beſtows a value on the moſt insignificant object.

WE may puſh the ſame obſervation further, and may conclude, that even when the mind operates alone, and feeling the ſentiments of blame or approbation, pronounces one object deform'd and odious, another beautiful and amiable; I ſay, that even in this caſe, theſe qualities are not really in the objects, but belong entirely to the ſentiments of that mind which blames or praiſes. I grant, that it will be more difficult to make this propoſition evident, and as it were, palpable, to negligent thinkers, becauſe nature is more uniform in the ſentiments of the mind than in moſt feelings of the body, and produces a nearer reſemblance in the inward than in the outward part of human kind. There is ſomething approaching to principles in mental taſte; and critics can reaſon and diſpute much more plauſibly than cooks or perfumers. We may obſerve, however, That this uniformity among human kind hinders not, but that there is a conſiderable diverſity in the ſentiments of beauty and worth, and that education,

education, cuſtom, prejudice, caprice, and humour frequently vary our taſte of this kind. You will never convince a man, who is not accuſtom'd to *Italian* muſic, and has not an ear to follow its intricacies, that a *Scotch* tune is not preferable. You have not even any ſingle argument, beyond your own taſte, which you can employ in your behalf: And to your antagoniſt, his particular taſte will always appear a much more convincing argument to the contrary. If you be wiſe, each of you will allow, that the other may be in the right; and having many other inſtances of this diverſity of taſte, you will both confeſs, that beauty and worth are merely of a relative nature, and conſiſt in an agreeable ſentiment produc'd by an object on a particular mind, according to the peculiar ſtructure and conſtitution of that mind.

By this diverſity of ſentiment, obſervable in human kind, nature has, perhaps, intended to make us ſenſible of her authority, and let us ſee what ſurpriſing changes ſhe cou'd produce on the paſſions and deſires of mankind, merely by the change of their inward fabric, without any alteration on the objects. The vulgar may even be convinc'd by this argument: But men accuſtom'd to thinking may draw a more convincing, at leaſt a more general argument, from the very nature of the ſubject.

In the operation of reaſoning, the mind does nothing but run over its objects, as they are ſuppos'd to ſtand in reality, without adding any thing

to them, or diminishing any thing from them. If I examine the *Ptolomaic* and *Copernican* systems, I endeavour only, by my enquiries, to know the real situation of the planets; that is, in other words, I endeavour to give them, in my mind or conception, the same relations which they bear towards each other in the heavens. To this operation of the mind, therefore, there seems to be always a real, tho' often an unknown standard, in the nature of things; nor is truth or falshood variable by the various apprehensions of mankind. Tho' all human race shou'd for ever conclude, that the sun moves, and the earth remains at rest, the sun stirs not an inch from his place for all these reasonings; and such conclusions are eternally false and erroneous.

BUT the case is not the same with the qualities of *beautiful and deform'd, desirable and odious*, as with truth and falshood. In the former case, the mind is not contented with merely surveying its objects, as they stand in themselves: It also feels a sentiment of delight or uneasiness, approbation or blame, consequent to that survey; and this sentiment determines it to pronounce the object *beautiful or deform'd, desirable or odious*. Now, 'tis evident, that this sentiment must depend upon the particular fabric or structure of the mind, which enables such particular objects to operate in such a particular manner, and produces a sympathy or conformity betwixt the mind and the objects. Vary the structure of the mind or inward organs, the sentiment no longer follows, tho' the objects remain the same. The

sentiment

ſentiment being different from the object, and ariſing from its operation upon the organs of the mind, an alteration upon the latter muſt vary the effect, nor can the ſame object, preſented to a mind totally different, produce the ſame ſentiment.

THIS concluſion every one is apt to form, of himſelf, without much philoſophy, where the ſentiment is evidently diſtinguiſhable from the object. Who is not ſenſible, that power, and glory, and vengeance, are not deſirable of themſelves, but derive all their value from the ſtructure of human paſſions, which begets a deſire for ſuch particular objects? But with regard to beauty, either natural or moral, the caſe is commonly ſuppos'd to be different. The agreeable quality is thought to lie in the object, not in the ſentiment; and that merely becauſe the ſentiment is not ſo turbulent and violent as to diſtinguiſh itſelf, in an evident manner, from the perception of the object.

BUT a very little reflection ſuffices to diſtinguiſh them. A man may know exactly all the circles and ellipſes of the *Copernican* ſyſtem, and all the irregular ſpirals of the *Ptolomaic*, without perceiving that the former is more beautiful than the latter. *Euclid* has very fully explain'd every quality of the circle, but has not, in any propoſition, ſaid a word of its beauty. The reaſon is evident. Beauty is not a quality of the circle. It lies not in any part of the line, *whoſe* parts are all equally

diſtant

diſtant from a common center. It is only the effect, which that figure operates upon the mind, whoſe particular fabric or ſtructure renders it ſuſceptible of ſuch ſentiments. In vain would you look for it in the circle, or ſeek it, either by your ſenſes, or by mathematical reaſonings, in all the properties of that figure.

THE mathematician, who took no other pleaſure in reading *Virgil*, but that of examining *Eneas*'s voyage by the map, might underſtand perfectly the meaning of every *Latin* word, imploy'd by that divine author; and conſequently, might have a diſtinct idea of the whole narration. He would even have a more diſtinct idea of it, than they could have who had not ſtudy'd ſo exactly the geography of the poem. He knew, therefore, every thing in the poem: But he was ignorant of its beauty; becauſe the beauty, properly ſpeaking, lies not in the poem, but in the ſentiment or taſte of the reader. And where a man has no ſuch delicacy of temper, as to make him feel this ſentiment, he muſt be ignorant of the beauty, tho' poſſeſs'd of the ſcience and underſtanding of an angel *.

THE

* Were I not afraid of appearing too philoſophical, I would remind my reader of that famous doctrine, ſuppos'd to be fully prov'd in modern times, *That taſtes and colours, and all other ſenſible qualities, lie not in the bodies, but merely in the ſenſes.* The caſe is the ſame with beauty and deformity, virtue and vice. This doctrine, however, takes off no more

THE inference upon the whole is, that it is not from the value or worth of the object, which any perſon purſues, that we can determine his enjoyment, but merely from the paſſion with which he purſues it, and the ſucceſs which he meets with in his purſuit. Objects have abſolutely no worth or value in themſelves. They derive their worth meerly from the paſſion. If that be ſtrong, and ſteady, and ſucceſsful, the perſon is happy. It cannot reaſonably be doubted, but a little miſs, dreſt in a new gown for a dancing-ſchool ball, receives as compleat enjoyment as the greateſt orator, who triumphs in the ſplendor of his eloquence, while he governs the paſſions and reſolutions of a numerous aſſembly.

ALL the difference, therefore, betwixt one man and another, with regard to life, conſiſts either in the *paſſion*, or in the *enjoyment*: And theſe differences are ſufficient to produce the wide extremes of happineſs and miſery.

more from the reality of the latter qualities, than from that of the former; nor need it give any umbrage either to critics or moraliſts. Tho' colours were allow'd to lie only in the eye, would dyers or painters ever be leſs regarded or eſteem'd? There is a ſufficient uniformity in the ſenſes and feelings of mankind, to make all theſe qualities the objects of art and reaſoning, and to have the greateſt influence on life and manners. And as 'tis certain, that the diſcovery above-mention'd in natural philoſophy, makes no alteration on action and conduct; why ſhould a like diſcovery in *moral* philoſophy make any alteration?

To

To be happy, the *passion* must neither be too violent nor too remiss. In the first case, the mind is in a perpetual hurry and flustre; in the second, it sinks into a disagreeable indolence and lethargy.

To be happy, the passion must be benign and social; not rough or fierce. The affections of the latter kind are not near so agreeable, to the feeling, as those of the former. Who will compare rancour and animosity, envy and revenge, to friendship, benignity, clemency and gratitude?

To be happy, the passion must be chearful and gay, not gloomy and melancholy. A propensity to hope and joy is real riches: One to fear and sorrow, real poverty.

SOME passions or inclinations, in the *enjoyment* of their object, are not so steady or constant as others, nor convey such durable pleasure and satisfaction. *Philosophical devotion*, for instance, like the enthusiasm of a poet, is the transitory effect of high spirits, great leisure, a fine genius, and a habit of study and contemplation: But notwithstanding all these circumstances, an abstracted, invisible object, like that which *natural* religion alone presents to us, cannot long actuate the mind, or be of any moment in life. To render the passion of continuance, we must find some method of affecting the senses and imagination, and must embrace some *historical* as well as *philosophical* accounts of the divinity. Popular super-

ſuperſtitions and obſervances are even found to be of uſe in this particular.

Tho' the tempers of men be very different, yet we may ſafely pronounce in general, that a life of pleaſure cannot ſupport itſelf ſo long as one of buſineſs, but is much more ſubject to ſatiety and diſguſt. The amuſements, which are the moſt durable, have all a mixture of application and attention in them; ſuch as gaming and hunting. And in general, buſineſs and action fill up all the great vacancies of human life.

But where the temper is the beſt diſpos'd for any *enjoyment*, the object is often wanting: And in this reſpect, the paſſions, which purſue *external* objects, contribute not ſo much to happineſs, as thoſe which reſt in ourſelves; ſince we are neither ſo certain of attaining ſuch objects, nor ſo ſecure of poſſeſſing them. A paſſion for learning is preferable, with regard to happineſs, to one for riches.

Some men are poſſeſt of great ſtrength of mind; and even when they purſue *external* objects, are not much affected by a diſappointment, but renew their application and induſtry with the greateſt chearfulneſs. Nothing contributes more to happineſs than this turn of mind.

According to this ſhort and imperfect ſketch of human life, the happieſt diſpoſition of mind is the *virtuous*; or, in other words, that which leads to action

action and employment, renders us ſenſible to the ſocial paſſions, ſteels the heart againſt the aſſaults of fortune, reduces the affections to a juſt moderation, makes our own thoughts an entertainment to us, and inclines us rather to the pleaſures of ſociety and converſation, than to thoſe of the ſenſes. This, in the mean time, muſt be obvious to the moſt careleſs reaſoner, that all diſpoſitions of mind are not alike favourable to happineſs, and that one paſſion or humour may be extremely deſirable, while another is equally diſagreeable. And indeed, all the difference betwixt the conditions of life depends upon the mind; nor is there any one ſituation of affairs, in itſelf, preferable to another. Good and ill, both natural and moral, are entirely relative to human ſentiment and affection. No man would ever be unhappy, could he alter his feelings. *Proteus*-like, he would elude all attacks, by the continual alterations of his ſhape and form.

BUT of this reſource nature has, in a great meaſure, deprivʼd us. The fabric and conſtitution of our mind no more depends on our choice, than that of our body. The generality of men have not even the ſmalleſt notion, that any alteration in this reſpect can ever be deſirable. As a ſtream neceſſarily follows the ſeveral inclinations of the ground, on which it runs; ſo are the ignorant and thoughtleſs part of mankind actuated by their natural propenſities. Such are effectually excluded from all pretenſions to philoſophy, and the *medicine of the mind*, ſo much boaſted. But even upon the wiſe and thoughtful, nature has a prodi-

a prodigious influence; nor is it always in a man's power, by the utmost art and industry, to correct his temper, and attain that virtuous character, to which he aspires. The empire of philosophy extends over a few: and with regard to these too, her authority is very weak and limited. Men may well be sensible of the value of virtue, and may desire to attain it; but 'tis not always certain, that they will be successful in their wishes.

WHOEVER considers, without prejudice, the course of human actions, will find, that men are almost entirely guided by constitution and temper, and that general maxims have little influence, but so far as they affect our taste or sentiment. If a man have a lively sense of honour and virtue, with moderate passions, his conduct will always be conformable to the rules of morality; or if he depart from them, his return will be easy and expeditious. But, on the other hand, where one is born of so perverse a frame of mind, of so callous and insensible a disposition, as to have no relish for virtue and humanity, no sympathy with his fellow-creatures, no desire of esteem and applause; such a one must be allow'd entirely incurable, nor is there any remedy in philosophy. He reaps no satisfaction but from low and sensual objects, or from the indulgence of malignant passions: He feels no remorse to controul his vicious inclinations: He has not even that sense or taste, which is requisite to make him desire a better character: For my part, I know not how I should address myself to such a one, or by what arguments I should endeavour

endeavour to reform him. Should I tell him of the inward satisfaction which results from laudable and humane actions, the delicate pleasures of disinterested love and friendship, the lasting enjoyments of a good name and an establish'd character; he might still reply, that these were, perhaps, pleasures to such as were susceptible of them; but that, for his part, he finds himself of a quite different turn and disposition. I must repeat it; my philosophy affords no remedy in such a case, nor could I do any thing but lament this person's unhappy condition. But then I ask, If any other philosophy can afford a remedy; or if it be possible, by any system, to render all mankind virtuous, however perverse may be their natural frame of mind? Experience will soon convince us of the contrary; and I will venture to affirm, that, perhaps, the chief benefit, which results from philosophy, arises in an indirect manner, and proceeds more from its secret, insensible influence, than from its immediate application.

'Tis certain, that a serious attention to the sciences and liberal arts, softens and humanizes the temper, and cherishes those fine emotions, in which true virtue and honour consists. It rarely, very rarely happens, that a man of taste and learning is not, at least, an honest man, whatever frailties may attend him. The bent of his mind to speculative studies must mortify in him the passions of interest and ambition, and must, at the same time, give him a greater sensibility of all the decencies and duties of life. He feels more fully a moral distinction in characters and man-

ners; nor is his ſenſe of this kind diminiſh'd, but, on the contrary, it is much encreas'd, by his ſpeculations.

Besides ſuch inſenſible changes upon the temper and diſpoſition, 'tis highly probable, that others may be produc'd by ſtudy and application. The prodigious effects of education may convince us, that the mind is not altogether ſtubborn and inflexible, but will admit of many alterations from its original make and ſtructure. Let a man propoſe to himſelf the model of a character, which he approves of; let him be well acquainted with thoſe particulars, in which his own character deviates from this model: Let him keep a conſtant watch over himſelf, and bend his mind, by a continual effort, from the vices towards the virtues; and I doubt not but, in time, he will find, in his temper, an alteration to the better.

Habit is another powerful means of reforming the mind, and implanting in it good diſpoſitions and inclinations. A man who continues in a courſe of ſobriety and temperance, will hate riot and diſorder: If he engage in buſineſs or ſtudy, indolence will ſeem a puniſhment to him: If he conſtrain himſelf to practiſe beneficence and affability, he will ſoon abhor all inſtances of pride and violence. Where one is thoroughly convinc'd, that the virtuous courſe of life is preferable; if he has resolution enough, for ſome time, to impoſe a ence on himſelf; his reformation need not be de-

ſpair'd

ſpair'd of. The misfortune is, that this conviction and this reſolution never can have place, unleſs a man be, before-hand, tolerably virtuous.

HERE then is the chief triumph of art and philoſophy: It inſenſibly refines the temper, and it points out to us thoſe diſpoſitions which we ſhould endeavour to attain, by a conſtant *bent* of mind, and by repeated *habit*. Beyond this I cannot acknowledge it to have great influence; and I muſt entertain doubts concerning all thoſe exhortations and conſolations, which are in ſuch vogue among all ſpeculative reaſoners.

WE have already obſerv'd, that no objects are, of themſelves, deſirable or odious, valuable or deſpicable; but that objects acquire theſe qualities from the particular character and conſtitution of the mind, which ſurveys them. To diminiſh therefore, or augment any perſon's value for an object, to excite or moderate his paſſions, there are no direct arguments or reaſons, which can be employ'd with any force or influence. The catching flies, like *Domitian*, if it give more pleaſure, is preferable to the hunting wild beaſts, like *William Rufus*, or conquering kingdoms, like *Alexander*.

BUT tho' the value of every object can be determin'd only by the ſentiments or paſſions of every individual, we may obſerve, that the paſſions, in pronouncing their verdict, conſider not the object ſimply, as it is in itſelf, but ſurvey it with all the cir-

cumſtances, which attend it. A man tranſported with joy, on account of his poſſeſſing a diamond, confines not his view to the gliſtering ſtone before him: He alſo conſiders its rarity, and from thence chiefly ariſes his pleaſure and exultation. Here therefore a philoſopher may ſtep in, and ſuggeſt particular views and conſiderations, and circumſtances, which otherwiſe would have eſcap'd us; and, by that means, he may either moderate or excite any particular paſſion.

It may ſeem unreaſonable abſolutely to deny the authority of philoſophy in this reſpect: But it muſt be confeſt, that there lies this ſtrong preſumption againſt it, that if theſe views be natural and obvious, they would have occurr'd of themſelves, without the aſſiſtance of philoſophy; if they be not natural, they never can have any influence on the affections. *Theſe* are of a very delicate nature, and cannot be forc'd or conſtrain'd by the utmoſt art and induſtry. A conſideration, which we ſeek for on purpoſe, which we enter into with difficulty, which we retain with care and attention, can never produce thoſe genuine and durable movements of paſſion, which are the reſult of nature, and the conſtitution of the mind. A man may as well pretend to cure himſelf of love, by viewing his miſtreſs thro' the *artificial* medium of a microſcope, or proſpect, and beholding there the coarſeneſs of her ſkin, and monſtrous diſproportion of her features, as hope to excite or moderate any paſſion by the *artificial* arguments of a *Seneca* or an *Epictetus*. The remembrance of the natural aſpect

and

and situation of the objects will, in both cases, still return upon him. The reflections of philosophy are too subtile and distant to take place in common life, or eradicate any affection. The air is too fine to breathe in, where it is above the winds and clouds of the atmosphere.

ANOTHER defect of those refin'd reflections, which philosophy presents to us, is, that commonly they cannot diminish or extinguish our vicious passions, without diminishing or extinguishing such as are virtuous, and rendering the mind totally indifferent and inactive. They are, for the most part, general, and are applicable to all our affections. In vain do we hope to direct their influence only to one side. If by incessant study and meditation we have render'd them very intimate and present to us, they will operate throughout, and spread an universal insensibility over the mind. When we destroy the nerves, we extinguish the sense of pleasure, along with that of pain.

IT will be easy, by one glance of the eye, to find one or other of these defects in most of those philosophical reflections, so much celebrated both in ancient and modern times. *Let not the injuries or violence of men*, say the philosophers *, *ever discompose you by anger or hatred. Would you be angry at the ape for its malice, or the tyger for its ferocity?* This reflection leads us into a bad opinion of human nature, and must extinguish the social affections. It tends also to

* *Plut. de ira cohibenda.*

remove all remorse for a man's own crimes, whe he considers, that vice is as natural to mankind, a the particular instincts to brute-creatures.

ALL ills arise from the order of the univers which is absolutely perfect. Would you wish to disturb so divine an order for the sake of your own particula interest. What if the ills I suffer arise from malic or oppression? *But the vices and imperfections of me are also comprehended in the order of the universe.*

If plagues and earthquakes break not heav'n's design,
Why then a Borgia *or a* Catiline?

Let this be allow'd; and my own vices will also b a part of the same order.

To one who said, that none was happy, who wa not above opinion, a *Spartan* reply'd, *then none a happy but knaves and robbers* *.

MAN is born to be miserable; and is he surpriz'd a any particular misfortune? And can he give way t sorrow and lamentation upon account of any disaster. Yes: He very reasonably laments, that he should b born to be miserable. Your consolation presents hundred ills for one, that you pretend to ease him of

YOU should always have before your eyes death, disease, poverty, blindness, exile, calumny, and infamy, a ills which are incident to human nature. When any one

* Plut. Lacon. *Apophthog.*

of

of these ills falls to your lot, you will bear it the better that you have laid your account with it. I answer, If we confine ourselves to a general and distant reflection on the ills of human life, *that* can have no effect to prepare us for them. If by close and intense meditation we render them present and intimate to us, *that* is the true secret to poison all our pleasures, and render us perpetually miserable.

YOUR sorrow is fruitless, and will not change the course of destiny. Very true: And for that very reason I am sorry.

CICERO's consolation for deafness is somewhat curious. *How many languages are there,* says he, *which you do not understand? The* Punic, Spanish, Gallic, Ægyptian, *&c. With regard to all these, you are as if you were deaf, and yet you are indifferent about the matter. Is it then so great a misfortune to be deaf to one language more* * ?

I LIKE better the repartee of *Antipater* the *Cyreniac,* when some women were condoling with him for his blindness. *What!* says he, *Do you think there are no pleasures in the dark?*

NOTHING can be more destructive, says *Fontenelle, to ambition, and the passion for conquests, than the true system of astronomy. What a poor thing is even the whole globe, in comparison of the infinite extent of nature?* This consideration is evidently too distant

* *Tusc. Quæst.* Lib. V.

ever to have any effect. And if it had any, wou'd it not destroy patriotism as well as ambition? The same gallant author adds with some reason, that the bright eyes of the ladies are the only objects, which lose nothing of their lustre or value from the most extensive views of astronomy and philosophy, but stand proof against every system. Wou'd philosophers advise us to limit our affection to them?

Thus says *Plutarch* to a friend in banishment, *it is [illegible]. Mathematicians tell us, that the whole earth is but as a point, compar'd to the heavens. To change and [illegible], then, is little more than to remove from one [illegible] to another. Man is not a plant, rooted to a [illegible] of earth: All pole and all climates are alike [illegible] to him* *. These topics are admirable cou'd they fall only into the hands of banish'd persons. But what if they come also to the knowledge of those employ'd in public affairs, and destroy all their attachment to their native country? Or will they operate, like the quack's medicine, which is equally good for a diabetes and a dropsy?

'Tis certain, were a superior being thrust into a human body, that the whole of life wou'd to him appear so mean, contemptible, and puerile, that he never cou'd be induc'd to take party in any thing, and wou'd scarcely give attention to what passes around him. To engage him to such condescension as to play even the part of a *Philip* with zeal and alacrity,

* *De exilio.*

wou'd

wou'd be much more difficult than to conſtrain the ſame *Philip*, after having been a king and conqueror during fifty years, to mend old ſhoes with proper care and attention; the occupation which *Lucian* aſſigns him in the infernal regions. Now all the ſame topics of diſdain towards human affairs, which cou'd operate on this ſuppos'd being, occur alſo to a philoſopher; but being, in ſome meaſure, diſproportion'd to human capacity, and not being fortify'd with the experience of any thing better, they make not a full impreſſion on him. He ſees, but he feels not ſufficiently their truth; and is always a ſublime philoſopher, when he needs not; that is, as long as nothing diſturbs him, or rouzes his affections. While others play, he wonders at their keenneſs and ardour; but he no ſooner puts in his own ſtake, than he is commonly tranſported with the ſame paſſions, which he had ſo much condemn'd while he remain'd a ſimple ſpectator.

THERE are chiefly two conſiderations to be met with in books of philoſophy, from which any conſiderable effect is to be expected; and that becauſe theſe two conſiderations are drawn from common life, and occur upon the moſt ſuperficial view of human affairs. When we reflect on the ſhortneſs and uncertainty of life, how deſpicable ſeem all our purſuits of happineſs? And even, if we wou'd extend our concern beyond our own life, how frivolous appear our moſt enlarg'd and moſt generous projects; when we conſider the inceſſant changes and revolutions of human affairs, by which laws and

learning, books and governments are hurry'd away by time, as by a rapid ſtream, and are loſt in the immenſe ocean of matter? Such a reflection certainly tends to mortify all our paſſions: But does it not thereby counterwork the artifice of nature, who has happily deceiv'd us into an opinion, that human life is of ſome importance? And may not ſuch a reflection be imploy'd with ſucceſs by voluptuous reaſoners, in order to lead us from the paths of action and virtue, into the flowery fields of indolence and pleaſure?

We are inform'd by *Thucydides*, that, during the famous plague of *Athens*, when death ſeem'd preſent to every one's eyes, a diſſolute mirth and gaiety prevail'd among the people, who exhorted one another to make the moſt of life as long as it endur'd. The ſame obſervation is made by *Boccace* with regard to the plague of *Florence*. A like principle makes ſoldiers, during war, to be more addicted to riot and expence, than any other race of men. Preſent pleaſure is always of importance; and whatever diminiſhes the importance of all other objects muſt beſtow on it an additional influence and value.

The *ſecond* philoſophical conſideration, which may often have an influence on the affections, is deriv'd from a compariſon of our own condition with the condition of others. This compariſon we are continually making, even in common life; but the misfortune is, that we are apt rather to compare our ſituation with that of our ſuperiors, than with that of

of our inferiors. A philosopher corrects this natural infirmity, by turning his view to the other side, in order to render himself easy in the situation in which fortune has plac'd him. There are few people, who are not susceptible of some consolation from this reflection; tho', to a very good-natur'd man, the view of human miseries shou'd rather produce sorrow than comfort, and add to his lamentations for his own misfortunes a deep compassion for those of others. Such is the imperfection, even of the best of these philosophical topics of consolation *.

I shall

* The sceptic, perhaps, carries the matter too far, when he limits all philosophical topics, and reflections to these two. There seem to be others, whose truth is undeniable, and whose natural tendency is to tranquilize and soften all the passions. Philosophy greedily seizes these, studies them, weighs them, commits them to the memory, and familiarizes them to the mind: And their influence on tempers, which are thoughtful, gentle, and moderate, may be considerable. But what is their influence, you will say, if the temper be antecedently dispos'd after the same manner which they pretend to form it? They may, at least, fortify that temper, and furnish it with views, by which it may entertain and nourish itself. Here are a few examples of such philosophical reflections.

1. Is it not certain, that every condition has conceal'd ills? Then why envy any body?

2. Every one has known ills; and there is a compensation throughout. Why not be contented with the present?

3. Custom deadens the sense both of the good and the ill, and levels every thing.

4. Health and humour all. The rest of little consequence, except these be affected.

5. How many other goods have I? Then why be vexed for one ill?

6. How many are happy in the condition of which I complain? How many envy me?

I SHALL conclude this subject with observing, That tho' virtue be undoubtedly the best choice, when

7. Every good must be pay'd for: Fortune by labour, favour by flattery. Wou'd I keep the price, yet have the commodity?

8. Expect not too great happiness in life. Human nature admits it not.

9. Propose not a happiness too complicated. But does that depend on me? Yes: The first choice does. Life is like a game: One may choose the game; and passion, by degrees, seizes the proper object.

10. Anticipate by your hopes and fancy future consolation, which time infallibly brings to every affliction.

11. I desire to be rich? Why? That I may possess many fine objects; houses, gardens, equipage, &c. How many fine objects does nature offer to every one without expence? If enjoy'd, sufficient. If not: See the effect of custom or of temper, which wou'd soon take off the relish of the riches.

12. I desire fame. Let this occur: If I act well, I shall have the esteem of all my acquaintance. And what is all the rest to me?

These reflections are so obvious, that 'tis a wonder they occur not to every man: So convincing, that 'tis a wonder they persuade not every man. But perhaps they do occur to and perswade most men; when they consider human life, by a general and calm survey: But where any real, affecting incident happens; when passion is awaken'd, fancy agitated, example draws, and counsel urges; the philosopher is lost in the man, and he searches in vain for that perswasion, which before seem'd so firm and unshaken. What remedy for this inconvenience? Assist yourself by a frequent perusal of the entertaining moralists: Have recourse to the learning of *Plutarch*, the imagination of *Lucian*, the eloquence of *Cicero*, the wit of *Seneca*, the gaiety of *Montaigne*, the sublimity of *Shaftsbury*. Moral precepts, touch'd, strike deep, and fortify the mind against the illusions of passion. But trust not altogether to external aid: By habit and study acquire that philosophic temper, which

[illegible] confusion of human affairs, [illegible] necessary or regular distribution of happiness and misery [illegible] in this life, [illegible] goods of fortune, and the endowments of the mind (both which are of great importance, and may [illegible] advantages) [illegible] virtuous and vicious, [illegible] the most chief partakes, in some degree, of the disorder and the most worthy character, by the very necessity of the passions, enjoys not always the highest felicity.

'Tis observable, that the most acute pain or pain proceeds from some disorder in the parts, yet the pain is not always proportionate to the disorder; but is greater or less, according to the greater or less sensibility of the part, upon which the noxious humours exert their influence. A *stone* produces more violent convulsions of pain, than a *pleurisy*, or a *dropsy*. In like manner, with regard to the constitution of the mind, we may observe, that all vice is indeed pernicious; but yet the disturbance or pain is not measur'd out by nature with exact proportion to the degrees of vice, nor is the man of highest virtue, even abstracting from external accidents, always the most happy. A gloomy and melancholy disposition is certainly, *to our sentiments*, a

which both gives force to reflection, and by rendering a great part of your happiness independent, takes off the edge from all disorderly passions, and tranquilizes the mind. Despise not these helps; but confide not too much in them neither; unless nature has been favourable in the temper, with which she has endow'd you.

vice or imperfection; but as it may be accompany'd with great ſenſe of honour and great integrity, it may be found in very worthy characters; tho' 'tis ſufficient alone to imbitter life, and render the perſon affected with it compleatly miſerable. On the other hand, a ſelfiſh villain may poſſeſs a ſpring and alacrity of temper, a certain *gaiety of heart*, which is indeed a good quality, but which is rewarded much beyond its merit, and when attended with good fortune, will compenſate the uneaſineſs and remorſe ariſing from all the other vices.

I SHALL add, as an obſervation to the ſame purpoſe, that if a man be liable to a vice or imperfection, it may often happen, that a good quality, which he poſſeſſes along with it, will render him more miſerable, than if he were compleatly vicious. A perſon of ſuch imbecillity of temper, as to be eaſily broke by affliction, is more unhappy for being endow'd with a generous and friendly diſpoſition, which gives him a lively concern for others, and expoſes him the more to fortune and accidents. A ſenſe of ſhame, in an imperfect character, is certainly a virtue, but produces great uneaſineſs and remorſe, from which the abandon'd villain is intirely free. A very amorous complexion, with a heart incapable of friendſhip, is happier than the ſame exceſs in love, with a generoſity of temper, which tranſports a man beyond himſelf, and renders him a total ſlave to the object of his paſſion.

IN a word, human life is more govern'd by fortune than by reason; is to be regarded more as a dull pastime than as a serious occupation; and is more influenc'd by particular humour than by general principles. Shall we engage ourselves in it with passion and anxiety? It is not worthy of so much concern. Shall we be indifferent about what happens? We lose all the pleasure of the game by our phlegm and carelessness. While we are reasoning concerning life, life is gone; and death, tho' *perhaps* they receive him differently, yet treats alike the fool and the philosopher. To reduce life to exact rule and method, is commonly a painful, oft a fruitless occupation: And is it not also a proof, that we overvalue the prize for which we contend? Even to reason so carefully concerning it, and to fix with accuracy its just idea, would be over-valuing it, were it not that, to some tempers, this occupation is one of the most amusing, in which life cou'd possibly be employ'd.

ESSAY

ESSAY XXII.

Of POLYGAMY *and* DIVORCES.

AS marriage is an engagement enter'd into by mutual consent, and has for its end the propagation of the species, 'tis evident, that it must be susceptible of all the variety of conditions, which consent establishes, provided they be not contrary to this end.

A MAN, in conjoining himself to a woman, is bound to her according to the terms of his engagement: In begetting children, he is bound, by all the laws of nature and humanity, to provide for their subsistence and education. When he has perform'd these two parts of duty, no being can reproach him with injustice or injury. And as the terms of his engagement, as well as the methods of subsisting his offspring, may be very various, 'tis mere superstition to imagine, that marriage can be intirely uniform, and will admit only of one mode or form. Did not human laws restrain the natural liberty of men, every particular marriage wou'd be as different, as contracts or bargains of any other kind or species.

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As circumſtances vary, and the laws propoſe different advantages, we find, that, in different times and places, they impoſe different conditions on this important contract. In *Tonquin* 'tis uſual for the ſailors, when the ſhips come into the harbour, to marry for the ſeaſon; and, notwithſtanding this precarious engagement, they are aſſur'd, 'tis ſaid, of the ſtricteſt fidelity to their bed, as well as in the whole management of their affairs, from thoſe temporary ſpouſes.

I CANNOT, at preſent, recollect my authorities; but I have ſomewhere read, That the republic of *Athens*, having loſt many of its citizens by war and peſtilence, allow'd every man to marry two wives, in order the ſooner to repair the waſte which had been made by theſe calamities. The poet *Euripides* happen'd to be coupled to two noiſy Vixons, who ſo plagu'd him with their jealouſies and quarrels, that he became ever after a profeſt *woman-hater*; and is the only theatrical writer, perhaps the only poet, who ever entertain'd an averſion againſt the whole ſex.

IN that agreeable romance, call'd *the Hiſtory of the Sevarambians*, where a great many men and a few women are ſuppos'd to be ſhipwreck'd on a deſert coaſt; the captain of the troop, in order to obviate thoſe endleſs quarrels which aroſe, regulates their marriages after the following manner: He takes a handſome female to himſelf alone; aſſigns one to every couple of inferior officers; and to five of the loweſt rank

rank he gives one wife in common. Cou'd the greateſt legiſlator, in ſuch circumſtances, have contriv'd matters with greater wiſdom?

THE ancient *Britons* had a very ſingular kind of marriage, which is to be met with among no other people. Any number of them, as ten or a dozen, join'd in a ſociety together, which was perhaps requiſite for mutual defence in thoſe barbarous times. In order to link this ſociety the cloſer, they took an equal number of wives in common, and whatever children were born, were reputed to belong to all of them, and were accordingly provided for by the whole community.

AMONG the inferior creatures, nature herſelf, being the ſupreme legiſlator, preſcribes all the laws which regulate their marriages, and varies thoſe laws according to the different circumſtances of the creature. Where ſhe furniſhes, with eaſe, food and defence to the new-born animal, the preſent embrace terminates the marriage; and the care of the offſpring is committed intirely to the female. Where the food is of more difficult purchaſe, the marriage continues for one ſeaſon, till the common progeny can provide for itſelf; and then the union immediately diſſolves, and leaves each of the parties free to enter into a new engagement at the enſuing ſeaſon. But nature having endow'd man with reaſon, has not ſo exactly regulated every article of his marriage-contract, but has left him to adjuſt them,

by

by his own prudence, according to his particular circumstances and situation. Municipal laws are a supply to the wisdom of each individual; and, at the same time, by restraining the natural liberty of men, make the private interest submit to the interest of the public. All regulations, therefore, on this head are equally lawful, and equally conformable to the principles of nature; tho' they are not all equally convenient, or equally useful to society. The laws may allow of polygamy, as among the *Eastern* nations; or of voluntary divorces, as among the *Greeks* and *Romans*; or they may confine one man to one woman, during the whole course of their lives, as among the modern *Europeans*. It may not be disagreeable to consider the advantages and disadvantages, which result from each of these institutions.

THE advocates for polygamy may recommend it as the only effectual remedy for the furies and disorders of love, and the only expedient for freeing men from that slavery to the females, which the natural violence of our passions has impos'd on us. By this means alone can we regain our right of sovereignty; and, sating our appetite, re-establish the authority of reason in our minds, and, of consequence, our own authority in our families. Man, like a weak sovereign, being unable to support himself against the wiles and intrigues of his subjects, must play one faction against another, and become absolute by the mutual jealousies of the females. *To divide and to govern* is an universal maxim; and, by neglect-

neglecting it, the *Europeans* undergo a more grievous and a more ignominious ſlavery than the *Turks* or *Perſians*, who are ſubjected indeed to a ſovereign, who lies at a diſtance from them, but in their domeſtic affairs rule with an uncontroulable ſway. An honeſt *Turk*, who ſhould come from his ſeraglio, where every one trembles before him, wou'd be ſurpriz'd to ſee *Sylvia* in her drawing room, ador'd by all the beaus and pretty fellows about town, and he wou'd certainly take her for ſome mighty and deſpotic queen, ſurrounded by her guard of obſequious ſlaves and eunuchs.

On the other hand, it may be urg'd with better reaſon, That this ſovereignty of the male is a real uſurpation, and deſtroys that nearneſs of rank, not to ſay equality, which nature has eſtabliſh'd betwixt the ſexes. We are, by nature, their lovers, their friends, their patrons: Wou'd we willingly change ſuch endearing appellations for the barbarous titles of maſter and tyrant?

In what capacity ſhall we gain by this inhuman proceeding? As lovers, or as huſbands? The *lover* is totally annihilated; and courtſhip, the moſt agreeable ſcene in human life, can no longer have place, where women have not the free diſpoſal of themſelves, but are bought and ſold, like the meaneſt animals. The *huſband* is as little a gainer, having found the admirable ſecret of extinguiſhing every part of love, except its jealouſy. There is no roſe without its thorn; but he muſt be a fooliſh wretch indeed,

indeed, who throws away the rose, and preserves only the thorn.

I WOU'D not willingly insist upon it as an advantage in our *European* customs, what was observ'd by *Mehemet Effendi* the last *Turkish* ambassador in *France*. *We Turks*, says he, *are great simpletons in comparison of the christians. We are at the expence and trouble of keeping a seraglio, each in his own house: But you ease yourselves of this burden, and have your seraglio in your friends houses.* The known virtue of our *British* ladies frees them sufficiently from this imputation: And the *Turk* himself, had he travel'd among us, must have own'd, that our free commerce with the fair-sex, more than any other invention, embellishes, enlivens, and polishes society.

BUT the *Asiatic* manners are as destructive to friendship as to love. Jealousy excludes men from all intimacies and familiarities. No man dares bring his friend to his house or table, lest he bring a lover to his numerous wives. Hence all over the east, each family is as separate from another, as if they were so many distinct kingdoms. No wonder then, that *Solomon*, living like an eastern prince, with his seven hundred wives, and three hundred concubines, without one friend, cou'd write so pathetically concerning the vanity of the world. Had he try'd the secret of one wife or mistress, a few friends, and a great many companions, he might have found life somewhat more agreeable. Destroy

love

love and friendſhip; what remains in the world worth accepting?

To render polygamy more odious, I need not recount the frightful effects of jealouſy, and the conſtraint in which it holds the fair-ſex all over the eaſt. In thoſe countries men are not allow'd to have any commerce with the females, not even phyſicians, when ſickneſs may be ſuppos'd to have extinguiſh'd all wanton paſſions in the boſoms of the fair, and, at the ſame time, has render'd them unfit objects of deſire. *Tournefort* tells us, That when he was brought into the *grand ſignior*'s ſeraglio as a phyſician, he was not a little ſurpriz'd, in looking along a gallery, to ſee a great number of naked arms, ſtanding out from the ſides of the room. He cou'd not imagine what this cou'd mean; 'till he was told, that thoſe arms belong'd to bodies, which he muſt cure, without knowing any more about them, than what he cou'd learn from the arms. He was not allow'd to aſk a queſtion of the patient, or even of her attendants, leſt he might find it neceſſary to enquire concerning circumſtances, which the delicacy of the ſeraglio allows not to be reveal'd. Hence the phyſicians in the eaſtern countries pretend to know all diſeaſes from the pulſe; as our quacks in *Europe* undertake to cure a perſon merely from ſeeing his water. I ſuppoſe, had *Monſieur Tournefort* been of this latter kind, he would not, in *Conſtantinople*, have been allow'd by the jealous *Turks* to be furniſh'd with materials requiſite for exerciſing his art.

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In another country, where polygamy is allow'd, they render their wives cripples, and make their feet of no use to them, in order to confine them to their own houses. But it will, perhaps, appear strange, that in an *European* country, where polygamy is not allow'd, jealousy can yet be carr'd to such a height, that 'tis indecent so much as to suppose, that a woman of rank can have feet or legs. A *Spaniard* is jealous of the very thoughts of those who approach his wife; and, if possible, will prevent his being dishonour'd, even by the wantonness of imagination. Witness the following story, which we have from very good authority *. When the mother of the late king of *Spain* was on her road towards *Madrid*, she past thro' a little town in *Spain*, famous for its manufactory of gloves and stockings. The honest magistrates of the place thought they could not better express their joy, for the reception of their new queen, than by presenting her with a sample of those commodities, for which alone their town was remarkable. The *major-domo*, who conducted the queen, receiv'd the gloves very graciously: But when the stockings were presented, he flung them away with great indignation, and severely reprimanded the magistrates for this egregious piece of indecency. *Know*, says he, *That a queen of* Spain *has no legs*. The poor young queen, who, at that time, understood the language but very imperfectly, and had been often frighten'd with stories of *Spanish*

* *Memoires de la cour d'Espagne par Madame d'Aunoy.*

jealousy,

jealousy, imagin'd that they were to cut off her legs. Upon which she fell a crying, and begg'd them to conduct her back to *Germany*; for that she never cou'd endure that operation: And it was with some difficulty they could appease her. *Philip* IV. is said never in his life to have laugh'd heartily, but at the recital of this story.

If a *Spanish* lady must not be suppos'd to have legs, what must be suppos'd of a *Turkish* lady? She must not be suppos'd to have a being at all. Accordingly, 'tis esteem'd a piece of rudeness and indecency at *Constantinople*, ever to make mention of a man's wives before him *. In *Europe*, 'tis true, fine bred people make it also a rule never to talk of their wives: But the reason is not founded on our jealousy. I suppose it is because we should be apt, were it not for this rule, to become troublesome to company, by talking too much of them.

The author of the *Persian* letters has given a different reason for this polite maxim, *Men*, says he, *never care to mention their wives in company, lest they should talk of them before people, who know them better than themselves do.*

Having rejected polygamy, and match'd one man with one woman, let us now consider what duration we shall assign to their union, and whether we shall admit of those voluntary divorces, which

* *Memoires de Marquis d'Argens.*

were in use among the *Greeks* and *Romans*. They who would defend this practice, may imploy the following reasons.

HOW often does disgust and aversion arise after marriage, from the most trivial accidents, or from an incompatibility of humour; where time, instead of curing the wounds proceeding from mutual injuries, festers them every day the more, by new quarrels and reproaches? Let us separate hearts, which are not made for each other. Each of them may, perhaps, find another, for which it is better fitted. At least, nothing can be more cruel, than to preserve, by violence, an union, which, at first, was made by mutual love, and is now, in effect, dissolv'd by mutual hatred.

BUT the liberty of divorces is not only a cure to hatred and domestic quarrels: It is also an admirable preservative against them, and the only secret for keeping alive that love, which first united the marry'd couple. The heart of man delights in liberty: The very image of constraint is grievous to it: When you wou'd confine it by violence, to what wou'd otherwise have been its choice, the inclination immediately changes, and desire is turn'd into aversion. If the public interest will not allow us to enjoy in polygamy that *variety*, which is so agreeable in love; at least, deprive us not of that liberty, which is so essentially requisite. In vain you tell me, that I had my choice of the person, with whom I would conjoin myself. I had my choice, 'tis true, of

my prison; but this is but a small comfort, since it must still be a prison.

SUCH are the arguments, which may be urg'd in favour of divorces: But there seem to be these three unanswerable objections against them; *First*, What must become of the children, upon the separation of the parents? Must they be committed to the care of a stepmother; and, instead of the fond attention and concern of a parent, feel all the indifference or hatred of a stranger or an enemy? These inconveniences are sufficiently felt, where nature has made the divorce by the doom inevitable to all mortals: And shall we seek to multiply these inconveniencies, by multiplying divorces, and putting it in the power of parents, upon every caprice, to render their posterity miserable?

Secondly, IF it be true, on the one hand, that the heart of man naturally delights in liberty, and hates every thing to which it is confin'd; 'tis also true, on the other hand, that the heart of man naturally submits to necessity, and soon loses an inclination when there appears an absolute impossibility of gratifying it. These principles of human nature, you will say, are contradictory: But what is man but a heap of contradictions? Tho' 'tis remarkable, that where principles are, after this manner, contrary in their operation, they do not always destroy each other; but the one or the other may predominate on any particular occasion, according as circumstances are more or less favourable to it. For instance, love

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is a restless and impatient passion, full of caprices and variations; arising in a moment from a feature, from an air, from nothing, and suddenly extinguishing after the same manner. Such a passion requires liberty above all things; and therefore *Eloisa* had reason, when, in order to preserve this passion, she refus'd to marry her belov'd *Abelard*.

How oft, when prest to marriage, have I said,
Curse on all laws, but those which love has made.
Love, free as air, at sight of human ties,
Spreads his light wing, and in a moment flies.

But *friendship* is a calm and sedate affection, conducted by reason, and cemented by habit; springing from long acquaintance and mutual obligations; without jealousies or fears, and without those feverish fits of heat and cold, which cause such an agreeable torment in the amorous passion. So sober an affection, therefore, as friendship, rather thrives under constraint, and never rises to such a height, as when any strong interest or necessity binds two persons together, and gives them some common object of pursuit. Let us consider then, whether love or friendship should most predominate in marriage; and we shall soon determine whether liberty or constraint be most favourable to it. The happiest marriages, to be sure, are found where love, by long acquaintance, is consolidated into friendship. Whoever dreams of raptures and extasies beyond the honeymoon, is a fool. Even romances themselves, with all their liberty of fiction, are oblig'd to drop their

lovers the very day of their marriage, and find it easier to support the passion for a dozen of years under coldness, disdain and difficulties, than a week under possession and security. We need not, therefore, be afraid of drawing the marriage-knot the closest possible. The friendship betwixt the persons, where it is solid and sincere, will rather gain by it: And where it is wavering and uncertain, this is the best expedient for fixing it. How many frivolous quarrels and disgusts are there, which people of common prudence endeavour to forget, when they lye under a necessity of passing their lives together; but which would soon inflame into the most deadly hatred, were they pursu'd to the utmost, under the prospect of an easy separation?

In the *third* place, we must consider, that nothing is more dangerous than to unite two persons so closely in all their interests and concerns, as man and wife, without rendering the union intire and total. The least possibility of a separate interest must be the source of endless quarrels and jealousies. What Dr. *Parnel* calls,

The little pilf'ring temper of a wife,

will be doubly ruinous; and the husband's selfishness, being accompany'd with more power, may be still more dangerous.

Should these reasons against voluntary divorces be esteem'd insufficient, I hope no body will pretend

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to refuſe the teſtimony of experience. At the time when divorces were moſt frequent among the *Romans*, marriages were moſt rare; and *Auguſtus* was oblig'd, by penal laws, to force the men of faſhion into the married ſtate: A circumſtance which is ſcarce to be found in any other age or nation. The more ancient laws of *Rome* which prohibited divorces, are extremely prais'd by *Dionyſius Halycarnaſſæus* *. Wonderful was the harmony, ſays the hiſtorian, which this inſeparable union of intereſts produc'd between marry'd perſons; while each of them conſider'd the inevitable neceſſity by which they were link'd together, and abandon'd all proſpect of any other choice or eſtabliſhment.

THE excluſion of polygamy and divorces ſufficiently recommends our preſent *European* practice, with regard to marriage.

* Lib. 2.

ESSAY XXIII.

Of SIMPLICITY *and* REFINEMENT *in writing.*

FINE writing, according to Mr. *Addison*, consists of sentiments, which are natural, without being obvious. There cannot be a juster, and more concise definition of fine writing.

SENTIMENTS, which are merely natural, affect not the mind with any pleasure, and seem not worthy of our attention. The pleasantries of a waterman, the observations of a peasant, the ribaldry of a porter or hackney coachman; all these are natural, and disagreeable. What an insipid comedy should we make of the chit-chat of the tea-table, copy'd faithfully and at full length? Nothing can please persons of taste, but nature drawn with all her graces and ornaments, *la belle nature*; or if we copy low life, the strokes must be strong and remarkable, and must convey a lively image to the mind. The absurd * naivety of *Sancho Pancho* is represented

* A word which I have borrow'd from the *French*, and which is wanted in our language.

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in ſuch inimitable colours by *Cervantes*, that it entertains as much as the picture of the moſt magnanimous hero or ſofteſt lover.

THE caſe is the ſame with orators, philoſophers, critics, or any author, who ſpeaks in his own perſon, without introducing other ſpeakers or actors. If his language be not elegant, his obſervations uncommon, his ſenſe ſtrong and maſculine, he will in vain boaſt his nature and ſimplicity. He may be correct; but he never will be agreeable. 'Tis the unhappineſs of ſuch authors, that they are never blam'd nor cenſur'd. The good fortune of a book, and that of a man, are not the ſame. The ſecret deceiving path of life, which *Horace* talks of, *fallentis ſemita vitæ*, may be the happieſt lot of the one; but is the greateſt misfortune, which the other can poſſibly fall into.

ON the other hand, productions, which are merely ſurpriſing, without being natural, can never give any laſting entertainment to the mind. To draw chimeras is not, properly ſpeaking, to copy or imitate. The juſtneſs of the repreſentation is loſt, and the mind is diſpleas'd to find a picture, which bears no reſemblance to any original. Nor are ſuch exceſſive refinements more agreeable in the epiſtolary or philoſophic ſtile than in the epic or tragic. Too much ornament is a fault in every kind of production. Uncommon expreſſions, ſtrong flaſhes of wit, pointed ſimilies, and epigrammatic turns, eſpecially when they occur too frequently, are a diſfigure-

ment rather than any embellishment of discourse. As the eye, in surveying a *Gothic* building, is distracted by the multiplicity of ornaments, and loses the whole by its minute attention to the parts; so the mind, in perusing a work over-stock'd with wit, is fatigu'd and disgusted with the constant endeavour to shine and surprize. This is the case where a writer over-abounds in wit, even tho' that wit, in itself, should be just and agreeable. But it commonly happens to such writers, that they seek for their favourite ornaments, even where the subject affords them not; and by that means, have twenty insipid conceits for one thought which is really beautiful.

THERE is no subject in critical learning more copious than this of the just mixture of simplicity and refinement in writing; and therefore, not to wander in too large a field, I shall confine myself to a few general observations on that head.

First, I observe, *That tho' excesses of both kinds are to be avoided, and tho' a proper medium ought to be study'd in all productions; yet this medium lies not in a point, but admits of a very considerable latitude.* Consider the wide distance, in this respect, betwixt Mr. *Pope* and *Lucretius*. These seem to lye in the two greatest extremes of refinement and simplicity, in which a poet can indulge himself, without being guilty of any blameable excess. All this interval may be fill'd with poets, who may differ from each other, but may be equally admirable, each in his peculiar stile and manner. *Corneille* and *Congreve*, who carry their

their wit and refinement ſomewhat farther than Mr. *Pope* (if poets of ſo different a kind can be compar'd together) and *Sophocles* and *Terence*, who are more ſimple than *Lucretius*, ſeem to have gone out of that medium, in which the moſt perfect productions are found, and to be guilty of ſome exceſs in theſe oppoſite characters. Of all the great poets, *Virgil* and *Racine*, in my opinion, lye neareſt the center, and are the fartheſt remov'd from both the extremities.

MY *ſecond* obſervation on this head is, *That it is very difficult, if not impoſſible, to explain, by words, where the juſt medium betwixt the exceſſes of ſimplicity and refinement lyes, or to give any rule, by which we can know preciſely the bounds betwixt the fault and the beauty.* A critic may not only diſcourſe very judiciouſly on this head, without inſtructing his readers, but even without underſtanding the matter perfectly himſelf. There is not a finer piece of criticiſm than *the diſſertation on paſtorals* by *Fontenelle*; where, by a number of reflections and philoſophical reaſonings, he endeavours to fix the juſt medium, which is ſuitable to that ſpecies of writing. But let any one read the paſtorals of that author, and he will be convinc'd, that this judicious critic, notwithſtanding his fine reaſonings, had a falſe taſte, and fix'd the point of perfection much nearer the extreme of refinement, than paſtoral poetry will admit of. The ſentiments of his ſhepherds are better ſuited to the toilettes of *Paris*, than to the foreſts of *Arcadia*. But this it is impoſſible to diſcover

from his critical reasonings. He blames all excessive painting and ornament as much as *Virgil* could have done, had *he* wrote a dissertation on that species of poetry. However different the tastes of men may be, their general discourses on these subjects are commonly the same. No criticism can be very instructive, which descends not to particulars, and is not full of examples and illustrations. 'Tis allow'd on all hands, that beauty, as well as virtue, lies always in a medium; but where this medium is plac'd, is the great question, and can never be sufficiently explain'd by general reasonings.

I SHALL deliver it as a *third* observation on this subject, *that we ought to be more on our guard against the excess of refinement than that of simplicity; and that because the former excess is both less* beautiful, *and more* dangerous *than the latter*.

'TIS a certain rule, that wit and passion are intirely inconsistent. When the affections are mov'd, there is no place for the imagination. The mind of man being naturally limited, 'tis impossible, that all its faculties can operate at once: And the more any one predominates, the less room is there for the others to exert their vigour. For this reason, a greater degree of simplicity is requir'd in all compositions, where men, and actions, and passions are painted, than in such as consist of reflections and observations. And as the former species of writing is the more engaging and beautiful, one may safely, upon this account, give the preference to

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the extreme of simplicity above that of refinement.

WE may also observe, that those compositions, which we read the oftenest, and which every man of taste has got by heart, have the recommendation of simplicity, and have nothing surprizing in the thought, when divested of that elegance of expression, and harmony of numbers, with which it is cloath'd. If the merit of the composition lyes in a point of wit; it may strike at first; but the mind anticipates the thought in the second perusal, and is no longer affected by it. When I read an epigram of *Martial*, the first line recalls the whole; and I have no pleasure in repeating to myself what I know already. But each line, each word in *Catullus* has its merit; and I am never tir'd with the perusal of him. 'Tis sufficient to run over *Cowley* once: But *Parnel*, after the fiftieth reading, is as fresh as at the first. Besides, 'tis with books, as with women, where a certain plainness of manner and of dress is more engaging than that glare of paint and airs and apparel, which may dazzle the eye, but reaches not the affections. *Terence* is a modest and bashful beauty, to whom we grant every thing, because he assumes nothing, and whose purity and nature make a durable, tho' not a violent, impression upon us.

BUT refinement, as it is the less *beautiful*, so is it the more *dangerous* extreme, and what we are the aptest to fall into. Simplicity passes for dulness, when it is not accompany'd with great elegance and

propriety. On the contrary, there is something surprizing in a blaze of wit and conceit. Ordinary readers are mightily struck with it, and falsely imagine it to be the most difficult, as well as most excellent way of writing. *Seneca* abounds with agreeable faults, says *Quintilian, abundat dulcibus vitiis*; and for that reason is the more dangerous, and the more apt to pervert the taste of the young and inconsiderate.

I SHALL add, that the excess of refinement is now more to be guarded against than ever; because 'tis the extreme, which men are the most apt to fall into, after learning has made great progress, and after eminent writers have appear'd in every species of composition. The endeavour to please by novelty leads men wide of simplicity and nature, and fills their writings with affectation and conceit. 'Twas thus the *Asiatic* eloquence degenerated so much from the *Attic*. 'Twas thus the age of *Claudius* and *Nero* became so much inferior to that of *Augustus* in taste and genius: And perhaps there are, at present, some symptoms of a like degeneracy of taste, in *France* as well as in *England*.

ESSAY

ESSAY XXIV.

Of NATIONAL CHARACTERS.

THE vulgar are very apt to carry all *national characters* to extremes; and having once eſtabliſh'd it as a principle, that any people are knaviſh, or cowardly, or ignorant, they will admit of no exception, but comprehend every individual under the ſame character. Men of ſenſe condemn theſe undiſtinguiſhing judgments; tho' at the ſame time, they allow, that each nation has a peculiar ſet of manners, and that ſome particular qualities are more frequently to be met with among one people than among their neighbours. The common people in *Swiſſerland* have ſurely more probity than thoſe of the ſame rank in *Ireland*; and every prudent man will, from that circumſtance alone, make a difference in the truſt which he repoſes in each. We have reaſon to expect greater wit and gaiety in a *Frenchman* than in a *Spaniard*; tho' *Cervantes* was born in *Spain*. An *Engliſhman* will naturally be ſuppos'd to have more knowledge than a *Dane*; tho' *Tycho Brahe* was a native of *Denmark*.

DIFFERENT reaſons are aſſign'd for theſe *national characters*; while ſome account for them from *moral* and

and others from *physical* causes. By *moral* causes, I mean all circumstances, which are fitted to work on the mind as motives or reasons, and which render a peculiar set of manners habitual to us. Of this kind are, the nature of the government, the revolutions of public affairs, the plenty or penury in which the people live, the situation of the nation with regard to its neighbours, and such like circumstances. By *physical* causes, I mean those qualities of the air and climate, which are suppos'd to work insensibly on the temper, by altering the tone and habit of the body, and giving a particular complexion, which tho' reflection and reason may sometimes overcome, yet will it prevail among the generality of mankind, and have an influence on their manners.

That the character of a nation will very much depend on *moral* causes must be evident to the most superficial observer; since a nation is nothing but a collection of individuals, and the manners of individuals are frequently determin'd by these causes. As poverty and hard labour debase the minds of the common people, and render them unfit for any science and ingenious profession; so where any government becomes very oppressive to all its subjects, it must have a proportional effect on their temper and genius, and must banish all the liberal arts from amongst them. Instances of this nature are very frequent in the world.

The same principle of moral causes fixes the character of different professions, and alters even that disposition,

disposition, which the particular members receive from the hand of nature. A *soldier* and a *priest* are different characters, in all nations, and all ages; and this difference is founded on circumstances, whose operation is eternal and unalterable.

THE uncertainty of their life makes soldiers lavish and generous as well as brave: Their idleness, as well as the large societies, which they form in camps or garrisons, inclines them to pleasure and gallantry: By their frequent change of company, they acquire good breeding and an openness of behaviour: Being employ'd only against a public and an open enemy, they become candid, honest, and undesigning: And as they use more the labour of the body than that of the mind, they are commonly thoughtless and ignorant *.

'TIS a trite, but not altogether a false maxim, that *priests of all religions are the same*; and tho' the character of the profession will not, in every instance, prevail over the personal character, yet is it sure al-

* 'Tis a saying of *Menander*, Κομψὸς στρατιώτης, οὐδ' ἂν εἰ πλάττει θεὸς Οὐθεὶς γένοιτ' ἄν. *Men. apud Stobæum. 'Tis not in the power even of God to make a polite soldier.* The contrary observation with regard to the manners of soldiers takes place in our days. This seems to me a presumption, that the ancients ow'd all their refinement and civility to books and study; for which, indeed, a soldier's life is not so well calculated. Company and the world is their sphere. And if there be any politeness to be learn'd from company, they will certainly have a considerable share of it.

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ways to predominate with the greater number. For as chymists observe, that spirits, when rais'd to a certain height, are all the same, from whatever materials they be extracted; so these men, being elevated above humanity, acquire a uniform character, which is entirely their own, and which, in my opinion, is, generally speaking, not the most amiable, that is to be met with in human society. It is, in most points, opposite to that of a soldier; as is the way of life, from which it is deriv'd *.

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* Tho' all mankind have a strong propensity to religion at certain times and in certain dispositions; yet are there few or none, who have it to that degree, and with that constancy, which is requisite to support the character of this profession. It must, therefore, happen, that clergymen, being drawn from the common mass of mankind, as people are to other employments, by the views of profit, the greatest part, tho' no atheists or freethinkers, will find it necessary, on particular occasions, to feign more devotion than they are, at that time, possest of, and to maintain the appearance of fervour and seriousness, even when jaded with the exercises of their religion, or when they have their minds engag'd in the common occupations of life. They must not, like the rest of the world, give scope to their natural movements and sentiments: They must set a guard over their looks and words and actions: And in order to support the veneration paid them by the ignorant vulgar, they must not only keep a remarkable reserve, but must promote the spirit of superstition, by a continu'd grimace and hypocrisy. This dissimulation often destroys the candour and ingenuity of their temper, and makes an irreparable breach in their character.

If by chance any of them be possest of a temper more susceptible of devotion than usual, so that he has but little occasion for hypocrisy to support the character of his profession; 'tis so natural for him to over-rate this advantage, and to think that it atones for every violation of morality, that

As to *physical* causes, I am inclin'd to doubt altogether of their operation in this particular; nor do I think,

that frequently he is not more virtuous than the hypocrite. And tho' few dare openly avow those exploded opinions, *that every thing is lawful to the saints, and that they alone have a property in their goods*; yet may we observe, that these principles lurk in every bosom, and represent a zeal for religious observances as so great a merit, that it may compensate for many vices and enormities. This observation is so common, that all prudent men are on their guard, when they meet with any extraordinary appearance of religion; tho' at the same time, they confess, that there are many exceptions to this general rule, and that probity and superstition are not altogether incompatible.

Most men are ambitious; but the ambition of other men may commonly be satisfy'd, by excelling in their particular profession, and thereby promoting the interests of society. The ambition of the clergy can often be satisfy'd only by promoting ignorance and superstition and implicite faith and pious frauds. And having got what *Archimedes* only wanted, (*viz.* another world, on which he could fix his engines) no wonder they move this world at their pleasure.

Most men have an over-weaning conceit of themselves; but *these* have a peculiar temptation to that vice, who are regarded with such veneration, and are even deem'd sacred, by the ignorant multitude.

Most men are apt to bear a particular regard for the members of their own profession; but as a lawyer, or physician, or merchant does, each of them, follow out his business apart, the interests of these professions are not so closely united as the interests of clergymen of the same religion; where the whole body gains by the veneration, paid to their common tenets, and by the suppression of antagonists.

Few men can bear contradiction with patience; but the clergy too often proceed even to a degree of fury on this article: Because all their credit and livelihood depend upon the belief, which their opinions meet with; and they alone pretend to a divine and supernatural authority, or have any colour for representing their antagonists as impious and

profane.

I think, that men owe any thing of their temper or genius to the air, food, or climate. I confess, that the contrary opinion may justly, at first sight,

prophane. The *Odium Theologicum*, or theological hatred, is noted even to a proverb, and means that degree of rancour, which is the most furious and implacable.

Revenge is a very natural passion to mankind; but seems to reign with the greatest force in priests and women: Because, being depriv'd of the immediate exertion of anger, in violence and combat, they are apt to fancy themselves despis'd on that account; and their pride supports their vindictive disposition.

Thus many of the vices of human nature are, by fast moral causes, inflam'd in that profession; and tho' several individuals escape the contagion, yet all wise governments will be on their guard against the attempts of a society, who will for ever combine into one faction, and while it acts as a society, will for ever be actuated by ambition, pride, revenge, and a persecuting spirit.

The temper of religion is grave and serious; and this is the character requir'd of priests, which confines them to strict rules of decency, and commonly prevents irregularity and intemperance amongst them. The gaiety, much less the excesses of pleasure, is not permitted in that body; and this virtue is, perhaps, the only one, which they owe to their profession. In religions, indeed, founded on speculative principles, and where public discourses make a part of religious service, it may also be suppos'd that the clergy will have a considerable share in the learning of the times; tho' 'tis certain that their taste in eloquence will always be better than their skill in reasoning and philosophy. But whoever possesses the other noble virtues of humanity, meekness, and moderation, as very many of them, no doubt, do, is beholden for them to nature or reflection, not to the genius of his calling.

'Twas no bad expedient in the *Romans*, for preventing the strong effect of the priestly character, to make it a law that no one shou'd be receiv'd into the sacerdotal office till he was past fifty years of age, *Dion. Hal.* lib. 1. The living a layman till that age, 'tis presum'd, wou'd be able to fix the character.

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seem very probable: since we find, that their circumstances have an influence over every other animal, and that even those creatures, which are fitted to live in all climates, such as dogs, horses, &c. do not attain the same perfection in all. The courage of bull-dogs and game-cocks seems peculiar to *England*. *Flanders* is remarkable for large and heavy horses: *Spain* for horses light, and of good mettle. And any breed of these creatures, transported from one country into another, will soon lose the qualities, which they deriv'd from their native climate. It may be ask'd, Why not the same with men *?

THERE are few questions more curious than this, or which will occur oftener in our enquiries concerning human affairs; and therefore it may be proper to give it a serious examination.

* *Cæsar* (*de Bell. Gallico*, lib. 1.) says that the *Gallic* horses were very good; the *German* very bad. We find in *lib.* 7. that he was oblig'd to remount some *German* cavalry with *Gallic* horses. At present, no part of *Europe* has so bad horses of all kinds as *France*: But *Germany* abounds with excellent war horses. This may beget a little suspicion, that even animals depend not on the climate; but on the different breeds and on the skill and care in rearing them. The north of *England* abounds in the best horses of all kinds which are in the world. In the neighbouring counties, north side the *Tweed*, no good horses of any kind are to be met with. *Strabo*, lib. 2. rejects, in a great measure, the influence of climate upon men. All is custom and education, says he. It is not from nature, that the *Athenians* are learn'd, the *Lacedæmonians* ignorant, and the *Thebans* too, who are still nearer neighbours to the former. Even the difference of climals, he adds, depends not on climate.

THE human mind is of a very imitative nature; nor is it possible for any set of men to converse often together, without acquiring a similitude of manners, and communicating to each other their vices as well as virtues. The propensity to company and society is strong in all rational creatures; and the same disposition, which gives us this propensity, makes us enter deeply into each other's sentiments, and causes like passions and inclinations to run, as it were by contagion, thro' the whole club or knot of companions. Where a Number of men are united into one political body, the occasions of their intercourse must be so frequent, for defence, commerce, and government, that, along with the same speech or language, they must contract a resemblance in their manners, and have a common or national character, as well as a personal one, peculiar to each individual. Now tho' nature produces all kinds of temper and understanding in great abundance, it follows not that she always produces them in like proportions, and that in every society the ingredients of industry and indolence, valour and cowardice, humanity and brutality, wisdom and folly will be mixt after the same manner. In the infancy of society, if any of these dispositions be found in greater abundance than the rest, it will naturally prevail in the composition, and give a tincture to the national character. Or should it be asserted, that no species of temper can reasonably be presum'd to predominate, even in those contracted societies, and that the same proportions will always be

be preſerv'd in the mixture; yet ſurely the perſons in credit and authority, being a more contracted body, cannot always be preſum'd to be of the ſame character; and their influence on the manners of the people, muſt, at all times, be very conſiderable. If on the firſt eſtabliſhment of a republic, a *Brutus* ſhould be plac'd in authority, and be tranſported with ſuch an enthuſiaſm for liberty and public good, as to overlook all the ties of nature, as well as private intereſt; ſuch an illuſtrious example will naturally have an effect on the whole ſociety, and kindle the ſame paſſion in every boſom. Whatever it be that forms the manners of one generation, the next muſt imbibe a deeper tincture of the ſame dye; men being more ſuſceptible of all impreſſions during infancy, and retaining theſe impreſſions as long as they remain in the world. I aſſert, then, that all national characters, where they depend not on fixt *moral* cauſes, proceed from ſuch accidents as theſe, and that phyſical cauſes have no diſcernible operation on the human mind.

IF we run over the whole globe, or revolve all the annals of hiſtory, we ſhall diſcover every-where ſigns of this ſympathy or contagion of manners, none of the influence of air or climate.

Firſt. WE may obſerve, that where a very extenſive government has been eſtabliſh'd for many centuries, it ſpreads a national character over the whole empire, and communicates to every part a ſimilitude of manners. Thus the *Chineſe* have the greateſt uniformity

formity of character imaginable; tho' the air and climate, in different parts of those vast dominions, admit of very considerable variations.

Secondly. In small governments, which are contiguous, the people have notwithstanding a different character, and are often as distinguishable in their manners as the most distant nations. *Athens* and *Thebes* were but a short day's journey from each other; tho' the *Athenians* were as remarkable for ingenuity, politeness, and gaiety, as the *Thebans* for dulness, rusticity, and a phlegmatic temper. *Plutarch*, discoursing of the effects of air on the minds of men, observes, that the inhabitants of the *Piræum* possest very different tempers from those of the higher town of *Athens*, which was distant about four miles from the former. But I believe no one attributes the difference of manners, in *Wapping* and St. *James's*, to a difference of air or climate.

Thirdly. The same national character commonly follows the authority of government to a precise boundary; and upon crossing a river, or passing a mountain, one finds a new set of manners, along with a new government. The *Languedocians* and *Gascons* are the gayest people of all *France*; but whenever you pass the *Pyrenees*, you are among *Spaniards*. Is it conceivable, that the qualities of the air should change so exactly with the limits of an empire, which depend so much on the accidents of battles, negotiations, and marriages?

Fourthly,

Fourthly. WHERE any set of men, scatter'd over distant nations, have a close society or communication together, they acquire a similitude of manners, and have but little in common with the nations amongst whom they live. Thus the *Jews* in *Europe*, and the *Armenians* in the east, have a peculiar character; and the former are as much noted for fraud, as the latter for probity *. The *Jesuites*, in all *Roman-Catholic* countries, are also observ'd to have a character peculiar to themselves.

Fifthly. WHERE any accident, as a difference of language or religion, keeps two nations, inhabiting the same country, from mixing with each other, they will preserve, for several centuries, a distinct and even opposite set of manners. The integrity, gravity, and bravery of the *Turks* form an exact contrast to the deceit, levity, and cowardice of the modern *Greeks*.

Sixthly. THE same set of manners will follow a nation, and adhere to them over the whole globe, as well as the same laws and language. The *Spanish*, *English*, *French*, and *Dutch* colonies are all distinguishable, even betwixt the tropics.

* A small sect or society amidst a greater are commonly most regular in their morals; because they are more remarkt, and the faults of individuals draw dishonour on the whole. The only exception to this rule is, when the superstition and prejudices of the large society are so strong as to throw an infamy on the smaller society, independent of their morals. For in that case, having no character either to save or gain, they become careless of their behaviour, except among themselves.

Seventhly.

Seventhly. The manners of a people change very considerably from one age to another; either by great alterations in their government, by the mixtures of new people, or by that inconstancy, to which all human affairs are subject. The ingenuity and industry of the ancient *Greeks* have nothing in common with the stupidity and indolence of the present inhabitants of those regions. Candour, bravery, and love of liberty, form'd the character of the ancient *Romans*; as subtilty, cowardice, and a slavish disposition do that of the modern. The old *Spaniards* were restless, turbulent, and so addicted to war, that many of them kill'd themselves, when depriv'd of their arms by the *Romans* *. One would find an equal difficulty, at present, (at least one would have found it fifty years ago) to rouze up the modern *Spaniards* to arms. The *Batavians* were all soldiers of fortune, and hir'd themselves into the *Roman* armies. Their posterity make use of foreigners for the same purpose that the *Romans* did their ancestors. Tho' some strokes of the *French* character be the same with that, which *Cæsar* has ascrib'd to the *Gauls*; yet what comparison betwixt the civility, humanity and knowledge of the modern inhabitants of that country, and the ignorance, barbarity and grossness of the ancient? Not to insist upon the great difference betwixt the present possessors of *Britain*, and those before the *Roman* conquest; we may observe, that our ancestors, a few centuries ago, were sunk into the most abject super-

* Tit. Livii, Lib. 34. Cap. 17.

stition,

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [

form way of life will fix their character. If it consists chiefly of nobles and landed gentry, like *Germany*, *France*, and *Spain*, the same effect follows. The genius of a particular sect or religion is also apt to mould the manners of a people. But the *English* government is a mixture of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy. The people are compos'd of gentry and merchants. All sects of religion are to be found amongst them. And the great liberty and independency, which they enjoy, allows every one to display the manners, which are peculiar to him. Hence the *English*, of any people in the universe, have the least of a national character; unless this very singularity may stand for such.

If the characters of men depended on the air and climate, the degrees of heat and cold should naturally be expected to have a mighty influence; since nothing has a greater effect on all plants and irrational animals. And indeed, there is some reason to think, that all the nations, which live beyond the polar circles or betwixt the tropics, are inferior to the rest of the species, and are utterly incapable of all the higher attainments of the human mind. The poverty and misery of the northern inhabitants of the globe, and the indolence of the southern from their few necessities, may, perhaps, account for this remarkable difference, without having recourse to *physical* causes. This however is certain, that the characters of nations are very promiscuous in the temperate climates, and that almost all the general observations, which have been form'd of the more

southern

southern or more northern climates in which climates are found to be [illegible] and [illegible] *

Shall we [illegible] the [illegible] of the sun influence the complexion of men, and give them peculiar spirit and genius? The [illegible] Egyptians and Persians are remarkable for gravity. The Japanese, Chinese and Siamese are noted for gravity and a serious temper, without any such influence of climate, as to produce this difference of temper.

THE *Greeks* and *Romans*, who call'd all other nations barbarians, confin'd genius and a fine understanding to the more southern climates, and pro

* I am apt to suspect the negroes, and in general all the other species of men (for there are four or five different kinds) to be naturally inferior to the whites. There never was a civiliz'd nation of any other complexion than white, nor even any individual eminent either in action or speculation. No ingenious manufactures amongst them, no arts, no sciences. On the other hand, the most rude and barbarous of the whites, such as the antient *Germans*, the present *Tartars*, have still something eminent about them, in their valour, form of government, or some other particular. Such a uniform and constant difference could not happen, in so many countries and ages, if nature had not made an original distinction betwixt these breeds of men. Not to mention our colonies, there are *Negroes* slaves dispersed all over *Europe*, of which none ever discover'd any symptoms of ingenuity; tho' low people, without education, will start up amongst us, and distinguish themselves in every profession. In *Jamaica* indeed, they talk of one negro, as a man of parts and learning; but 'tis likely he is admired for very slender accomplishments, like a parrot, who speaks a few words plainly.

nounc'd the northern nations incapable of all knowledge and civility. But *Britain* has produc'd as great men, either for action or learning, as *Greece* or *Italy* has to boast of.

'Tis pretended, that the sentiments of men become more delicate as the country approaches nearer the sun; and that the taste of beauty and elegance receives proportionable improvements in every latitude; as we may particularly observe of the languages, of which the more southern are smooth and melodious, the northern harsh and untuneable. But this observation holds not universally. The *Arabic* is uncouth and disagreeable: The *Muscovite* soft and musical. Energy, strength, and sometimes harshness form the character of the *Latin* tongue: The *Italian* is the most liquid, smooth, and effeminate language, which can possibly be imagin'd. Every language will depend somewhat on the manners of the people; but much more on that original stock of words and sounds, which they receiv'd from their ancestors, and which remain unchangeable, even while their manners admit of the greatest alterations. Who can doubt, but the *English* are at present a much more polite and knowing people than the *Greeks* were for several ages after the siege of *Troy*? Yet there is no comparison between the language of *Milton* and that of *Homer*. Nay, the greater are the alterations and improvements, which happen in the manners of a people, the less can be expected in their language. A few great and refin'd geniuses will communicate their taste and knowlege to a whole

people,

people, are produce the greatest improvements. But they in the degree in their writings, are prevent, in some degree, a further change.

My lord Bacon has observed, that the inventions of the south are, in general, more ingenious than those of the north: but that, where the nerve of a cold climate has genius, it rises to a higher pitch than can be reached by the southern wits. This observation a late writer * confirms, by comparing the southern wits to cucumbers, which are commonly all good of their kind; but at best are an insipid fruit: While the northern geniuses are like melons, of which not one in fifty is good; but when it is good, it has an exquisite relish. I believe this remark may be allow'd just, when confin'd to the *European* nations, and to the present age, or rather to the preceding one: But then I think it may be accounted for from moral causes. All the sciences and liberal arts have been imported to us from the south; and 'tis easy to imagine, that, in the first ardour of application, when excited by emulation and by glory, the few, who were addicted to them, would carry them to the greatest height, and stretch every nerve, and every faculty, to reach the pinnacle of perfection. Such illustrious examples spred knowledge every where, and begot an universal esteem for the sciences: After which, 'tis no wonder, that industry relaxes; while men meet not with suitable encouragement, nor arrive at such distinction by their attain-

* Dr. *Berkeley*: *Minute philosopher*.

ments. The universal diffusion of learning among a people, and the entire banishment of gross ignorance and rusticity is, therefore, seldom attended with any remarkable perfection in particular persons. It seems to be taken for granted in the dialogue *de Oratoribus*, that knowledge was much more common in *Vespasian*'s age than in that of *Cicero* or *Augustus*. *Quintilian* also complains of the profanation of learning, by its becoming too vulgar. "Formerly, says *Juvenal*, science was confin'd to *Greece* and *Italy*. "Now the whole world emulate *Athens* and *Rome*. "Eloquent *Gaul* has taught *Britain*, knowing in the "laws. Even *Thulé* entertains thoughts of hiring "rhetoricians for its instruction *." This state of learning is remarkable; because *Juvenal* is himself the last of the *Roman* writers, who possest any degree of genius. Those, who succeeded, are valued for nothing but the matters of fact, of which they give us information. I wish the late conversion of *Muscovy* to the study of the sciences may not prove a like prognostic to the present period of learning.

Cardinal *Bentivoglio* gives the preference to the northern nations above the southern with regard to candour and sincerity; and mentions, on the one hand, the *Spaniards* and *Italians*, and on the other,

* *Sed Cantaber unde*
Stoicus? antiqui præsertim ætate Metelli.
Nunc totus Graias, nostrasque habet orbis Athenas.
Gallia causidicos docuit facunda Britannos:
De conducendo loquitur jam rhetore Thulé.

Satyr. 15.

the

the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] and the [illegible] nation [illegible] that [illegible] upon [illegible] upon [illegible] and [illegible] wards from the [illegible]

[illegible] rageous [illegible] courage [illegible] English, which [illegible] But the

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* Sir William Temple's account of the Netherlands.

O 4 Swedes,

Swedes, notwithstanding their disadvantages in this particular, are not inferior, in martial courage, to any nation that ever was in the world.

In general, we may observe, that courage, of all national qualities, is the most precarious; because it is exerted only at intervals, and by a few in every nation; whereas industry, knowledge, civility, may be of constant and universal use, and for several ages, may become habitual to the whole people. If courage be preserv'd, it must be by discipline, example, and opinion. The tenth legion of *Cæsar*, and the regiment of *Picardy* in *France* were form'd promiscuously from amongst the citizens; but having once entertain'd a notion, that they were the best troops in the service, this very opinion really made them such.

As a proof how much courage depends on opinion, we may observe, that of the two chief tribes of the *Greeks*, the *Dorians* and *Ionians*, the former were always esteem'd, and always appear'd more brave and manly than the latter; tho' the colonies of both the tribes were interspers'd and intermingled thro' all the extent of *Greece*, the lesser *Asia*, *Sicily*, *Italy* and the islands of the *Ægean* sea. The *Athenians* were the only *Ionians* that ever had any reputation for valour or military atchievements; tho' even these were esteem'd inferior to the *Lacedæmonians*, the bravest of the *Dorians*.

The

THE only obſervation, with regard to the differences of men in different climates, on which we can reſt any weight, is the vulgar one, that people in the northern regions have a greater inclination to ſtrong liquors, and thoſe in the ſouthern to love and women. One can aſſign a very probable *phyſical* cauſe for this difference. Wine and diſtill'd ſpirits warm the frozen blood in the colder climates, and fortify men againſt the injuries of the weather: As the genial heat of the ſun, in the countries, expos'd to his beams, inflames the blood, and exalts the paſſion betwixt the ſexes.

PERHAPS too, the matter may be accounted for by *moral* cauſes. All ſtrong liquors are rarer in the north, and conſequently are more coveted. *Diodorus Siculus* * tells us, that the *Gauls*, in his time, were great drunkards, and much addicted to wine; chiefly, I ſuppoſe, from its rarity and novelty. On the other hand, the heat in the ſouthern climates, obliging men and women to go half naked, thereby renders their frequent commerce more dangerous, and inflames their mutual paſſion. This makes parents and huſbands more jealous and reſerv'd; which ſtill farther inflames the paſſion. Not to mention, that as women ripen ſooner in the ſouthern regions, 'tis neceſſary to obſerve greater jealouſy and care in their

* *Lib.* 5. The ſame author aſcribes taciturnity to that people; a new proof that national characters may alter very much. Taciturnity, as a national character, implies unſociableneſs.

education; it being evident that a girl of twelve cannot possess equal discretion to govern the furies of this passion, with one, who feels not its violence till she be seventeen or eighteen.

PERHAPS too, the fact is false, that nature has, either from moral or physical causes, distributed these different inclinations to the different climates. The ancient *Greeks*, tho' born in a warm climate, seem to have been much addicted to the bottle; nor were their parties of pleasure any thing but matches of drinking amongst the men, who past their time altogether apart from the fair-sex. Yet when *Alexander* led the *Greeks* into *Persia*, a still more southern climate, they multiplied their debauches of this kind, in imitation of the *Persian* manners *. So honourable was the character of a drunkard amongst the *Persians*, that *Cyrus* the younger, soliciting the sober *Lacedemonians* for succour against his brother; *Artaxerxes*, claims it chiefly on account of his superior endowments, as more valorous, more bountiful, and a better drinker †. *Darius Hystaspes* made it be inscrib'd on his tombstone, among his other virtues and princely qualities, that no one could bear a greater quantity of liquor. You may obtain any thing of the *Negroes* by offering them strong liquor; and may easily prevail with them to sell, not only their parents, but their wives and mistresses, for a cask of brandy. In *France* and *Italy* few drink pure wine,

* *Babylonii maxime in vinum & quæ ebrietatem sequuntur, effusi sunt.* Quint. Cur. Lib. 5. Cap. 1.

† Plut. Symp. Lib. 1. Quæst. 4.

except in the greateſt heats of ſummer; and indeed, it is then almoſt as neceſſary, in order to recruit the ſpirits, evaporated by heat, as it is in *Sweden*, during the winter, in order to warm the bodies congeal'd by the rigour of the ſeaſon.

IF jealouſy be regarded as a proof of an amorous diſpoſition, no people were more jealous than the *Muſcovites*, before their communication with *Europe* had ſomewhat alter'd their manners in this particular.

BUT ſuppoſing the fact true, that nature, by phyſical principles, has regularly diſtributed theſe two paſſions, the one to the northern, the other to the ſouthern regions; we can only infer, that the climate may affect the groſſer and more bodily organs of our frame; not that it can work upon thoſe finer organs, on which the operations of the mind and underſtanding depend. And this is agreeable to the analogy of nature. The races of animals never degenerate when carefully tended; and horſes, in particular, always ſhow their blood in their ſhape, ſpirit, and ſwiftneſs: But a coxcomb may beget a philoſopher, as a man of virtue may leave a ſcoundrelly progeny.

I SHALL conclude this ſubject with obſerving, that tho' the paſſion for liquor be much more brutal and debaſing than love, which, when properly manag'd, is the ſource of all politeneſs and refinement; yet this gives not ſo great an advantage to the ſouthern climates, as we may be apt, at firſt ſight, to imagine.

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When love goes beyond a certain pitch, it renders men jealous, and cuts off the free intercourſe betwixt the ſexes, on which the politeneſs of a nation will always much depend. And if we would ſubtilize and refine upon this point, we might obſerve, that nations, in very temperate climates, bid the faireſt chance for all ſorts of improvement; their blood not being ſo inflam'd as to render them jealous, and yet being warm enough to make them ſet a due value on the charms and endowments of the fair ſex.

ESSAY

ESSAY XXV.

Of the ORIGINAL CONTRACT.

AS no party, in the present age, can pretend to support itself, without a philosophical or speculative system of principles, annex'd to its political or practical one; we accordingly find, that each of the parties, into which this nation is divided, has rear'd up a fabric of the former kind, in order to protect and cover that scheme of actions, which it prosecutes. The people being commonly very rude builders, especially in this speculative way, and more especially still, when actuated by party zeal; 'tis natural to imagine, that their workmanship must be a little unshapely, and discover evident marks of that violence and hurry, in which it was rais'd. The one party, by tracing up the origin of government to the DEITY, endeavour to render government so sacred and inviolate, that it must be little less than sacrilege, however disorderly it may become, to touch or invade it, in the smallest article. The other party, by founding government altogether on the consent of the PEOPLE, suppose that there is a kind of *original contract*, by which the subjects have reserv'd the power of resisting their sovereign, whenever they find them-

selves

ſelves aggriev'd by that authority, with which they have, for certain purpoſes, voluntarily entruſted him. Theſe are the ſpeculative principles of the two parties; and theſe too are the practical conſequences, deduc'd from them.

I SHALL venture to affirm, *That both theſe ſyſtems of ſpeculative principles are juſt; tho' not in the ſenſe, intended by the parties:* And *that both the* Schemes *of practical conſequences are prudent; tho' not in the extremes, to which each party, in oppoſition to the other, has commonly endeavour'd to carry them.*

THAT the DEITY is the ultimate author of all government, will never be denied by any one who admits a general providence, and allows, that all events in the univerſe are conducted by an uniform plan and directed to wiſe purpoſes. As 'tis impoſſible for human race to ſubſiſt, at leaſt in any comfortable or ſecure ſtate, without the protection of government; government muſt certainly have been intended by that beneficent Being, who means the good of all his creatures: And as it has univerſally, in fact, taken place, in all countries and all ages; we may conclude, with ſtill greater certainty, that it was intended by that omniſcient Being, who can never be deceiv'd by any event or operation. But ſince he gave riſe to it, not by any particular or miraculous interpoſition, but by his conceal'd and univerſal efficacy; a ſovereign cannot, properly ſpeaking, be call'd his vice-gerent, in any other ſenſe than every power or force, being deriv'd from him, may be ſaid

to

to act by his commiſſion. Whatever actually happens is comprehended in the general plan or intention of providence; nor has the greateſt and moſt lawful prince any more reaſon, upon that account, to plead a peculiar ſacredneſs or inviolable authority, than an inferior magiſtrate, or even an uſurper, or even a robber and a pyrate. The ſame divine ſuper-intendant, who, for wiſe purpoſes, inveſted an *Elizabeth* or a *Henry* * with authority, did alſo, for purpoſes, no doubt, equally wiſe, tho' unknown, beſtow power on a *Borgia* or an *Angria*. The ſame cauſes, which gave riſe to the ſovereign power in every ſtate, eſtabliſh'd likewiſe every petty juriſdiction in it, and every limited authority. A conſtable, therefore, no leſs than a king, acts by a divine commiſſion, and poſſeſſes an indefeaſible right.

WHEN we conſider how nearly equal all men are in their bodily force, and even in their mental powers and faculties, 'ere cultivated by education; we muſt neceſſarily allow, that nothing but their own conſent cou'd, at firſt, aſſociate them together, and ſubject them to any authority. The PEOPLE, if we trace up government to its firſt origin in the woods and deſerts, are the ſource of all power and juriſdiction, and voluntarily, for the ſake of peace and order, abandon'd their native liberty, and receiv'd laws from their equal and companion. The conditions, upon which they were willing to ſubmit,

* *Henry* the 4th of *France*.

were

were either expreſt, or were ſo clear and obvious, that it might well be eſteem'd ſuperfluous to expreſs them. If this, then, be meant by the *original contract*, it cannot be denied, that all government is, at firſt, founded on a contract, and that the moſt ancient rude combinations of mankind were form'd entirely by that principle. In vain, are we ſent to the records to ſeek for this charter of our liberties. It was not wrote on parchment, nor yet on leaves or barks of trees. It preceded the uſe of writing, and all the other civiliz'd arts of life. But we trace it plainly in the nature of man, and in the equality, which we find in all the individuals of that ſpecies. The force, which now prevails, and which is founded on fleets and armies, is plainly political, and deriv'd from authority, the effect of eſtabliſh'd government. A man's natural force conſiſts only in the vigour of his limbs and the firmneſs of his courage; which could never ſubject multitudes to the command of one. Nothing but their own conſent, and their ſenſe of the advantages of peace and order, could have had that influence.

But philoſophers, who have embrac'd a party (if that be not a contradiction in terms) are not contented with theſe conceſſions. They aſſert, not only that government in its earlieſt infancy aroſe from conſent, or the voluntary combination of the people; but alſo, that, even at preſent, when it has attain'd its full maturity, it reſts on no other foundation. They affirm, that all men are ſtill born equal, and owe allegiance to no prince or government, unleſs bound

bound by the obligation and ſanction of a *promiſe*. And as no man, without ſome equivalent, would forego the advantages of his native liberty, and ſubject himſelf to the will of another; this promiſe is always underſtood to be conditional, and impoſes on him no obligation, unleſs he meets with juſtice and protection from his ſovereign. Theſe advantages the ſovereign promiſes him in return; and if he fails in the execution, he has broke, on his ſide, the articles of engagement, and has thereby freed his ſubjects from all obligations to allegiance. Such, according to theſe philoſophers, is the foundation of authority in every government; and ſuch the right of reſiſtance, poſſeſt by every ſubject.

BUT would theſe reaſoners look abroad into the world, they would meet with nothing that, in the leaſt, correſponds to their ideas, or can warrant ſo refin'd and philoſophical a ſyſtem. On the contrary, we find, every where, princes, who claim their ſubjects as their property, and aſſert their independent right of ſovereignty, from conqueſt or ſucceſſion. We find alſo, every where, ſubjects, who acknowledge this right in their princes, and ſuppoſe themſelves born under obligations of obedience to a certain ſovereign, as much as under the ties of reverence and duty to certain parents. Theſe connexions are always conceiv'd to be equally independent of our conſent, in *Perſia* and *China*; in *France* and *Spain*; and even in *Holland* and *England*, wherever the doctrines abovementioned have not been carefully inculcated. Obedience or ſubjection becomes ſo

familiar,

familiar, that moſt men never make any enquiry about its origin or cauſe, more than about the principle of gravity, reſiſtance, or the moſt univerſal laws of nature. Or if curioſity ever move them; ſo ſoon as they learn, that they themſelves and their anceſtors have, for ſeveral ages, or from time immemorial, been ſubject to ſuch a government or ſuch a family; they immediately acquieſce, and acknowledge their obligation to allegiance. Were you to preach, in moſt parts of the world, that political connexions are founded altogether on voluntary conſent or a mutual promiſe, the magiſtrate would ſoon impriſon you, as ſeditious, for looſening the tyes of obedience; if your friends did not before ſhut you up, as delirious, for advancing ſuch abſurdities. 'Tis ſtrange, that an act of the mind, which every individual is ſuppos'd to have form'd, and after he came to the uſe of reaſon too, otherwiſe it cou'd have no authority; that this act, I ſay, ſhould be ſo unknown to all of them, that, over the face of the whole earth, there ſcarce remain any traces or memory of it.

But the contract, on which government is founded, is ſaid to be the *original contract*; and conſequently may be ſuppos'd too old to fall under the knowledge of the preſent generation. If the agreement, by which ſavage men firſt aſſociated and conjoin'd their force, be here meant, this is acknowledged to be real; but being ſo ancient, and being obliterated by a thouſand changes of government and princes, it cannot now be ſuppos'd to retain any authority.

authority. If we would ſay any thing to the purpoſe, we muſt aſſert, that every particular government, which is lawful, and which impoſes any duty of allegiance on the ſubject, was, at firſt, founded on conſent and a voluntary compact. But beſides that this ſuppoſes the conſent of the fathers to bind the children, even to the moſt remote generations (which republican writers will never allow) beſides this, I ſay, it is not juſtified by hiſtory or experience, in any age or country of the world.

ALMOST all the governments, which exiſt at preſent, or of which there remains any record in ſtory, have been founded originally, either on uſurpation, or conqueſt, or both, without any pretence of a fair conſent, or voluntary ſubjection of the people. When an artful and bold man is plac'd at the head of an army or faction, 'tis often eaſy for him, by employing ſometimes violence, ſometimes falſe pretences, to eſtabliſh his dominion over a people a hundred times more numerous than his partizans. He allows no ſuch open communication, that his enemies can know, with certainty, their number or forces. He gives them no leiſure to aſſemble together in a body to oppoſe him. Even all thoſe, who are the inſtruments of his uſurpation, may wiſh his fall; but their ignorance of each other's intention keeps them in awe, and is the ſole cauſe of his ſecurity. By ſuch arts as theſe many governments have been eſtabliſh'd; and this is all the *original contract*, which they have to boaſt of.

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THE face of the earth is continually changing, by the encreaſe of ſmall kingdoms into great empires, by the diſſolution of great empires into ſmaller kingdoms, by the planting of colonies, by the migration of tribes. Is there any thing diſcoverable, in all theſe events, but force and violence? Where is the mutual agreement or voluntary aſſociation ſo much talkt of?

EVEN the ſmootheſt way, by which a nation may receive a foreign maſter, by marriage or a will, is not extremely honourable for the people; but ſuppoſes them to be diſpos'd of, like a dowry or a legacy, according to the pleaſure or intereſt of their rulers.

BUT where no force interpoſes, and election takes place; what is this election ſo highly vaunted? 'Tis either the combination of a few great men, who decide for the whole, and will allow of no oppoſition: Or 'tis the fury of a rabble, that follow a ſeditious ringleader, who is not known, perhaps, to a dozen amongſt them, and who owes his advancement merely to his own impudence, or to the momentary caprice of his fellows. Are theſe diſorderly elections, which are rare too, of ſuch mighty authority, as to be the only lawful foundation of all government and allegiance?

IN reality, there is not a more terrible event, than a total diſſolution of government, which gives liberty

liberty to the multitude, and makes the determination or choice of the new eſtabliſhment depend upon a number, which nearly approaches the body of the people: For it never comes entirely to the whole body of them. Every wiſe man, then, wiſhes to ſee, at the head of a powerful and obedient army, a general, who may ſpeedily ſeize the prize, and give to the people a maſter, which they are ſo unfit to chooſe for themſelves. So little correſpondent is fact and reality to thoſe philoſophical notions.

LET not the eſtabliſhment at the *revolution*, deceive us, or make us ſo much in love with a philoſophical origin to government, as to imagine all others monſtrous and irregular. Even that event was far from correſponding to theſe refin'd ideas. 'Twas only the ſucceſſion, and that only in the regal part of the government, which was then chang'd: And 'twas only the majority of ſeven hundred, who determin'd that change for near ten millions. I doubt not, indeed, but the bulk of theſe ten millions acquieſc'd willingly in the determination: But was the matter left, in the leaſt, to their choice? Was it not juſtly ſuppos'd to be, from that moment, decided, and every man puniſh'd, who refus'd to ſubmit to the new ſovereign? How otherways could the matter have ever been brought to any iſſue or concluſion?

THE republic of *Athens* was, I believe, the moſt extenſive democracy, which we read of in hiſtory: Yet if we make the requiſite allowances for the women,

men, the ſlaves, and the ſtrangers, we ſhall find, that that eſtabliſhment was not, at firſt, made, nor any law ever voted, by a tenth part of thoſe, who were bound to pay obedience to it. Not to mention the iſlands and foreign dominions, which the *Athenians* claim'd as theirs by right of conqueſt. And as 'tis well known, that popular aſſemblies in that city were always full of licence and diſorder, notwithſtanding the forms and laws, by which they were checkt: How much more diſorderly muſt they be, where they form not the eſtabliſh'd conſtitution, but aſſemble tumultuouſly on the diſſolution of the ancient government, in order to give riſe to a new one? How chimerical muſt it be to talk of a choice in any ſuch circumſtances?

THE *Achæans*, enjoy'd the freeſt and moſt perfect democracy of all antiquity; yet they employ'd force to oblige ſome cities to enter into their league, as we learn from *Polybius* *.

Harry the IVth and *Harry* the VIIth of *England*, had really no other title to the throne but a parliamentary election; yet they never wou'd acknowledge it, for fear of weakening their authority. Strange! if the only real foundation of all authority be conſent and promiſe.

'TIS in vain to ſay, that all governments are, or ſhou'd be, at firſt, founded on popular conſent,

* Lib. 2. Cap. 38.

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as much as the neceſſity of human affairs will admit. This favours entirely my pretenſion. I maintain, that human affairs never will admit of this conſent; ſeldom of the appearance of it: But that conqueſt or uſurpation, that is, in plain terms, force, by diſſolving the ancient governments, is the origin of almoſt all the new ones; which ever were eſtabliſh'd in the world. And that in the few caſes, where conſent may ſeem to have taken place, it was commonly ſo irregular, ſo confin'd, or ſo much intermix'd either with fraud or violence, that it cannot have any great authority.

MY intention here is not to exclude the conſent of the people from being one juſt foundation of government where it has place. It is ſurely the beſt and moſt ſacred of any. I only pretend, that it has very ſeldom had place in any degree, and never almoſt, in its full extent. And that therefore ſome other foundation of government muſt alſo be admitted.

WERE all men poſſeſt of ſo inflexible a regard to juſtice, that, of themſelves, they would totally abſtain from the properties of others; they had for ever remain'd in a ſtate of abſolute liberty, without ſubjection to any magiſtrates or political ſociety: But this is a ſtate of perfection, of which human nature is juſtly eſteem'd incapable. Again; were all men poſſeſt of ſo perfect an underſtanding as always to know their own intereſt, no form of government had ever been ſubmitted to, but what was eſtabliſh'd on conſent, and was fully canvaſt by each member of

of the ſociety: But this ſtate of perfection is likewiſe much ſuperior to human nature. Reaſon, hiſtory and experience ſhow us, that all political ſocieties have had an origin much leſs accurate and regular; and were one to chooſe a period of time, when the people's conſent was leaſt regarded in public tranſactions, it would be preciſely on the eſtabliſhment of a new government. In a ſettled conſtitution, their inclinations are often ſtudy'd; but during the fury of revolutions, conqueſts, and public convulſions, military force or political craft commonly decides the controverſy.

When a new government is eſtabliſh'd, by whatever arts, the people are commonly diſſatisfy'd with it, and pay obedience more from fear and neceſſity, than from any idea of allegiance or of moral obligation. The prince is watchful and jealous, and muſt carefully guard againſt every beginning or appearance of inſurrection. Time, by degrees, removes all theſe difficulties, and accuſtoms the nation to regard, as their lawful or native princes, that family, whom, at firſt, they conſidered as uſurpers or foreign conquerors. In order to found this opinion, they have no recourſe to any notion of voluntary conſent or promiſe, which, they know, never was, in this caſe, either expected or demanded. The original eſtabliſhment was form'd by violence, and ſubmitted to from neceſſity. The ſubſequent adminiſtration is alſo ſupported by power, and acquieſc'd in by the people, not as a matter of choice, but of obligation.

tion. They imagine not, that their conſent gives their prince a title: But they willingly conſent, becauſe they think, that, from long poſſeſſion, he has acquir'd a title, independent of their choice or inclination.

SHOULD it be ſaid, that by living under the dominion of a prince, which one might leave, every individual has given a *tacit* conſent to his authority, and promis'd him obedience; it may be anſwer'd, That ſuch imply'd conſent can only take place, where a man imagines, that the matter depends on his choice. But where he thinks (as all mankind do who are born under eſtabliſh'd governments) that by his birth he owes allegiance to a certain prince or certain government; it would be abſurd to infer a conſent or choice, which he expreſly, in this caſe, renounces and abjures.

CAN we ſeriouſly ſay, that a poor peaſant or artizan has a free choice to leave his own country, when he knows no foreign language or manners, and lives from day to day, by the ſmall wages which he acquires? We may as well aſſert, that a man, by remaining in a veſſel, freely conſents to the dominion of the maſter; tho' he was carry'd on board while aſleep, and muſt leap into the ocean, and periſh, the moment he leaves her.

WHAT if the prince forbid his ſubjects to leave his dominions; as in *Tiberius*'s time, 'twas regarded as a crime in a *Roman* knight that he had attempted

to fly to the *Parthians*, in order to escape the tyranny of that emperor * ? Or as the ancient *Muscovites* prohibited all travelling under pain of death ? And did a prince observe, that many of his subjects were seis'd with the frenzy of transporting themselves to foreign nations, he would doubtless, with great reason and justice, restrain them, in order to prevent the depopulation of his own country. Would he forfeit the allegiance of all his subjects, by so wise and reasonable a law ? Yet the freedom of their choice is surely, in that case, ravish'd from them.

A COMPANY of men, who should leave their native country, in order to people some uninhabited region, might dream of recovering their native freedom ; but they would soon find, that their prince still laid claim to them, and call'd them his subjects, even in their new settlement. And in this he would but act conformably to the common ideas of mankind.

THE truest *tacit* consent of this kind, which is ever observ'd, is when a foreigner settles in any country, and is beforehand acquainted with the prince, and government, and laws, to which he must submit : Yet is his allegiance, tho' more voluntary, much less expected or depended on, than that of a natural born subject. On the contrary, his native prince still asserts a right to him. And if he punishes not the renegade, when he seizes him in

* *Tacit.* Ann. 6. Cap. 14.

war

war with his new prince's commiſſion; this clemency is not founded on the municipal law, which in all countries condemns the priſoner; but on the conſent of princes, who have agreed to this indulgence, in order to prevent repriſals.

SUPPOSE an uſurper, after having baniſh'd his lawful prince and royal family, ſhould eſtabliſh his dominion for ten or a dozen years in any country, and ſhould preſerve ſuch exact diſcipline in his troops, and ſo regular a diſpoſition in his gariſons, that no inſurrection had ever been rais'd, or even murmur heard, againſt his adminiſtration: Can it be aſſerted, that the people, who in their hearts abhor his treaſon, have tacitly conſented to his authority, and promis'd him allegiance, merely becauſe, from neceſſity, they live under his dominion? Suppoſe again their natural prince reſtor'd, by means of an army, which he aſſembles in foreign countries: They receive him with joy and exultation, and ſhew plainly with what reluctance they had ſubmitted to any other yoke. I may now aſk, upon what foundation the prince's title ſtands? Not on popular conſent ſurely: For tho' the people willingly acquieſce in his authority, they never imagine, that their conſent makes him ſovereign. They conſent; becauſe they apprehend him to be already, by birth, their lawful ſovereign. And as to that tacit conſent, which may now be infer'd from their living under his dominion, this is no more than what they formerly gave to the tyrant and uſurper.

When we assert, that all lawful government arises from the people, we certainly do them a great deal more honour than they deserve, or even expect and desire from us. After the *Roman* dominions became too unweildy for the republic to govern, the people, over the whole known world, were extremely grateful to *Augustus* for that authority, which, by violence, he establish'd over them; and they shew'd an equal disposition to submit to the successor, whom he left them, by his last will and testament. It was afterwards their misfortune, that there never was, in one family, any long regular succession; but that their line of princes was continually broke, either by private assassinations or public rebellions. The *prætorian* bands, on the failure of every family, set up one emperor; the legions in the *East* a second; those in *Germany*, perhaps, a third: And the sword alone could decide the controversy. The condition of the people, in that mighty monarchy, was to be lamented, not because the choice of the emperor was never left to them; for that was impracticable: But because they never fell under any succession of masters, who might regularly follow each other. As to the violence and wars and bloodshed, occasion'd by every new settlement; those were not blameable, because they were inevitable.

The house of *Lancaster* rul'd in this island about sixty years; yet the partizans of the white rose seem'd daily to multiply in *England*. The present establishment has taken place near the same time.

Have all views of right in another family been utterly extinguiſh'd; even tho' few men now alive had arriv'd at years of diſcretion, when it was expell'd, or could have conſented to its dominion, or have promis'd it allegiance? A ſufficient indication ſurely of the general ſentiment of mankind on this head. For we blame not the partizans of the abdicated family, merely on account of the long time, during which they have preſerv'd their imaginary fidelity. We blame them for adhering to a family, which, we affirm, has been juſtly expell'd, and which, from the moment the new ſettlement took place, had forfeited all title to authority.

BUT would we have a more regular, at leaſt, a more philoſophical refutation of this principle of an original contract or popular conſent; perhaps, the following obſervations may ſuffice.

ALL *moral* duties may be divided into two kinds. The *firſt* are thoſe, to which men are impell'd by a natural inſtinct or immediate propenſity, which operates in them, independent of all ideas of obligation, and of all views either to public or private utility. Of this nature are, love of children, gratitude to benefactors, pity to the unfortunate. When we reflect on the advantage, which reſults to ſociety from ſuch humane inſtincts, we pay them the juſt tribute of moral approbation and eſteem: But the perſon, actuated by them, feels their power and influence, antecedent to any ſuch reflection.

THE *second* kind of moral duties are ſuch as are not ſupported by any original inſtinct of nature, but are perform'd entirely from a ſenſe of obligation, when we conſider the neceſſities of human ſociety, and the impoſſibility of ſupporting it, if theſe duties were neglected. 'Tis thus *juſtice* or a regard to the property of others, *fidelity* or the obſervance of promiſes, become obligatory, and acquire an authority over mankind. For as 'tis evident, that every man loves himſelf better than any other perſon, he is naturally impell'd to extend his acquiſitions as much as poſſible; and nothing can reſtrain him in this propenſity, but reflection and experience, by which he learns the pernicious effects of that licence, and the total diſſolution of ſociety, which muſt enſue from it. His original inclination, therefore, or inſtinct, is here check'd and reſtrain'd by a ſubſequent judgment or obſervation.

THE caſe is preciſely the ſame with the political or civil duty of *allegiance*, as with the natural duties of juſtice and fidelity. Our primary inſtincts lead us, either to indulge ourſelves in unlimited liberty, or to ſeek dominion over others: And 'tis reflection only, which engages us to ſacrifice ſuch ſtrong paſſions to the intereſts of peace and order. A very ſmall degree of experience and obſervation ſuffices to teach us, that ſociety cannot poſſibly be maintain'd without the authority of magiſtrates, and that this authority muſt ſoon fall into contempt, where exact obedience is not pay'd to it. The obſervation

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of theſe general and obvious intereſts is the ſource of all allegiance, and of that moral obligation, which we attribute to it.

WHAT neceſſity, therefore, is there to found the duty of *allegiance* or obedience to magiſtrates on that of *fidelity* or a regard to promiſes, and to ſuppoſe, that 'tis the conſent of each individual, which ſubjects him to government; when it appears, that both allegiance and fidelity ſtand preciſely on the ſame foundation, and are both ſubmitted to by mankind, on account of the apparent intereſts and neceſſities of human ſociety? We are bound to obey our ſovereign, 'tis ſaid; becauſe we have given a tacit promiſe to that purpoſe. But why are we bound to obſerve our promiſe? It muſt here be aſſerted, that the commerce and intercourſe of mankind, which are of ſuch infinite advantage, can have no ſecurity, where men pay no regard to their engagements. In like manner, may it be ſaid, that men could not live at all in ſociety, at leaſt in a civiliz'd ſociety, without laws and magiſtrates and judges, to prevent the encroachments of the ſtrong upon the weak, of the violent upon the juſt and equitable. The obligation to allegiance, being of like force and authority with the obligation to fidelity, we gain nothing by reſolving the one into the other. The general intereſts or neceſſities of ſociety are ſufficient to eſtabliſh both.

IF the reaſon is aſkt of that obedience, which we are bound to pay to government, I readily an-

ſwer: *becauſe ſociety cou'd not otherwiſe ſubſiſt:* And this anſwer is clear and intelligible to all mankind. Your anſwer is, *becauſe we ſhou'd keep our word.* But beſides, that no body, 'till train'd in a philoſophical ſyſtem, can either comprehend or reliſh this anſwer: Beſides this, I ſay, you find yourſelf embarraſs'd, when 'tis aſk'd you, *why we are bound to keep our word?* And you can give no other anſwer, but what would, immediately, without any circuit, have accounted for our obligation to allegiance.

But *to whom is allegiance due? And who are our lawful ſovereigns?* This queſtion is often the moſt difficult of any, and liable to infinite diſcuſſions. When people are ſo happy, that they can anſwer, *Our preſent ſovereign, who inherits, in a direct line, from anceſtors, that have govern'd us for many ages*; this anſwer admits of no reply; even tho' hiſtorians, in tracing up to the remoteſt antiquity the origin of that royal family, may find, as commonly happens, that its firſt authority was deriv'd from uſurpation and violence. 'Tis confeſt, that private juſtice or the abſtinence from the properties of others, is a moſt cardinal virtue: Yet reaſon tells us, that there is no property in durable objects, ſuch as lands or houſes, when carefully examin'd in paſſing from hand to hand, but muſt, in ſome period, have been founded on fraud and injuſtice. The neceſſities of human ſociety, neither in private nor publick life, will allow of ſuch an accurate enquiry: And there is no virtue or moral duty, but what may, with facility, be refin'd away, if we indulge a falſe philo-

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phy, in ſifting and ſcrutinizing it, by every captious rule of logic, in every light or poſition, in which it may be plac'd.

THE queſtions with regard to private property have fill'd infinite volumes of law and philoſophy, if in both we add the commentators to the original text; and in the end, we may ſafely pronounce, that many of the rules, there eſtabliſh'd, are uncertain, ambiguous, and arbitrary. The like opinion may be form'd with regard to the ſucceſſions and rights of princes and forms of government. Many caſes, no doubt, occur, eſpecially in the infancy of any government, which admit of no determination from the laws of juſtice and equity: And our hiſtorian, *Rapin*, allows, that the controverſy betwixt *Edward* the third and *Philip de Valois* was of this nature, and cou'd be decided only by an appeal to heaven, that is, by war and violence.

WHO ſhall tell me, whether *Germanicus* or *Druſus* ought to have ſucceeded *Tiberius*, had he dy'd, while they were both alive, without naming any of them for his ſucceſſor? Ought the right of adoption to be receiv'd as equivalent to that of blood, in a nation, where it had the ſame effect in private families, and had already, in two inſtances, taken place in the public? Ought *Germanicus* to be eſteem'd the eldeſt ſon, becauſe he was born before *Druſus*; or the younger, becauſe he was adopted after the birth of his brother? Ought the right of the elder to be regarded in a nation, where the eldeſt brother had no

advantage in the ſucceſſion of private families? Ought the *Roman* empire, at that time, to be eſteem'd hereditary, becauſe of two examples; or ought it, even ſo early, to be regarded as belonging to the ſtronger or the preſent poſſeſſor, as being founded on ſo recent an uſurpation?

COMMODUS ſucceeded to a pretty long ſucceſſion of excellent emperors, who had acquir'd their title not by birth, or public election, but by the fictitious rite of adoption. That bloody debauchee being murder'd by a conſpiracy ſuddenly form'd betwixt his wench and her gallant, who happen'd at that time to be *Prætorian Præfect*, or to have the command of the guards; theſe immediately deliberated about chooſing a maſter to human kind, to ſpeak in the ſtyle of thoſe ages; and caſt their eyes on *Pertinax*. Before the tyrant's death was known, the *Præfect* went ſecretly to that ſenator, who, on the appearance of the ſoldiers, imagin'd his execution had been order'd by *Commodus*. He was immediately ſaluted emperor by the officer and his attendants; chearfully proclaim'd by the rabble; unwillingly ſubmitted to by the guards; formally recogniz'd by the ſenate; and paſſively receiv'd by the provinces and armies of the empire.

The diſcontent of the *Prætorian* bands ſoon broke out in a ſudden ſedition, which occaſion'd the murther of that excellent prince: And the world being now without a maſter and without government, the guards thought proper to ſet the empire formally to

ſale.

ſale. *Julian*, the purchaſer, was proclaim'd by the ſoldiers, recogniz'd by the ſenate, and ſubmitted to by the people, and muſt alſo have been ſubmitted to by the provinces, had not the envy of the legions begot oppoſition and reſiſtance. *Peſcennius Niger* in *Syria* elected himſelf emperor, gain'd the tumultuary conſent of his army, and was attended with the ſecret goodwill of the ſenate and people of *Rome*. *Albinus* in *Britain* found an equal right to ſet up his claim; but *Severus*, who govern'd *Pannonia*, prevail'd in the end above both of them. That able politician and warrior, finding his own birth and dignity too much inferior to the imperial crown, profeſt at firſt an intention only of revenging the death of *Pertinax*. He march'd as general into *Italy*, defeated *Julian*; and without our being able to fix any preciſe commencement even of the ſoldiers conſent, he was from neceſſity acknowledg'd emperor by the ſenate and people; and fully eſtabliſh'd in his violent authority by the ſubduing *Niger* and *Albinus* *.

Inter hæc Gordianus Cæſar (ſays *Capitolinus*, ſpeaking of another period) *ſublatus a militibus*, Imperator *eſt appellatus, quia non erat alius in præſenti*. 'Tis to be remark'd that *Gordian* was a boy of fourteen years of age.

FREQUENT inſtances of a like nature occur in the hiſtory of the emperors; in that of *Alexander*'s ſucceſſors; and of many other countries: Nor can any

* *Herodian*, Lib. 2.

thing

thing be more unhappy than a despotic government of that kind; where the succession is disjointed and irregular, and must be determin'd, on every occasion, by force or election. In a free government, the matter is often unavoidable, and is also much less dangerous. The interests of liberty must there frequently lead the people, in their own defence, to alter the succession of the crown. And the constitution, being compounded of parts, may still maintain a sufficient stability, by resting on the aristocratical or democratical members, tho' the monarchical be alter'd, from time to time, in order to accommodate it to the former.

In an absolute government, when there is no legal prince, who has a title to a throne, it may safely be determin'd to belong to the first occupier. Instances of this kind are but too frequent, especially in the eastern monarchies. When any race of princes expires, the will or destination of the last sovereign will be regarded as a title. Thus the edict of *Lewis* the XIVth, who call'd the bastard prince to the succession, in case of the failure of all the legitimate princes, wou'd, in such an event, have some authority *. The cession of the ancient proprietor, especially

* 'Tis remarkable, that in the remonstrance of the duke of *Bourbon* and the legitimate princes, against this destination of *Louis* the XIVth, the doctrine of the *original contract* is insisted on, even in that absolute government. The *French* nation, say they, choosing *Hugh Capet* and his posterity to rule over them and their posterity, where the former line fails, there is a tacit right reserv'd to choose a new royal family; and this right is invaded by calling the bastard princes

cially when join'd to conquest, is likewise esteem'd a very good title. The general bond or obligation, which binds us to government, is the interest and necessities of society; and this obligation is very strong. The determination of it to this or that particular prince or form of government is frequently more uncertain and dubious. Present possession has considerable authority in these cases, and greater than in private property; because of the disorders, which attend all revolutions and changes of government †.

WE shall only observe, before we conclude, that tho' an appeal to general opinion may justly, in the speculative sciences of metaphysics, natural philosophy, or astronomy, be esteem'd unfair and inconclusive, yet in all questions with regard to morals, as well as criticism, there is really no other standard,

princes to the throne, without the consent of the nation. But the *Comte de Boulainvilliers*, who wrote in defence of the bastard princes, ridicules this notion of an original contract, especially when apply'd to *Hugh Capet*; who mounted the throne, says he, by the same arts, which have ever been employ'd by all conquerors and usurpers. He got his title, indeed, recogniz'd by the states after he had put himself in possession: But is this a choice or contract? The *Comte de Boulainvilliers*, we may observe, was a noted republican; but being a man of learning, and very conversant in history, he knew the people were never almost consulted in these revolutions and new establishments, and that time alone bestow'd right and authority on what was commonly at first founded on force and violence. See *Etat de la France*. Vol. III.

† The crime of rebellion, amongst the ancients was commonly markt by the terms νεωτερίζειν, *novas res moliri*.

by

by which any controversy can ever be decided. And nothing is a clearer proof, that a theory of this kind is erroneous, than to find, that it leads to paradoxes, which are repugnant to the common sentiments of mankind, and to the practice and opinion of all nations and all ages. The doctrine, which founds all lawful government on an *original contract*, or consent of the people, is plainly of this kind; nor has the ablest of its partizans, in prosecution of it, scrupled to affirm, *that absolute monarchy is inconsistent with civil society, and so can be no form of civil government at all* *; and *that the supreme power in a state cannot take from any man by taxes and impositions, any part of his property, without his own consent or that of his representatives* †. What authority any moral reasoning can have, which leads into opinions, so wide of the general practice of mankind, in every place but this single kingdom, 'tis easy to determine ‡.

* See Locke on government, Chap. 7. §. 90.

† Id. Chap. 11. §. 138, 139, 140.

‡ The only passage I meet with in antiquity, where the obligation of obedience to government is ascrib'd to a promise is in Plato *in Critone*; where *Socrates* refuses to escape from prison, because he had tacitly promis'd to obey the laws. Thus he builds a tory consequence of passive obedience, on a whig foundation of the original contract.

New discoveries are not to be expected in these matters. If no man, till very lately, ever imagin'd that government was founded on contract, 'tis certain it cannot, in general, have any such foundation.

ESSAY

ESSAY XXVI.

Of PASSIVE OBEDIENCE.

IN the former eſſay, we endeavour'd to refute the *ſpeculative* ſyſtems of politics, advanc'd in this nation; as well the religious ſyſtem of the one party, as the philoſophical of the other. We come now to examine the *practical* conſequences, deduc'd by each party, with regard to the meaſures of ſubmiſſion, due to ſovereigns.

As the obligation to juſtice is founded intirely on the intereſts of ſociety, which require mutual abſtinence from property, in order to preſerve peace amongſt mankind; 'tis evident, that, when the execution of juſtice would be attended with very pernicious conſequences, that virtue muſt be ſuſpended, and give place to public utility, in ſuch extraordinary and ſuch preſſing emergencies. The maxim, *fiat Juſtitia & ruat Cœlum*, let juſtice be perform'd, tho' the univerſe be deſtroy'd, is apparently falſe, and by ſacrificing the end to the means, ſhews a prepoſterous idea of the ſubordination of duties. What governor of a town makes any ſcruple of burning the ſuburbs, when they facilitate the advances of the enemy?

enemy? Or what general abſtains from plundering a neutral country, when the neceſſities of war require it, and he cannot otherwiſe maintain his army? The caſe is the ſame with the duty of obedience to magiſtrates; and common ſenſe teaches us, that as government obliges to obedience only on account of its tendency to public utility, it muſt always, in extraordinary caſes, when public ruin would evidently attend obedience, yield to the primary and original obligation. *Salus populi ſuprema Lex*, the ſafety of the people is the ſupreme law. This maxim is agreeable to the ſentiments of mankind in all ages: Nor is any one, when he reads of the inſurrections againſt a *Nero*, or a *Philip*, ſo infatuated with party-ſyſtems, as not to wiſh ſucceſs to the enterprize, and praiſe the undertakers. Even our high monarchical party, in ſpite of their ſublime theory, are forc'd, in ſuch caſes, to judge, and feel, and approve, in conformity to the reſt of mankind.

Resistance, therefore, being admitted in extraordinary emergencies, the queſtion can only be, amongſt good reaſoners, with regard to the degree of neceſſity, which can juſtify reſiſtance, and render it lawful or commendable. And here I muſt confeſs, that I ſhall always incline to *their* ſide, who draw the bond of allegiance the cloſeſt poſſible, and conſider an infringement of it, as the laſt refuge, in deſperate caſes, when the public is in the higheſt danger, from a cruel and abandon'd tyranny. For beſides the miſchiefs of a civil war, which commonly attends inſurrection; 'tis certain, that where a diſpoſition to rebellion

rebellion appears amongſt any people, it is one chief cauſe of tyranny in the rulers, and forces them into many violent meaſures, which they never would have embrac'd, had every one ſeem'd inclin'd to ſubmiſſion and obedience. 'Tis thus the *tyrannicide* or aſſaſſination, approv'd of by ancient maxims, inſtead of keeping tyrants and uſurpers in awe, made them ten times more fierce and unrelenting; and is now juſtly, upon that account, aboliſh'd by the laws of nations, and univerſally condemn'd as a baſe and treacherous method of bringing to juſtice theſe diſturbers of ſociety.

Besides; we muſt conſider, that as obedience is our duty in the common courſe of things, it ought chiefly to be inculcated; nor can any thing be more prepoſterous than an anxious care and ſollicitude in ſtating all the caſes, in which reſiſtance may be allow'd. Thus, tho' a philoſopher reaſonably acknowledges, in the courſe of an argument, that the rules of juſtice may be diſpens'd with in caſes of urgent neceſſity; what ſhould we think of a preacher or caſuiſt, who ſhould make it his chief ſtudy to find out ſuch caſes, and enforce them with all the vehemence of argument and eloquence? Would he not be better employ'd in inculcating the general doctrine, than in diſplaying the particular exceptions, which we are, perhaps, but too much inclin'd, of ourſelves, to embrace, and to extend?

There are, however, two reaſons, which may be pleaded in defence of that party amongſt us, who

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have, with ſo much induſtry, propagated the maxims of reſiſtance; maxims, which, it muſt be confeſt, are, in general, ſo pernicious, and ſo deſtructive of civil ſociety. The *firſt* is, that their antagoniſts carrying the doctrine of obedience to ſuch an extravagant height, as not only never to mention the exceptions in extraordinary caſes (which might, perhaps, be excuſable) but even poſitively to exclude them; it became neceſſary to inſiſt on theſe exceptions, and defend the rights of injur'd truth and liberty. The *ſecond*, and, perhaps, better reaſon, is founded on the nature of the *Britiſh* conſtitution and form of government.

'Tis almoſt peculiar to our conſtitution to eſtabliſh a firſt magiſtrate with ſuch high pre-eminence and dignity, that, tho' limited by the laws, he is, in a manner, ſo far as regards his own perſon, above the laws, and can neither be queſtion'd nor puniſh'd for any injury or wrong, which may be committed by him. His miniſters alone, or thoſe who act by his commiſſion, are obnoxious to juſtice; and while the prince is thus allur'd, by the proſpect of perſonal ſafety, to give the laws their free courſe, an equal ſecurity is, in effect, obtain'd, by the puniſhment of leſſer offenders, and at the ſame time a civil war is avoided, which would be the infallible conſequence, were an attack, at every turn, made directly upon the ſovereign. But tho' the conſtitution pays this ſalutary compliment to the prince, it can never reaſonably be underſtood, by that maxim, to have determin'd its own deſtruction, or to have eſtabliſh'd a tame

a tame ſubmiſſion, where he protects his miniſters, perſeveres in his injuſtice, and uſurps the whole power of the commonwealth. This caſe, indeed, is never expreſsly put by the laws; becauſe it is impoſſible for them, in their ordinary courſe, to provide a remedy for it, or eſtabliſh any magiſtrate, with ſuperior authority, to chaſtiſe the exorbitancies of the prince. But as a right without a remedy would be the greateſt of all abſurdities; the remedy, in this caſe, is the extraordinary one of reſiſtance, when affairs come to that extremity, that the conſtitution can be defended by it alone. Reſiſtance, therefore, muſt, of courſe, become more frequent in the *Britiſh* government, than in others, which are ſimpler, and conſiſt of fewer parts and movements. Where the king is an abſolute ſovereign, he has little temptation to commit ſuch enormous tyranny as may juſtly provoke rebellion: But where he is limited, his imprudent ambition, without any great vices, may run him into that perillous ſituation. This was evidently the caſe with *Charles* the Firſt; and if we may now ſpeak truth, after animoſities are laid, this was alſo the caſe with *James* the ſecond. Theſe were harmleſs, if not, in their private character, good men; but miſtaking the nature of our conſtitution, and engroſſing the whole legiſlative power, it became neceſſary to oppoſe them with ſome vehemence; and even to deprive the latter formally of that authority, which he had us'd with ſuch imprudence and indiſcretion.

FINIS.